


# ***JPRS Report—***

# **Soviet Union**

## ***Military Affairs***

19980112 184



# Soviet Union Military Affairs

JPRS-UMA-91-019

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17 July 1991

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[ERRATUM: In JPRS-UMA-91-015 of 21 June 1991 the figure on page 16, 2nd column, 2nd paragraph should read 13,826 instead of 18,826.]

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**Marshal Kozhedub's Concern For Army's Role In Society**

91UM0647B Moscow RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA  
in Russian 9 May 91 p 2

[Article by Marshal of Aviation Ivan Kozhedub, USSR People's Deputy and Thrice Hero of the Soviet Union: "I've Never Trusted 'Turncoats'"]

[Text] The four war years were a grave test for our people. There were millions of dead and wounded, hundreds of destroyed cities, thousands of burned-out villages. That is the price we had to pay for our freedom and independence.

Hitler declared that the basic objective of the war against the USSR was to deprive the eastern peoples of any form of state organization whatsoever and, in accordance with this, to keep them at the lowest possible cultural level. Our people, consequently, not only triumphed over fascism, but also defended our statehood, ensured the integrity of our country, saved our culture, language, and traditions, and did not allow themselves to be thrown back into an era of slavery and colonial oppression.

The Hitlerites had counted on dividing the peoples of Russia. Their hopes were shattered. The Russians and Ukrainians, the Belorussians and Kazakhs, the Georgians and Lithuanians, the Kalmyks and Tatars, and members of our country's other peoples, fighting shoulder to shoulder, defended their motherland. But what has happened to us today? Why has ethnic strife flared up in our country with such destructive force?

We already have the answers to these questions. The political and moral position of those politicians who oppose the union has become utterly clear. They are fighting above all against those who triumphed over fascism. Monuments to Soviet military leaders are being torn down, streets bearing the names of heroes are being renamed, and the blasphemous rehabilitation is under way of the enemy's collaborators—Bandera's men, the "forest brothers," the Vlasovites. The ambitious leaders who have taken on the role of grave-diggers of our great power know full well just who is preventing them from leading the people down the path of national isolation.

My conscience obliges me to say in no uncertain terms that the policy of national isolation, despite the seductive promises of its proponents, has no future. It will inevitably lead to the breakup of not only the Union but also multiethnic Russia, which for centuries was strong by virtue of its cohesion. People, don't allow yourselves to be deceived, think about not only the present but also the future. What will be left for our children and grandchildren? What they need is not a country fragmented and torn by strife, but a monolithic and powerful country capable of overcoming all life's adversities and ensuring peace and economic and environmental well-being.

As a military man, I am concerned about the state of the Armed Forces and their standing in society. At the third

Congress of USSR People's Deputies, I already had an opportunity to say that the antiarmy campaign that is being purposefully waged by certain publications has nothing good in store. Its results are already apparent. The prestige of military service has declined precipitously. According to sociological studies, every third young man who is conscripted says his parents don't want him to serve in the army. Draft evasion and desertion have become widespread.

I find it difficult to understand and justify the actions of a national leadership that is trying to shift police functions to the Armed Forces. These actions, some of them in no way justified, are undermining the authority of military personnel.

Discriminatory measures by local authorities with respect to servicemen have become widespread in recent years. In many regions of the country, the situation with regard to apartments for officers and warrant officers has become aggravated. They can't secure residency permits, find jobs for their wives, enroll their children in school and kindergarten. It's difficult for them to obtain ration cards for food and manufactured goods. All these things are forcing even young officers to consider discharge into the reserve. It has become especially hard to serve in those republics where the army is viewed as foreign and Soviet soldiers are openly referred to as occupation forces.

It has been said that a people who are unwilling to feed their own army will feed someone else's. We're not the ones who said it, but these words serve as a stern warning for us. I am not a "hawk" and not a militarist; I'm simply a man who got a good taste of what it's like to be at the front. A sense of duty to the memory of those who paid for negligence and complacency with their lives forces me to recall this.

Who is attacking the Soviet Army today? Who is skillfully molding its soldiers and officers into new "enemies of the people"? Look, good people, into the faces of the attackers and you will see "turncoats."

I have never trusted "turncoats." Yesterday they praised the party without restraint, and today they demand that it be put on trial. Just who do they intend to try? The political instructor or commissar who was the first to lead the attack with the cry "communists, forward!"? The fallen soldier whose party card was pierced by a fascist bullet? The communist pilot who rammed an enemy plane to prevent it from dropping bombs on civilians?

I believe in the collective reason of our people, and I know that everything that is alien and bound up with ambition and civil strife will be rejected. The sacred ideas of unity of peoples and state integrity will prevail over a policy of national egoism. But this won't happen by itself. Elbow to elbow, wing to wing—only in this way, together, can we endure and triumph. Just like in the war whose memory will remain with our people forever.

**Central Committee Secretariat To Veterans Council**

*91UM0647C Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 11 May 91  
First Edition p 1*

[“To the All-Union Council of War, Labor, and USSR Armed Forces Veterans”]

[Text] Dear veterans!

Today the Soviet people and all people of goodwill are marking the 46th anniversary of the Soviet People's Victory in the Great Patriotic War, which was a grave test for our multinational Motherland.

The storm of that war, the bloodiest in the world's history, raged for 1,418 days. And every one of those days was a page in the tragic and heroic chronicle of Soviet people's feat at the front and in the rear and of their bravery and steadfastness.

The moral and political unity of all the USSR's peoples, who waged a mortal struggle to defeat fascism and protect the socialist Fatherland, was demonstrated during the years of those most severe trials with special force.

The Soviet Army, child of the people, steadfastly endured the setbacks of the first battles against the aggressor, held fast, defeated Hitlerism, and victoriously concluded the war.

The entire country responded to the Motherland's call. On the fronts of the Great Patriotic War, in the ocean depths, in air battles, and in the partisans' forests, our countrymen gave for the cause of victory the most cherished thing that a man has—his life. Among them were millions and millions of Communists and Young Communists. Glory to the heroes who fell for the Motherland's freedom and the happiness of future generations! Let them live forever in our memory!

“All for the front, all for victory.” That was not just a slogan. It was the moral cornerstone of people's thoughts and labor exploits. In the cities, villages, stanitsas, kishlaks, and auls, in the plants and factories, and in transport, construction, and agriculture, the rear-service workers of the war generation, overcoming hunger, deprivation, and the pain of losing loved ones, gave their labor, personal savings, and the warmth of their hearts to victory.

Glory to the rear-service workers who ensured our victory over the enemy!

The Soviet people's victory in the Great Patriotic War not only upheld the freedom and independence of the Motherland, but also brought liberation from enslavement to the people's of Europe. The defeat of fascism through the combined efforts of the countries of the anti-Hitler coalition and the victorious conclusion of

World War II became an event of world historic significance that opened before a redeemed humanity the path of progress and the prospect of a just and lasting peace on the planet.

Our respect for war, labor, and Armed Forces veterans is boundless. To you, dear comrades, the country owes its victory, and it remembers with gratitude the things your generation did in the name of the Motherland.

Dear war, labor and Armed Forces veterans!

Your lives are a model of selfless devotion to the Fatherland and an example of patriotism and internationalism. In the battles for the Motherland and in your everyday labor, you hardly stopped to think about your comrade's nationality. The most important measure of relations was always reliability, mutual aid, and a feeling of love for your socialist Motherland.

We appeal to you: Pass on these sacred feelings of fraternity and friendship to new generations. Use all your authority to eliminate ethnic hostility, promote the achievement of civil accord. We will preserve for your children the Fatherland that you defended and to which you have devoted your entire lives.

Dear war, labor, and USSR Armed Forces veterans!

Please accept our sincere congratulations on this Victory holiday!

We wish you good health and happiness, prosperity to your families, and peace on this planet!—The CPSU Central Committee Secretariat.

**Clergyman On Concern For Servicemen's Needs**

*91UM0647A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 14 May 91 First Edition p 1*

[Interview With Metropolitan Pitirim: “Invitation To Discussion: Religion, Morality, And The Army”]

[Text] Metropolitan Pitirim of Volokolamsk and Yuryevskiy (in secular society, Konstantin Vladimirovich Nechayev) is well known in our country and abroad. He is a professor and doctor of theology. He serves as a USSR People's Deputy and is a member of the USSR Supreme Soviet Committee on Internationalist Soldiers Affairs.

In an interview, he observed:

“Indeed, I was one of the first, in the year of the millennium of Christianity in Russia, to say that it is the task of the Russian church to show concern for Afghan war veterans. Not all of my colleagues supported me. But the former soldiers themselves responded with gratitude. Representatives of the country's leadership, the USSR Ministry of Defense, and the public declared their support. The idea arose of setting up a rehabilitation service and center in Moscow Oblast. I would like to see the

hospital be located in clean natural surroundings. It should have the very latest equipment and the best doctors.

"But that's not all. You have heard that the army is now being reduced and that many officers and their families don't know what is to become of them. And there are 500,000 such people, maybe even more! They have plenty of experience in life, but in most cases they lack civilian professions. Let us also recall the Russian refugees who are leaving areas where they have lived for a very long time. And there are so many people who have spent long years working in the North and now dream of moving to central Russia. Why not enlist all those who are willing in agricultural work, why not give them land and money to set up personal auxiliary farming operations and to build houses? We're also going to help these people..."

**On May 14, Metropolitan Pitirim will answer questions from readers on the feedback telephone line.**

**We await your calls from 10:00 to 12:00, Moscow time. Telephone: 941-24-40.**

#### All-Army Conference on Ideology Held

*91UM0760B Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA  
in Russian 11 Jun 91 First edition p 1*

[Article by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA Correspondent Colonel G. Barnev, under the rubric: "From Moscow": "At the Initiative of the All-Army Partkom"]

[Text] We all know what difficulties the country and the CPSU are experiencing. The Party's prestige is declining, faith in the correctness of the socialist choice made in October 1917 is being diligently eroded in society, and certain forces are discrediting Marxist-Leninist teaching. Under these conditions as never before, the role of theoretical thought is increasing and this could help to correctly assess the essence of the socio-economic and political processes that are occurring in the country and to rid ourselves of dogmatism in our views on socialism and various types of illusions and deformations of most recent times.

A theoretical discussion conducted by the All-Army Partkom and in which CPSU Central Committee representatives, military scholars, social science teachers from a number of military academies, and practical party workers participated, was dedicated to discussing the contemporary state of Party ideological work and its ability to not lose its historical perspective and to express the fundamental interests of the people's masses. CPSU Central Committee Member, All-Army Partkom Secretary, Lieutenant-General M.S. Surkov conducted the discussion.

The participants were particularly interested in the following issues which were examined during the course of the discussion: the CPSU's role in the reorganization of the political system, a scientific assessment of what is

relevant in the theory and practice of Marxism-Leninism for CPSU activities and what is obsolete and has not withstood the test of time, and what the novelty is in the modern reading of the ideological-theoretical heritage of the classics of Marxism-Leninism and others.

Discussion materials will be useful for the All-Army Partkom in working out positions on CPSU program provisions and in arming army and navy communists with the contemporary understanding of the processes that are occurring in the country and in the Party.

#### Tyumen Afghan Vets' Self-Sufficiency Praised

*91UM0760A Moscow TRUD in Russian 15 Jun 91 p 1*

[Article by V. Pavlenko, Tyumen: "They Are not Begging—They Are Earning Money"]

[Text] How many times have we had the opportunity to read that state enterprises, entrepreneurs, trade unions, or individual citizens are contributing resources to assist Afghan veterans, their societies, and clubs.

But here is a diametrically opposite event: The Union of Veterans of Afghanistan Tyumen Territorial Branch sent the Kalininskiy Rayispolkom 500,000 rubles for charitable purposes. Union of Veterans of Afghanistan Territorial Branch Board Chairman O. Gorshkov says:

"We rejected 'begging' and decided to earn money through entrepreneurial activities. And when we had earned our first million rubles, we gave lump-sum assistance to 23 disabled veterans. We are preparing the same type of act for very needy families. The board also decided that it would be appropriate to share the money earned with the rayon on whose territory we are operating. All the more so since its leadership actively assisted in the formation of the Union of Veterans of Afghanistan Territorial Branch.

The Rayispolkom plans to use the money that has been transferred to the rayon to provide public services and amenities, to acquire needed equipment, and to aid people with low incomes. Three cafeterias are being established right now where they will feed those rayon residents who live in poverty....

#### Social Defense Fund Officers Interviewed

*91UM0752A Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA  
in Russian 19 Jun 91 p 3*

[Interview with Lieutenant Colonel A. Reshetnikov, chairman of the All-Army Council of Komsomol Organizations, and Major S. Tsikalyuk, director of the Fund for Social Protection of Young Servicemen, by KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA correspondent K. Andreyev; place and date not given: "The Army Protects Everyone—Who Will Protect the Army?"]

[Text] Registration of the Fund for Social Protection of Young Servicemen took place yesterday in the USSR

**Ministry of Justice.** Our correspondent talks with Lieutenant Colonel Aleksey Reshetnikov, chairman of the All-Army Council of Komsomol [Leninist Communist Youth League] Organizations, and Major Sergey Tsikalyuk, director of the fund.

[Andreyev] It seems to me that funds have already been established in the country which protect everybody from everything. Is it worth venturing with yet another? I would be afraid there are no patrons left.

[Reshetnikov] It is worth it. Let me repeat, however trite, that the soldier and young officer are entirely unprotected socially. Not a single fund existing today is involved with their problems, of which there is quite an abundance. If only for the young officer and his family in the Baltic and Transcaucasus, the problems of units being withdrawn from Eastern Europe...

[Andreyev] The state struggles with this and cannot resolve it, but you can resolve it?

[Tsikalyuk] We have no intention of replacing the state—indeed we cannot do so. But it is within our powers to unite the capabilities of those who would like to aid the young army.

[Andreyev] In other words, another organ is being established which will be distributing?

[Tsikalyuk] It will distribute as well, but I do not see anything bad in this. In every Suvorov Institute, for example, we have orphans, and in every higher military institute—cadets with children. Should they be assisted or not?

[Andreyev] They should, who would argue that? But I am talking about something else: a fund created to collect money from some people and hand it out to others.

[Reshetnikov] It is not just that. The fund has the right of legislative initiative and intends to utilize this right. That must be said first of all. Second, we will be conducting our own economic activity—simply put, we will be earning the money needed to implement our programs.

[Andreyev] Tell us, how does the Ministry of Defense leadership view the concept of the fund?

[Tsikalyuk] The concept was approved by General-Colonel N. Shlyaga, chief of the Main Military-Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy. So there is understanding and, we hope, there will be support.

[Andreyev] Might not the fund just turn out to be an appendage of the Main Political Directorate?

[Tsikalyuk] No. Primarily because we, as officers, profess the principle of unity of command. And we have but one "commander"—the law.

#### Volga-Ural MD Dispute with Local Governments

91UM0760C Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA  
in Russian 29 Jun 91 First edition p 3

[Article by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA Correspondent Lieutenant Colonel O. Bedula under the rubric: "Soviets and Garrisons": "There Is no Law for the Time Being but We Need to Cooperate"]

[Text] The Volga-Ural Military District Military Soviet just recently considered the issue on how garrison commanders relations with local authorities are developing. This distinctive feature was ascertained: practically all army structures are themselves experiencing the powerful pressure of the region's difficult socio-political and economic situation.

At the beginning of the year, the city reduced the standard of meat and butter deliveries to Samarskiy Garrison without any explanations whatsoever. Servicemen-Gorsoviet deputies raised the "food issue" at the presidium session, spoke on oblast television, and informed the oblsvoiet chairman on possible consequences for troop combat readiness.

The "meat-butter" conflict was ultimately settled. But since the local authorities also did not provide food guarantees, the garrison began to more aggressively develop its subsidiary farm: they decided to increase the total number of pigs, to start a herd of cows, and to build a poultry house.

But now a raysoviet ecological commission has attempted to veto military agricultural activity. Specifically, a bill for 86,000 rubles was submitted to a military unit for damage allegedly caused to the environment. The State Board of Arbitration has protested this bill but the conflict has not yet been settled.

"Relations with the local authorities are difficult," Military District Commander Colonel-General A. Makashov told me. "We are still pretty much spinning our wheels in the resolution of tasks associated with maintaining military district combat readiness. It also happens that oblast, city, rayon, and village Soviets cannot work out a unified position with regard to the military. In so doing, often some do not have the competence, others do not have the appropriate powers, and still others do not have a good, respectful attitude toward the army. But all of them taken together genuinely have state responsibility for the country's defense capability."

By the way, these problems that I have described are characteristic not only of the Volga-Ural Military District. Naturally, we can complain about our young democracy, the country's grave economic situation, and the politization of society. But for all that, the military district is obliged to conserve and multiply its primary property—combat readiness. And obviously it is of little use to appeal to the center, considering that everything is not smooth in Ministry of Defense interrelations with

the USSR and RSFSR Supreme Soviets. But is it perhaps the military district that must in this situation partially assume the responsibility for the thorough practical development of not only the primary directions of military reform but also for mutual relations with local authorities?

In any case, the Volga-Ural Military District Military Soviet has already begun this work. While defining the strategy of mutual relations with local authorities, here they decided to begin by investigating mutual relations of "garrisons and Soviets." It is absolutely impossible without this: The protracted economic difficulties in the region have resulted in the fact that the military district is simply incapable of untying all of the knots of garrison problems. There is not enough money, building materials, and many other things. In this situation, "steppe" and "forest" garrisons could to some degree depend on the local authorities and production structures. And now they really value this assistance while telling the military district: they say, relations with local authorities are fine. But if this was so....

I talked on this subject with "steppe" Garrison Commander Colonel Yu. Azarenkov.

"Would you like me to be frank?" suggested Yuriy Alekseyevich. "Yes, there are many things in our garrison's mutual relations with the local authorities that need improvement. But, assume that I report my problems to the leadership—what will change? At best, the military district will turn to the obispolkom and Party obkom which for the rayon at the present time is not a decree. But in so doing, I risk losing whatever mutual relations I have established with such difficulty."

I also remembered this story. A unit commander was ordered to build a concrete wall at the motor pool. The military district did not provide construction materials and the officer could not obtain them in the rayon because he did not know the directors of local enterprises. The commander was soon relieved of his duties. With this direct, it seems to me, derisive wording: "For not taking steps to increase unit combat readiness."

As Colonel Azarenkov told me, he established business relations with the ispolkom leaders and plant directors only three years after arriving and then the opportunity appeared to solve any "concrete or food" issue. It turns out that he will be replaced by a new man tomorrow and he will not find a nail in the entire military district. Here is a small task for personnel organs: The longer a garrison commander is in that position, the greater are his chances of maintaining unit combat readiness at the proper level....

But how does the other side—the local authorities—look at this problem? Well here, for example, is what Gorispolkom Chairman P. Zaytsev told me.

"Our relations with the military are structured on mutual respect, cooperation, and assistance. But relations between state structures must be structured on the

basis of the law and not on personal sympathies or antipathies. But for the time being, there are no documents that would define our relations with military units."

The absence of laws that define mutual relations between military garrisons and local authorities at times gives rise to extremely intricate phenomena. Already in some places you can hear "thoughts" on the importance for the military to be imbued with Bashkir patriotism or to be devoted to the Mordovian land. There are attempts to "suggest" to commanders that they need to conduct the extra work at harvest time not there where they are being sent but on the territory of "their own" republic or oblast.

Do we need to talk about how large the servicemen-deputies' role is in this situation. And in many ways thanks to them, the housing and food problems have been unfrozen in a number of republics and oblasts and cooperation has begun in economic and farming spheres and the ecology.

"And nevertheless we are still not fully utilizing our capabilities in the formation of relations with local authorities," Military District Military-Political Directorate Deputy Chief Colonel N. Krasny told me. "There is a need to create a department which would efficiently solve garrison problems."

There are also other ideas in the military-political directorate.

The Military District Military Soviet recently studied the problems of the spring draft campaign. For the first time, representatives of seven republics and 10 region oblasts arrived to exchange opinions. The conversation was extremely substantive and went beyond the framework of draft problems. The sides managed to discuss and immediately agree on a whole series of economic, housing, and farming issues.

Right now the military district is preparing its study of the issue to establish cooperation between garrisons and local Soviets for the center since there already is a bit of positive experience.

#### More on Abuse of Senior Officers' Privileges

*91UM0744A Moscow ARGUMENTY I FAKTY  
in Russian No 24, Jun 91 p 5*

[Article by V. Romanenko: "What Soldier Does Not Dream...: Where Three ZIL Refrigerators Cost 215 Rubles"]

[Text]The publication of "They Are Privatizing... Dachas" in ARGUMENTY I FAKTY No. 22, 1991, has produced substantial mail to the editors and a lot of questions, including some related to the "dacha inventory" of the USSR Ministry of Defense. We are offering you now some documents from the USSR Supreme Soviet Commission on Preferences and Privileges.

**From an official memo of USSR Deputy Minister of Finance V.A. Salnikov.**

"In accordance with the resolution of the USSR Supreme Soviet Commission on Preferences and Privileges of 10 December 1990, the Main Control and Audit Department of the USSR Ministry of Finance, together with appropriate specialists from the USSR Ministry of Defense, has conducted an audit of the USSR Ministry of Defense in the area of construction, maintenance, and exploitation of properties used as dachas, boarding resorts, hunting lodges, etc.

"In violation of the Statute on the recreation fund of the USSR Ministry of Defense, and with the knowledge of former chief of Administrative-Economic Department (AKhU), Lieutenant General A.V. Koskin, expenditures on the maintenance of dachas for the ministry's top personnel in excess of norms established by the USSR Government were paid for out of the general budget of the USSR Ministry of Defense. (This is the money the state allocates for defense—Ed.).

"In addition, the audit established that expenses such as rent, furniture and other inventory amortization, and current repairs were not calculated and not paid for by the persons using the dachas. The total amount of underpayment for 1989 alone comes to 68,000 rubles [R].

"Taking advantage of the shortcomings of the existing legislation, the former AKhU of the USSR Ministry of Defense sold to lessees and other persons furniture and other equipment located in these dachas worth 111,600 rubles. The sale of the contents of some official dachas was conducted several times throughout the year for amounts of R10,000 to R20,000, in many cases without the proper paperwork and control on the part of finance department and AKhU senior officials..."

**From USSR minister of defense Order No. 156 of 4 March 1991 "On the Results of the Audit of the USSR Ministry of Defense Recreation Fund."**

In violation of Order No. 293, furniture and property located at the dachas were being sold not only to lessees but also to unrelated persons; furniture was also sold directly from commandants' warehouses.

Lieutenant General A.V. Koskin, former USSR Ministry of Defense AKhU chief, has been discharged for dereliction of official duties.

It came out that furniture and property located at generals' dachas was mostly sold to the owners of these dachas at clearly understated prices.

**From Object No. 8 (official dacha of Army General A.D. Lizichev) the following was sold: In June-July 1990, Marcelle bedroom furniture set for R3,040 (95 percent usable life left), Omega furniture set for R2,163 (95**

percent usable life left), Balaton living room furniture set for R1,712 (80 percent usable life left), dining room furniture set for R1,425 (75 percent usable life left), two Marcelle easy chairs for R399, two padded chairs for R210, two chairs for R590, two easy chairs and a magazine table from Carolina furniture set for R1,111, two sideboards for R366, two sofas for R598, as well as three rugs and runners for R3,397, two Minsk refrigerators for R407, one ZIL refrigerator for R185, television sets Record for R488 and Rubin for R499, German silver spoons and forks for R165, and other property. On the whole, R20,502.66 worth of furniture, appliances, and other property was sold from this object.

**From Object No. 37 (official dacha of USSR Marshal S.F. Akhromeyev) in March, July, and October 1990, the following was sold: Violeta furniture set for R3,342 (80 percent usable life left), a bed from Milena furniture set for R200 (80 percent usable life left), a sofa and two easy chairs for R553 (60 percent usable life left), two Chelen chairs for R336 (50 percent usable life left), two sets of bedroom furniture for R1,670, set of soft furniture for R434, two Crystal chandeliers for R940 (100 percent usable life left), six tables for R885, Balaton furniture set for R575 (90 percent usable life left), three ZIL refrigerators for R215 (20 percent usable life left), Rubin television set for R357, woolen rug for R660, and other property for R1,952. On the whole, R12,727.09 worth of furniture, appliances, and other property was sold from this object.**

A similar picture emerges in regard to official dachas of USSR Marshals V.G. Kulikov, S.L. Sokolov, and N.V. Ogarkov; Army Generals M.I. Sorokin, I.M. Tretyak, P.G. Lushev, and V.M. Arkhipov; Marshal of Aviation N.M. Skomorokhov; and Col.Gen. Yu.A. Yashin.

All in all in 1990, R122,700 worth of furniture, rugs, appliances, and other property was sold from the objects (official dachas).

**USSR minister of defense Order No. 293 stipulates that all expenses related to the dachas' maintenance—including rent, lease payments for the use of furniture and other property, and municipal services—are paid for by the lessees. Thus, starting 1 July 1990 no money in the USSR Ministry of Defense budget is allocated for the maintenance of top officials' dachas. Ministry of Defense dacha compounds are maintained on the basis of self-financing: The dachas, with all their contents, have been "privatized."**

How burdensome this is for their owners, our readers can determine on their own next time they are about to buy a dacha, a refrigerator, television sets, or furniture.

[ERRATUM: In JPRS-UMA-91-015 of 21 June 1991 the figure on page 16, 2nd column, 2nd paragraph should read 13,826 instead of 18,826.]

**Kazakh Decree on Popular Appeals Against Service**  
*91UM0658A Alma-Ata KAZAKHSTANSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 28 Feb 91 p 1*

[Decree and commentary: "Kazakh SSR Presidential Ukase on Consideration of Grievances Associated with Military Service by Republic Citizens in the USSR Armed Forces"]

[Text] In view of numerous complaints made by Republic citizens related to violation of the law, loss of life and personal injuries inflicted on servicemen on compulsory duty in the USSR Armed Forces, I hereby resolve the following:

1. Organization of a special commission which will examine complaints submitted by servicemen and their parents, for the purpose of insuring completeness and objectivity of inquiries related to loss of life, personal injury and violation of the law, as suffered by Republic servicemen serving their compulsory term of service in the Armed Forces of the USSR.

Appointment as commission chairman Comrade S. K. Nurmagambetov, chairman of the KaSSR Supreme Soviet Committee on Affairs of Veterans, the Handicapped and Servicemen; chairman, Kazakh Republic Council of Veterans of War and Labor.

The commission is to be composed of the following members:

V. V. Bardakov, second secretary, Central Committee of the LKSM [Lenin Young Communist League] of Kazakhstan;

G. Ya. Belonosov, manager, Training Methods Center, Kazakh Branch, Interbranch Institute, State Committee for Statistics;

V. I. Vyushkov, first deputy minister, Kazakh SSR Ministry of Health;

A. F. Dudkin, assistant procurator general, Turkestan Military District;

K. Z. Zhusupov, Kazakh SSR People's Deputy; deputy procurator general, Kazakh SSR;

T. B. Ibrayev, Kazakh SSR People's Deputy; former member, Commission on National Policy, Cultural Development and Language;

I. N. Isengepov, Kazakh SSR People's Deputy; deputy chairman, Committee on Affairs of Women and Protection of the Family, Motherhood and Childhood;

A. B. Kazhenov, first deputy, Main State Arbitrator's Office, Kazakh SSR; vice-president, Kazakhstan Union of Jurists;

A. S. Kobzhev, deputy chairman, Kazakh SSR Supreme Soviet Committee on Affairs of Youth;

A. D. Chernov, first deputy minister, Kazakh SSR Ministry of Justice;

M. D. Shampiyev, chief, Political Section, Kazakh Military Commissariat.

The Cabinet of Ministers of the Kazakh SSR is to settle matters of finance, payment of travel expenses and other expenditures incurred by the Republic Commission, and insure the provision of technical equipment and official quarters.

2. The Republic Commission is to assume a direct role in the prosecution of each grievance submitted by servicemen or their parents pertaining to serious violation of the law with respect to interethnic or nonregulation incidents, and also to incidents involving loss of life or bodily injury suffered by servicemen; based on its findings, it is to make known its opinion concerning responsibility of an official or officials and submit this opinion to the respective state and law enforcement agencies.

The Commission is to work in close harmony with the USSR Ministry of Defense, USSR Main Military Procuracy, authorities of districts and flotillas, military political organs, and the Special Commission called into being by the 15 November 1990 USSR Presidential Ukase on Measures Implementing Suggestions of the Committee of Soldiers' Mothers.

3. Ministries and departments of the Kazakh SSR, obispolkom, and the Alma-Ata and Lenin gorispolkom are to render the Commission every possible assistance and cooperation; make available to it upon its request the necessary information and materials.

4. Officials of the mass information media are to insure regular coverage of the Commission's activities; promulgation of legality and discipline in Army collectives; heroic-patriotic and mass defense work among youth.

N. NAZARBAYEV  
President, Kazakh Soviet Socialist Republic  
Alma Ata, 26 February 1991

**Comments by Yu. Khitrin**

Below is the text of an interview an AZIYA-PRESS correspondent held with Yu. A. Khitrin, Kazakh SSR state adviser on state and legal problems, on the subject of the above decree.

[AZIYA-PRESS] What were the causes leading to issuance of the Decree?

[Khitrin] We have been receiving a large number of letters and declarations from servicemen and their mothers concerning serious violations committed within the Soviet Army. The allegations as a rule have a basis in fact. Hazing of new recruits by men who have been in service some time, abuse of power, bodily harm inflicted by certain officers—all this has become a bitter reality of our time.

I shall tell you about the latest occurrence that has come to our attention. This involved the disappearance of a

soldier of Kazakh origin serving in a military unit located in Krasnoyarsk Kray. His disappearance was noted by an elderly Russian woman living in the vicinity; she had frequently taken note of his presence. She proceeded to write a letter to his mother. An older son arrived to conduct a search. It was only at that time (!) that the unit took official notice of the disappearance. The search was unsuccessful. The unit authorities went no further than writing unintelligible replies to inquiries. In this case, the same as unfortunately in many others, the honor of the uniform transcends all else, as far as the authorities are concerned.

That is what gave rise to issuance of the Decree and organization of the Commission.

[AZIYA-PRESS] But will not the latter be merely another Official Committee of Soldiers' Fathers and Mothers?

[Khitrin] It will not. Do you remember the commission on investigation of violations in the Soviet Army that was brought into being by direction of the USSR President? Can you list any of its accomplishments? I also cannot.

The main thought and thrust of the Decree is as follows. We passed the Declaration of Sovereignty and established the institution of the Presidency. In accordance with Article 114-3 of the Constitution of the Kazakh SSR, the President functions as the guarantor of the rights and freedoms of our citizens. Kazakhs, including those serving in the ranks of the Soviet Army, both within the confines of the Republic and beyond its borders, should possess an awareness that their honor, dignity, health and, finally, life, are protected.

[AZIYA-PRESS] With what specific functions is the Commission to be charged?

[Khitrin] It is to act on incoming letters and declarations, and enlist organs of justice and the procuracy in carrying out objective investigations of stated complaints. It will not be possible for the Commission to take action on each and every complaint, of course. Its main purpose—I would call it the strategic purpose—is to place the education activity of the military under the control of the people, under the control of their authorized representatives, the deputies.

It is sometimes said that the Army is a state within a state. We have only one state, and the interests of its citizens should be held in sacred trust. That is our credo. This is how we intend to proceed, now and forever. It is from this position that we expect to receive support from the Ministry of Defense, military justice organs, and authorities in military units where Kazakhs are carrying out their duty.

#### **Union of Baltic Military Personnel Defended**

91UM0768A Riga CINA in Latvian 23 Apr 91 p 3

[Interview with Valentin Filatov by Davids Gefters: "General Filatov: 'Union of Baltic Military Personnel' Is Public Organization"]

[Text] Major General Valentin Filatov, deputy commander of the Main Command Staff of the Baltic Military District, rejected the contention expressed in an announcement by the Latvian Supreme Soviet's defense and internal affairs committee that the "Union of Baltic Military Personnel" supports the restoration of a totalitarian regime.

"The 'Union of Baltic Military Personnel' is a public organization," General Filatov told LETA [Latvian press agency] correspondent Davids Gefters. "It unites not only those internal troops of the USSR KGB and Ministry of Internal Affairs, veterans of the Armed Forces, and family members, who are deployed in the Baltic Military District, but also those deployed in the Baltic Border Defense District, the Baltic Fleet, Baltic republics, and the Kaliningrad Region of the RSFSR."

The goal of this union is to protect the legal social and political interests, and rights and freedoms, of soldiers, members of their families, and veterans of the armed forces. It categorically denounces the campaign of lies and attacks against military personnel. The union organizes its work in firm accordance with the constitutions of the USSR and the Baltic republics, and with the USSR law on citizens public associations. Not a single document published by the union calls for 'changing the legally elected structures of state power in the Baltic by armed coup.'"

#### **Political Chief Defends Vilnius Garrison's Actions**

91UM0769A Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA  
in Russian 8 Jun 91 p 3

[Interview with Colonel Stanislav Starodub, chief of the military-political section of the Vilnius garrison's special unit, by IMA correspondent Anna Broydo, specially for NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA; place and date not given: "What Are We To Do, Not Defend Our Motherland?"]

[Text]

[Broydo] There are various versions of what really happened in Vilnius the evening of 3 June and later on that night. We would like to hear yours.

[Starodub] Two convicts who had committed dangerous crimes escaped from the guardhouse of the Kaunas Commandant's Office because of slipshod security. Operation "Ring" has been in effect for many years now for use in such instances, providing for stake-outs and reinforced patrols in interception localities—train stations, motor vehicle depots, airports.

[Broydo] Why are government facilities included this time in the "Ring" operation?

[Starodub] We received information that deserters were hiding out there, and decided to organize their capture all at once. We arrested a couple of fellows, but released them following identification—they were not the ones. That's all there was to it. But foreign correspondents reported that the parliament had been seized, that 40,000 people had been assembled to secure it... Really, believe me—500 men came

at most. I haven't seen such deceit since the time of Goebbels (even if I was not alive at that time, the methods are the very same). When I arrived at work in the morning, my wife called and asked with alarm: "What has happened with you there?" I phoned the chief of the garrison, the Central Committee—no one knew anything, there were no explanations up to dinner time. Because nothing had happened—everything was as usual.

[Broydo] It is clear that the relative calm established in the republic after January could not last forever. All the same, this new flare-up of tension was somewhat unexpected.

[Starodub] It was a very alarming calm. I felt inside, in my very spine, that something was brewing—these people need more blood. We in the professional military realize that the Army has been utilized, and still can be utilized for political purposes.

[Broydo] As happened in January?

[Starodub] Yes. After all, the rating of the republic leadership had fallen and it was urgently necessary to build it up. The provocations began—seizure of military facilities, of the DOSAAF [Voluntary Society for the Promotion of the Army, Aviation, and Navy].

[Broydo] But was it not Soviet Army soldiers who not so long ago seized the Commerce Bank and DOSAAF property?

[Starodub] We call that "taking for security." There was no other way out—they began to make money on equipment which was the property of military units and transferred to DOSAAF on lease by order of the military district commander. It must be returned.

[Broydo] But Lithuanians have been paying DOSAAF dues for many years. Consequently, a portion of this property belongs to them.

[Starodub] Perhaps a portion does. But you must understand that the forces that have stirred up this trouble have never belonged to DOSAAF, have never paid dues or voluntarily provided any assistance to the Army, Aviation, or Navy. And those who have paid are far from being on their side. All matters of dispute must be resolved through political, civilized methods, and not like that—just going out and seizing something. The Army must also be reckoned with. People must understand our psychology—after all, we took an oath and served honestly; we did not have any idea that our rear areas were crammed full of racketeers, mafiosi, foreign-intrigue hookers, and nationalists gone wild leeching on gratuitous Russian raw materials.

[Broydo] Local residents often reproach the military for lack of respect for Lithuanian culture and customs.

[Starodub] That is a lie. We have had occasion to serve in various republics. And although there is a black sheep in

every family, I do not know of a single example where we foisted our own laws, customs, or traditions on others. In Lithuania in general, therefore, people relate well to the military, even better than in Russia.

[Broydo] All the same, in Russia they are not labeled occupiers...

[Starodub] Not yet—they will be. But here... Indeed, if we were occupiers, would we permit them to establish themselves in the parliament and pile dirt on us? What—are we here of our own will? What have we done to the republic that is bad? I love Lithuania and Lithuanians. My wife is a Lithuanian. And I do not identify these quirks, this hatred and extremism, with the attitude towards us of the Lithuanian people as a whole. In the village where my wife's relatives live, no one considers me an occupier. The Army has not besmirched itself in any way.

[Broydo] And the blood of the 13 January victims?

[Starodub] I don't care what Landsbergis or Yeltsin say! We don't need a snow-job, we've seen enough dirty tricks in actuality. Only the officers had live cartridges, and not one of them fired a round. Had soldiers opened fire, there would have been incomparably greater casualties—we know what an automatic weapons burst does.

[Broydo] But one girl was killed under the tracks of a tank...

[Starodub] Well, perhaps some truck or UAZ [Ural Motor Vehicle Plant vehicle] ran her over, but not a tank. If a girl falls under a tank, even if some Rambo falls under a tank—just a flat pancake will remain! I know what it's like when someone falls under a tank... Why do you—forgive the expression—powder the brains of gullible residents? It seems to me it was no accident that the funeral was held so quickly. And they simply forced the forensic medical experts to sign the appropriate paperwork.

[Broydo] Do you really think they were compelled to provide such a deposition?

[Starodub] I cannot think anything. In order to reach a conclusion, we need the documents of a disinterested, joint investigation which would be conducted by representatives of the Lithuanian procuracy, USSR procuracy, and neutral parties—from Armenia, Russia, or other republics—on a strictly scientific basis.

[Broydo] The statement of USSR Procurator General Nikolay Trubin confirms that the soldiers had live cartridges and that the girl was crushed by a tank.

[Starodub] Well, anything could have happened there. The crowd was gathered, tanks were moving so that people would not crawl on them or run up to them. That is not what we are talking about. But what is disturbing you? The fact that live cartridges were issued? But it is blanks that were fired. Even against some of our comrades—our own people who could not be identified in the throng—bursts of blanks were fired.

**Journalist Visits Spetsnaz Training Facility**

*91UM0625A Moscow SOYUZ in Russian No 8,  
20 Feb 91 p 17*

[Article by Grant Apresyan: "Secret Base' In Ryazan"]

[Text] Jim Short, a British military consultant, journalist, and surprisingly, martial arts instructor, was the first Western correspondent to be admitted here, "inside a top secret Russian base in Ryazan that NATO experts believe to be a special forces school." His article was published in the newspaper MAIL ON SUNDAY under the headline—a striking one even for foreign readers—"Killers' School: Special Forces Cadets Secretly Train to Inflict Sudden Death." The article goes on to say: "In ordinary classrooms, the Soviet Union is training servicemen who, in wartime, could cause a big 'row' in England. In the event of World War III, these people will try to assassinate the royal family and Prime Minister, as well as to destroy military bases throughout Britain."

Just what is this "secret base," and who are "these people"?

One hundred twenty miles southeast of Moscow, as Jim Short pinpointed the area, and we are there—the Airborne Forces Higher Command School. It's the only one in the country and therefore extremely popular. The acclaim that these troops enjoy in the Soviet Army is indisputable. Knowledgeable people call the school's graduates "bone-breakers" and "rangers," the second word clearly eliciting comparison with the American rapid reaction forces, the world-famous Green Berets. The words are generally on target, but only partly so. In any case, we saw here not robotic supermen but top-flight professionals having equal success in mastering higher mathematics and karate, Chinese and the design of foreign military hardware.

In June and July of each year, the school is inundated with an influx of new students. Those passing through the checkpoint include soldiers who have already served 18 months in the Airborne Forces as well as people who have just graduated from school and who are irresistibly drawn here by the romanticism, smart uniforms, and daring leaps.

The first group is given unconditional preference in admissions. It is felt that their choice is the result of more thorough consideration. They are accepted even if they get below average scores on one or two tests. Lieutenant General Albert Slyusar, the school's chief, takes a fatherly attitude toward these boys. He takes responsibility for some of those who hopelessly fail the entrance exams and the physical training tests (and that is a 100 percent guarantee of being screened out) and admits them with the warning: "Until the first infraction. The school is not going to try to hold on to you. You hold onto it, if you want to be an officer."

Hero of the Soviet Union Albert Yevdokimovich Slyusar showed himself to be an exacting and strong-willed man.

By chance, we happened to arrive just as he had assembled the school and was expelling six cadets. His thundering voice reverberated over the parade grounds. We couldn't make out his words, the general's tone spoke for itself: We'd hate to be in those six fellows' shoes.

"Why did you expel them?" we asked him later.

"Their discipline in formation was poor."

"Isn't that a bit harsh? After all, they're only second-year students. You may have shattered their hopes for the future. Now they'll have to go into the army and finish their terms."

"I do that once a year, if that much. To keep them from getting out of hand. That kind of chewing-out is useful. They suffer, of course, but I don't revoke my decision, and there's no use trying to complain about me."

It's not our place, as civilians, to judge the school chief, who has spent several decades in the service.

He commanded a renowned airborne division in Afghanistan. In May 1982, when the first Pandshir operation was conducted—the Pandshir valley was considered sheer hell throughout the war years—Slyusar didn't heed the opinion of the 40th Army command but followed his own laws, those of the Airborne Forces. He returned to base 28 days later, having lost one soldier. The division commander awarded him the Order of Lenin. A year later, following a brilliant operation near Kabul, the title of Hero was conferred on him.

Slyusar was subsequently offered some very prestigious posts. For example, he was offered a position in the General Staff Academy or the post of deputy commander of the Airborne Forces. But he chose the school, because he had been through the school of the undeclared war. In 1985, he introduced intensive training in mountainous conditions, with airborne landings onto cliffs and several-day raids into gorges and along steep slopes.

Who better, one might ask, to initiate a transition to a professional army, which has been proposed as an experiment. After all, with the permission of the Defense Minister, the Airborne Forces commander has taken a decision to set up a subunit akin to a professional soldiers unit in every division. Albert Yevdokimovich himself takes a sober view of that idea, with a dose of skepticism.

"First," he observed, "in concluding a contract, a soldier has to be 'bought' for not 150 rubles, but a minimum of 500. Otherwise, he's run off to some cooperative a week later. Second, the school is not going to be able to provide its officers with apartments within the next 12 years. And this in Ryazan, a rather large city. Not to mention providing well-appointed housing for soldiers in remote garrisons. Third, even in the Airborne Forces, the training system for compulsory-service personnel is not yet so perfect as to be described with the word 'professionalism.'

"Cadets are another matter. Four years of intensive combat work turns a dilettante into a true professional. It's no accident that such a judge as Mr. Short was so impressed by them."

Lieutenant Colonel Aleksandr Ryabov's training battalion was wrapping up a three-week field exercise. They carved a camp out of the forest. Tomorrow the battalion will make a 10-kilometer rapid march back to the school. The distance will have to be covered within 48 minutes to make the top rating. Needless to say, the battalion commander will be running along with everyone else.

Ryabov spoke enthusiastically about the contract system—he's all for it. He's moved up from platoon commander to regiment deputy commander, and he understands that this would enhance the army's prestige to unprecedented heights. It would be an interesting and responsible undertaking, but on the condition that personnel aren't diverted from service. Economic work would have to go by the wayside.

"You can't imagine how exhausting it is to serve in Osh, Fergana, Yerevan, and other 'hot spots.' Yet some people used to think that the Airborne Forces were just for show, that they loved to shatter boards and bricks at large public gatherings on holidays. But as soon as things start heating up somewhere, they send in the blue berets. I don't intend to leave, but why don't the people 'at the top' understand that the Airborne Forces and the Internal Troops have different functions?"

That's right, Aleksandr Ivanovich, each has its own tasks. And your comrades are risking their lives today. Having barely gotten out of one war, they find themselves in another, a civil one. And while receiving very little pay, they spent six months moving about from one region to another with full combat gear without seeing their families, and then their wives, worn out and weary of longing for them, file for divorce.

We write that they are selfless, but the soldiers' nerves are strained to the limit; we take pride in the strength of their morale, but the heart of a 40-year-old man who has sweated and toiled in the Central Asian heat isn't in the best of shape. Yes, they know how to throw knives magnificently and to hit targets with their assault rifles while executing a virtuoso flip over flames. But such intensive training can hardly offer grounds for ignoring them as people and continually invoking the old-fashioned saying, "service is service."

"For the time being, it seems, they can't get along without us," remarked one of the school's senior officers, a holder of two combat decorations. Like his comrades, he still believes that those who wear "heavy" shoulderboards are treating him wisely and is still proud of his readiness to fly to wherever they order him to go.

**General Discusses Armed Forces Problem in Estonia**  
*91UM0770A Tallinn PAEVALEHT in Estonian,  
9 Apr 91 p 3*

[Article by Vello Vare: "About the Armed Forces Problem in Estonia"]

[Text] One of the most important characteristics of an independent state is achieving control over its own territory. In international practice, having such control is indeed the key requirement for being recognized as a state organization.

The different options that could be used for achieving such control can at this time be seen merely as ideal models, which can be carried out only when external circumstances are extremely favorable. Equally important is that we keep an eye on the situation in the Soviet Union.

In general, it is quite clear that the Soviet Union cannot go on existing the way it has been. Rearranging life in a new way, however, is extremely difficult. Apparently this is what is at least partially responsible for the fact that we look for culprits to be blamed for the economic decline of the state from among the democratic forces, while trying to forget the past. Same could be said about looking for culprits among the leadership of the Union republics and nationalists ("separatists").

To realize the independence aims of the republics, and to avoid further deterioration, it is important that the present leadership of the Soviet Union take A SERIES OF CONCRETE STEPS that would include the following areas:

- To recognize the situation currently prevailing in the Baltic states as a direct consequence of World War II, a major part of which was the Hitler-Stalin pact concluded at the expense of third countries, and to agree to eliminate it.
- To acknowledge Lenin's repeatedly emphasized concept of self-determination of nations, up to complete separation, leaving aside all restrictions to carrying out the will of the people;
- To take steps toward creating a real alliance of states, considering that the present draft of the treaty for belonging to the "renewed" (when?) Soviet Union, corresponds neither to the circumstances nor to the aims of the people, a fact that was confirmed amply by results of the recent referenda held in the three Baltic republics;
- To stop using units of the Soviet army against the people, and to divert them to their real task of defending the state against its external enemies;

Solving these problems would be a considerable step toward reaching agreements that would determine the status of armed forces within the territory of the Republic of Estonia, and to the creation of the republic's own defense forces.

The whole problem could not be solved with one single act, as some of the political figures of the Republic of Estonia tend to think. That would be naiveté.

I think that some kind of **TIME FRAME** could be established that would determine the length of the transition period. The transition period, in turn, could be divided into two stages. The first of these should be quite short and cover the interval from, let's say, right now up until the end of the period needed to accomplish a transition to independent statehood, thus the current year.

The second stage would last roughly four years, and would span the years from 1992 to 1995. This period would represent the stage of establishing statehood, during which all functions of the state will factually and finally be taken over of by the government of the Republic of Estonia.

Next, let's take a brief look at the remaining tasks, stage by stage, as they have emerged. While doing that, the author reserves himself the right not to agree with all of the theses advanced here.

The first major set of questions at the upcoming negotiations deals with **DETERMINING THE STATUS OF THE SOVIET ARMED FORCES**, and controlling their activity. This issue should go on the agenda for the first stage of negotiations with the Soviet Union, whereby it is necessary:

- To fix the number and structure of the "limited contingent of forces" stationed within the Republic of Estonia, at the time of the negotiations, and prohibit their further expansion;
- To focus the attention of the international public on the breach of promise made by president Gorbachev not to station any forces being moved out of Eastern and Central Europe in the Baltic republics (paratrooper unit in Võru, radio-communications unit with the Nadejda radio and television stations);
- To reach an agreement regarding removal of offensive weaponry, along with their supporting troops and units, from the territory of the Republic of Estonia, and outlining the continued, limited-term presence of only such contingents and units that guarantee the strategic defense of the Soviet Union (air defense, to a lesser degree the navy, and part of the radio-communications personnel) in quantities, and on terms to be agreed on;
- To establish a ban on nuclear weapons within the territory of the Republic of Estonia in a variety of forms, including multilateral international agreements;
- To reach agreements about returning to the Republic of Estonia, to the fullest extent possible, all objects that have been in possession of Soviet armed forces, along with reparations for material and ecological damages caused to the national economy and the culture of the Republic of Estonia;
- To arrange an exchange of information between the

government of the Republic of Estonia and the Soviet armed forces, including training schedules, the movement of troops within the territory of the Republic of Estonia, and other such matters;

- To establish minimum standards for the rotation of officers, ensigns (midshipmen), and re-enlisted personnel in units stationed in the Republic of Estonia;
- To regulate the deployment of young men and citizens of the Republic of Estonia, who are currently serving in the Soviet armed forces;
- To establish the basics of a military recruiting system for the republic;
- To guarantee the recognition of labor service as one of the forms of military service;
- To guarantee that the civil defense unit located in Estonia be placed under the authority of the government of the Republic of Estonia, along with its recruiting system linked to military service;
- To reach an agreement with military units regarding emergency measures to be taken in the event of catastrophes and natural disasters at both civilian and military locations;
- To submit to the civilian authority of the Republic of Estonia, all territories in the possession of Soviet military units, and all crimes committed by Soviet military personnel within the Estonian territory;
- To coordinate matters relating to the material and social welfare of military personnel and their families during their stay within the territory of the Republic of Estonia.

While these matters are being resolved, preparations should also be made for an **AGREEMENT ON MILITARY BASES**, that would, in effect, signal our entry into the second stage; and to secure, if at all possible, international backing for it, in order to:

- Accomplish a gradual return of all territories and facilities being used by the Soviet armed forces, free of charge, and in good condition both technically and ecologically;
- Determine the time limits, user fees and conditions of use for any territories or facilities remaining in the hands of the Soviet military for the remainder of the term specified. The status of the military personnel and their families should also be determined;
- Collect reparations from the Soviet Union for all damages caused since September 1, 1939 to the Republic of Estonia, its citizens and its legal entities as a result of war activities, confiscations, requisitions, recruitment, forced seizure of property, and other such acts committed by the Soviet armed forces, and also for fees accrued for the use of territories, facilities etc.

To determine the status of Soviet armed forces, it may be helpful to **DEVELOP COOPERATION** with the organization called Shield, and also with the military leadership of Eastern-European and Central-European states for the purpose of benefiting from their experience, and for planning a future course of action. Also more reliance should be placed on the (SU) People's Deputies elected

from Estonia to clarify matters regarding the status of Soviet armed forces at the appropriate offices in Moscow.

In essence, the objective for all the work being done during the first and the second stages would be the removal of all units of Soviet armed forces stationed within the territory of the Republic of Estonia, and the return of all the facilities and territories at their disposal to the Republic of Estonia, unconditionally (or with only minimal conditions).

The second set of questions deals with the formation of **DEFENSE FORCES** of the Republic of Estonia, that has become a topic of increasing frequency. Here, too, the problem should be approached in stages.

**The first stage** should include the following basic considerations:

- Implementing a system to regulate mandatory military service in the republic;
- Establishing a labor service system that would meet centralized, as well as international criteria;
- Setting up conditions for creating a defense force for the Republic of Estonia, and implementing legislation to that effect;
- Developing a defense-oriented, independent military doctrine for the Republic of Estonia, that would be based on curbing nuclear proliferation, cooperation between Estonia and other Baltic states, making the Republic of Estonia's defense potential part of the all-European system of security, based on neutrality, if possible, and taking into consideration the geo-strategic interests of the Soviet Union;
- Formation of the Ministry of Defense (Supreme Office of State Defense), and the creation of a state defense budget.

**At the second stage** the following main issues need to be resolved:

- Creation of an independent defense force for the Republic of Estonia, conceived as a combination of enlistment and contract service;

- Taking action to obtain international, multi-lateral guarantees for creating a neutral or (as a long-range objective) demilitarized zone within the territories of the Baltic states.

In the matter of an independent defense force for the Republic of Estonia, a number of differing opinions have been considered. Thus, the idea has been advanced that a defense force to be created for the Republic of Estonia should, much like the Warsaw pact, be based on a contract that establishes its operational subordination to the Soviet Union or a united military command (in case the latter should be deemed necessary).

It has been suggested that, even during the first stage, a national force up to the size of a motorized rifle division could be created, that would be made up of enlisted men recruited exclusively from Estonia, and as many officers and ensigns as possible. The upkeep of such a force could be handled through the Union budget, or else charged against the Union fees contributed by Estonia. The use of this force outside the territory of the Republic of Estonia, and under non-war conditions, could take place only with the consent of the Supreme Council or the government of the Republic of Estonia.

The above option is possible, in principle. National forces and their units have been justified in the past, and have also been effective, on a number of practical counts. Right now, however, the idea of restoring them runs into strong opposition from the "center", as seen from some of the legislation now being prepared. At the same time it has been brought up in alternative legislative proposals circulating at the (SU) Supreme Soviet. This is why we cannot overlook this option either.

In summary, it should be reiterated that the theses advanced in this writing do not fully represent the author's personal views, although many of them could be condoned. The author would be grateful to anyone, who would take the trouble of expressing his or her opinion.

**VELLO VARE** Retired Major General Member of the Committee on State Defense and Security Issues of the Soviet Union Supreme Soviet

**Impact of Reductions on Aviation Maintenance**

*91UM0746A Moscow Krasnaya Zvezda in Russian  
20 Jun 91 First Edition p 2*

[Article by Major N. Barabanov, maintenance chief, separate aviation squadron, in the column "Combat Training: Searches and Problems": "Flight Safety Suffers"]

[Text] At first glance, our technical maintenance unit is no different from any other subunit in aviation regiments. Aircraft maintenance personnel carry out preventive maintenance work specified by regulations to improve equipment operational reliability, replace engines and parts which have reached the end of their service life, and perform minor unit level repairs. While a TECh [technical maintenance unit] typically handles one kind of aircraft, we, TECh specialists of a separate squadron, must do scheduled maintenance of military transports An-24, An-26, and the Mi-8 helicopter. In addition, we have attached to us a certain number of aircraft from other aviation units.

This of course causes certain difficulties, forcing us to be especially careful in our planning so that craft are not delayed in the TECh beyond the time scheduled for the maintenance. In this regard, there is only one criterion: guaranteeing aircraft reliability and flight safety.

All fixed- and rotary-wing craft, of which there were several dozen, in the last few months were approved for release to duty on the first attempt, without a single flight failure attributable to maintenance personnel. In a word, no complaints were received. This being the case, it would appear that the subunit has no problems. That unfortunately is not the case. In spite of the high qualifications of our best specialists, Captains V. Lysenkov, V. Samoylov, S. Bakhanov, and Warrant Officer N. Mudarisov and others, and good work discipline, it is becoming increasingly difficult to carry out maintenance work. This means that flight safety is being jeopardized.

First and foremost here, in my opinion, is the need to restructure the table of organization, which has not changed for many years. What we have here is less than successful experiments and something I believe is not less than mindless reduction in TECh personnel. Judge for yourself. We were not consulted, nor was there any explanation offered, in the recent elimination of the commissioned technician slot in the aircraft and engine maintenance group. Even more difficulty was created for the electronic equipment group chief, Captain Bakhanov, whose losses are even more telling. The group, which even before that was small in size, now must handle the same amount of work, minus a commissioned technician and a senior mechanic, the slot for which was filled by a warrant officer.

The people remaining in the groups are completing the maintenance work on time, to be sure. With hardly any

complaints. However, beyond this apparent well-being there is the other side of the coin, something that is a cause for concern: An accumulation of minor faults during the equipment's operational period. The sub-unit's technical personnel has neither the means nor the time to correct these faults while the aircraft are parked, with the result that technicians or group chiefs may put off repairs until the next scheduled maintenance, in the hopes that the TECh will correct the shortcomings.

It seems to me that hidden here is one of the causes of the present state of flight safety. It is amazing that such considerable personnel reductions are carried out without soliciting the opinion of those who do the actual work on the equipment. The point is that we do have our ideas in this regard. For example, with a well thought out structural restructuring of the TECh, even the present aviation specialist staffing would be entirely sufficient to perform quality servicing of aircraft equipment. This could be done without substantially increasing the effort, in the time allotted, with extensive analysis of the causes of failures and breakdowns and application of remedies. However, as indicated above, another approach was chosen: reorganization, without consulting with the doers.

We are also experiencing quite a bit of trouble with a situation that has come about in technical maintenance units: soldiers in conscripted service. I think that now it should be clear to everyone that a soldier in aviation is a poor helper to the commissioned technician. Junior aviation maintenance specialist schools produce poorly-trained graduates year after year. Only a few of them acquire any appreciable technical experience by the time they complete their term of service. Basically, what they do is pull details, perform guard duty, and do housekeeping chores. Some of them show up in the TECh. The personnel shortage has an adverse effect on maintenance scheduling and quality of the work. This is an axiomatic truth no one wishes to think about.

I envy, in a positive way, those TECh chiefs who are insistent enough to refuse the services of mechanics. In this way, the quality of scheduled maintenance work does not suffer, and the officers resolve in a single stroke—so to speak—a great number of problems, thus concentrating all their resources on quality of work on aviation equipment. I believe that in the future it will be necessary to hire contract mechanics. In this connection, it is necessary to create conditions conducive to developing in every mechanic the desire to become a real professional. As of now, we have no alternative but to resolve existing problems on our own.

I would like to say a few words about the material and technical aspects of our work. This is another area in which we must rely on our own resources. It cost us no small effort, employing our own resources, to build an aircraft engine diagnostic repair system. Now aircraft maintenance personnel from the group under Captain V. Lysenkov can use the instruments to measure the reliability of every power plant. The idea here is that even if it is assumed that

the parameters of all engines are identical at the manufacturing plant, the results of several years of use and repair can bring about changes in parameter values from engine to engine, even after the same number of operating hours are logged. Aviation repair specialists cannot make definite decisions regarding the need for a particular kind of preventive maintenance in the absence of a considerable amount of statistical data. If we were provided with microcomputers, we could keep a running account of each flight and of other data directly connected with the condition of aircraft. Then it would be easier to make forecasts and predict failures. Alas!—all that is but a dream, since even that which for us is a vital necessity is something virtually not forthcoming by requisition. It is just this state of material and technical supply that for several years has made it impossible for us to perform the 600- and 1200-hour maintenance in our facility, thus requiring us to send

the crews to the TECh of the Balashov VVAUL [Higher Military Aviation School for Pilots]. What will happen when the market system takes over?

Nonetheless, Captains V. Samoylov and V. Lysenkov, our innovators, have accomplished much in the last few months. We now have new test stands and test equipment. We have utilized the experience of those who served in Afghanistan by making portable boxes that make it possible to perform certain kinds of repairs in the field.

If we are successful in resolving the pressing problems that constitute an obstacle to our performing work efficiently, I am sure that the probability of failure during the flight of fixed- and rotary-wing aircraft will be reduced to zero.

**Discussion Of Contract Service Experiment**

*91UM0757A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian  
21 Jun 91 First Edition p 2*

[Article by Captain First Rank B. Tsybenko, department head of a Navy Main Staff directorate: "The Navy Issues an Invitation: Provisional Statute on Contract Service Drafted"]

[Text] It will be recalled that the USSR Supreme Soviet has adopted a resolution "On Conducting an Experiment in the USSR Ministry of Defense to Staff the Positions of Sailors and Senior Sergeants in the Navy on a Voluntary and Contractual Basis With Servicemen On Active Compulsory Military Service." The editors continue to receive letters from readers requesting more details about the terms and conditions under which the experiment will be conducted. A provisional statute on active military service by sailors and senior sergeants who have concluded contracts and on their rights, responsibilities, and privileges has now been drafted. Captain First Rank B. Tsybenko, who took part in drafting the statute, discusses these topics.

Four large units of ships, one each from the Northern, Pacific, Black Sea, and Baltic fleets, have been chosen for the experiment. During the experiment, contracts will be concluded only with sailors and senior sergeants who are serving in these units and only with those who were conscripted in the spring and fall of 1991, after they have been on active compulsory military duty for at least six months. The duration of service under the contract is 2.5 years.

Sailors and senior sergeants who serve under contract will be considered compulsory-duty servicemen, and they will be subject to all the requirements of the "Statute on Active Compulsory Military Service by Soldiers, Sailors, Sergeants, and Senior Sergeants of the Soviet Army and Navy." They and their families will enjoy the rights, benefits, and privileges set forth in current legislation governing compulsory-duty servicemen and their families. They will be paid on the basis of norms set by current legislation for extended-service servicemen in the USSR Armed Forces. As of May of this year, with due regard for compensation payments stemming from the price increases, this pay amounted to between 300 and 700 rubles per month, depending on the area in which they serve (north or south) and the character of that service (on shore or on a ship).

After completing the term of contract service, the servicemen can continue extended-duty military service or service as warrant officers. Servicemen who complete the established term of service and do not express a desire to continue service will be discharged into the reserve. The contract is a voluntary agreement between the compulsory-duty servicemen and the unit commander. The servicemen who is undertaking contractual military service submits a written undertaking that spells out the terms under which he will serve and the grounds on which the contract can be dissolved. The main such grounds are: a petition from the serviceman himself; his state of health, provided a commission of military physicians concludes that the serviceman's

fulfillment of the duties of his post or his serving in a given area is countraindicated for him; unsuitability for service; and indiscipline.

When a contract with a servicemen is dissolved on the basis of the aforementioned grounds (excepting state of health), the time of his service under contract is not counted toward his term of active compulsory military service. In other words, service under contract will make it possible to enhance the professionalism of sailors and senior sergeants. They will simultaneously acquire two additional incentives to serve better than their comrades who have not concluded contracts—one material, the other administrative: If you serve well, you will make money; if you serve poorly, you could "extend" your service by several years, and without the previous level of pay. In addition, the duration of the contract—2.5 years—will allow servicemen to master their specialties better than they could if they were serving a two-year term.

Those who acquire a rated specialty and who get excellent marks in combat and political training will have preference in promotions. For high service parameters, senior sergeants can be promoted to a military rank one level above that stipulated on the basis of the appointment status they hold.

During the first two calendar years of military service, such servicemen will receive the same amount of leave and under the same conditions as compulsory-duty servicemen. After two calendar years of military service, they will receive mandatory leave for rest and relaxation in the amount of 30 days, not counting the time spent traveling to and from the place they spend their leave, but not to exceed a total of 45 days. As is the case with compulsory-duty servicemen, meals and clothing allowances for servicemen who conclude contracts will be provided free of charge.

Such are the basic rights, responsibilities, and benefits for servicemen who conclude contracts. Certain modifications could be made when the provisional statute is reviewed by the USSR Cabinet of Ministers, which has been instructed to confirm the resolution within 90 days of its adoption.

What about youths who are conscripted this year and would like to serve in the Navy under contract? When appearing before the draft commission, they have to express a desire to serve in the Navy. Should they meet health and other requirements with respect to personnel serving aboard ships, and also provided that the military commissariat has been instructed to conscript men for the Navy, these conscripts will be sent in military teams or troop trains to reception centers for naval recruits. When appearing before acceptance and technical commissions in the navy, the conscript has to reaffirm his desire to serve aboard a ship or in a unit taking part in the experiment, so that he can be sent to a unit that is training young recruits for them, or directly to a ship if the serviceman's civilian specialty requires no additional instruction (for example, for those who have graduated

from the naval schools operated by the Voluntary Society for the Promotion of the Army, Aviation, and Navy, seafaring schools, medical schools, and so on). What comes after that will depend mostly on the contract service candidate—his knowledge of his specialty, desire to master it as well as possible, a high degree of military discipline, love of naval service. If he has these things, he will be able to achieve his dream.

**Comment On Sale Of Naval Vessels Abroad For Scrap**

*91UM0757B Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA  
in Russian 20 Jun 91 First Edition p 3*

[Article attributed to information received from the Navy Main Staff: "Is There a Secret?"]

[Text] On June 12, I read in VECHERNYAYA MOSKVA that the missile cruiser Vladivostok, following in the footsteps of several of our other large ships, had been sold abroad for scrap. And that the terms of the deal are a military secret. Is this true?—M. Maksimov

In order to meet urgent needs of the national economy—for example, for construction materials and food products—the USSR Council of Ministers, in a decree issued in 1988, instructed the Navy to identify ships and vessels of obsolete design that had completed their established service life and been written off on account of their technical state for sale abroad as scrap, after all weapons, valuable equipment, and precious metals are removed from them.

The cruiser Vladivostok, built in 1968 and with a displacement of 5,340 tons (and not nearly 10,000, as was reported in VECHERNYAYA MOSKVA), was written off on account of its technical condition last year. Incidentally, the service life of ships of this class averages 25 years.

No "deal enshrouded in military secrecy" was concluded. In accordance with the aforementioned Council of Ministers decree, technical work is under way on the cruiser to prepare it for sale abroad. This work is to be completed in November or December of this year.

The sale abroad of ships and vessels is being carried out in complete accordance with the law via state foreign trade intermediary associations and organizations.

**STRATEGIC MISSILE TROOPS**

JPRS-UMA-91-019  
17 July 1991

**Soviet Nuclear Weapons Reported Removed From Baltics**

91WC0126A Tallinn *THE ESTONIAN INDEPENDENT*  
*in English No 60, 30 May-5 Jun 91 p 2*

[Unattributed item: "Nuclear Arms May Go East"]

[Text] The Soviet Union has removed part of its tactical nuclear weapons from the Baltics, said Pierre Schori,

secretary of the Swedish Foreign Ministry, on May 25 at a Conference of Labour Movements of countries bordering the Baltic Sea.

Mr. Schori said the Soviets have removed weapons that must be destroyed according to the US-Soviet armament reduction treaty. Moscow is also planning to transfer the remaining nuclear weapons from the Baltic region, so they cannot be used against the central Soviet power, the Norwegian News Agency NTB reported.

**Ranking Officers Answer Readers' Questions**

*91UM0751A Moscow KOMMUNIST  
VOORUZHENNYKH SIL in Russian No 9, May 91  
(Signed to press 08 May 91) pp 16-23*

[Letters to the editors of KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL and responses: "Military Reform: Without Harming the Country's Defense"; first two paragraphs are KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL introduction]

[Text] KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL receives numerous letters asking questions relative to the military reform in progress in the Army and Navy. The editors have prepared responses to the most pertinent and interesting questions.

This article is recommended for use by officer political training groups in their study of the topic "USSR Armed Forces Reform: Requirement, Nature, and Major Principles."

We can all see what perestroika has caused. Nothing good has come of it. Do we really intend to "restructure" our Armed Forces, also, merely to go along with the times? Is this not fraught with the danger of weakening the country's defense?

Captain S. Kozlov  
Executive Officer Motorized Infantry Battalion

[Marshall of the Soviet Union D. T. Yazov] In contradistinction to all military reforms of the past, the present military reform is associated not so much with strategic or military technical factors as with revolutionary socio-political and economic changes occurring within the country, and with major changes coming about in the international military and political situation. It is, along with the political, economic, legal and other reforms, a constituent part of perestroika, of the general process of renewal of our society, intended to effect a radical change in the existing system of defense construction.

The purpose of the reform is to create a system of defense construction which would assure its high efficiency at minimum cost in financial and other resources, with its principal tasks being effecting a fundamental reform and taking to the limits of sufficiency military production, while retaining and strengthening the latter's scientific, technical and manufacturing potential; optimizing the makeup and structure of the Armed Forces; raising their provisioning and training to a qualitatively new level; renewing the legal basis of defense construction; and creating an effective system of legal and social protection for servicemen and their dependents.

How did the military reform concept originate? I ask this, because I know that many changes of the past, those that happened in the country as well as in the Army, were detached from life, nothing more than mere "inventions." Therefore, is it possible that this particular concept of military reform was also "concocted" in the quiet of an office room?

Lieutenant Colonel N. Ivanov  
Military Pilot

[Minister of Defense D. T. Yazov] The conduct of the military reform assumes a radical reform in the defense construction system existing in our country. For this reason, the interested participation of wide circles of the public in the discussion of problems related to the reform is completely natural. There have been considerable differences of opinion on these problems, and various concepts have been proposed. All of them are undergoing careful analysis; those having merit are being summarized and used by the commission to the maximum extent to develop an integrated concept of military reform, with the minister of defense in charge of the latter.

There is no need to go into detail regarding the magnitude and complexity of this work. The point here is that this is not a matter involving the formulation of any particular statements or conclusions, but one of thorough consideration, substantiation, and interrelation of all measures relating to the reworking of the multiple-plan area of society's life activity that we have here in the area of defense. Participating in this work are large collectives of specialists and scientists; workers in many enterprises and departments involved in the resolution of tasks associated with the country's defensive capability and with the technical provisioning of the Armed Forces; and government and military leaders. Several sessions of the Ministry of Defense Collegium have been held to discuss the pressing problems of perestroika and the prospects of developing the service branches in an environment of societal renewal and changes in the international situation.

I know that there exists a draft concept of military reform proposed by the servicemen serving as people's deputies, in addition to the USSR Ministry of Defense's draft version. Could there be other concepts? Can you tell me something about alternative proposals?

Major I. Tursunov  
Deputy Battalion Commander for Military Political Work

[Army General M. A. Moiseyev] I must say that the submissions regarding reform are surprisingly substantive, offering many ideas and initiatives. They reflect the Soviet people's abiding interest in assuring a solid and reliable defense for the Fatherland. Unfortunately, these offerings have not received the attention they deserve in the mass media, with the exception of the military press. Only a few have been given any appreciable attention, with just one—that proposed by the group of service deputies—highlighted most of all. That one, incidentally, was also examined by the commission. Expert comments on this draft were forwarded to the deputies, and, judging from the latest versions, were used to some extent or other. Nonetheless, the draft has remained largely unchanged. It is still an abstract declaration, something which is considerably detached from the international military and political realities and our internal socio-economic realities, from the actual tasks of the country's defense and safety.

## MILITARY REFORM

JPRS-UMA-91-019

17 July 1991

[Colonel V. A. Chirvin, Candidate of Military Sciences]  
Why am I—a professional—not satisfied by the military reform concept proposed by the people's deputies?

Mainly because of its total failure to address the important topic of evaluation of the international military and political situation (to say nothing of the internal political situation). In other words, there is no starting point denoting an origin of any discussion that could be associated with defense. The point here is that military construction abhors abstraction. It should rest on a solid foundation of a thorough evaluation of the actual military and political situation and the balance of forces of the opposing sides, and it should include possible tasks to be levied on the Armed Forces in peacetime and wartime. The lack of this "foundation" neutralizes all the preceding discussions of the principle of assuring the state's security and reduces all the subsequent proposals to mere declarations.

One omission serves merely to give rise to another omission. In my view, a person cannot fail to note the utter inventiveness of some principles proposed in this concept as a basis for developing a military reform. Thus, one of the principles is worded as follows: "The exercise of oversight over the Ministry of Defense by higher state organs and society in general, with complete glasnost and maximum openness." Yes, the Ministry of Defense should be under the supervision of higher state organs. However, does this mean under the control of society in general? The point here is that society in general is the entity that is represented by higher organs of state authority. Is the phrase "society in general" a euphemism for an attempt to place the Ministry of Defense under the supervision of some kind of group, one that may exercise influence over mass information media and act ostensibly in the name of the people to develop highly important decisions regarding the country's defense, naturally based on its self-interests? (This is discussed in greater detail in Colonel V. Chirvin's article "Common Sense or Amateurism?", in KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL, No 2, 1991.)

I heard that the draft concept of the military reform was published in the mass media (for a narrow circle of readers, perhaps?). I did not have a chance to read it, not having gotten the PRAVITELSTVENNYY VESTNIK. Would it be possible to obtain information on the gist of the military reform and the phases it entails?

Major N. Vannikov  
Tank Battalion Commander

[Army General M. A. Moiseyev] In the first phase (by 1994), it is planned to accomplish in accordance with the agreement reached in Geneva and Vienna, if signed, measures involving reductions in nuclear and conventional armaments; complete the withdrawal of troops from Czechoslovakia and Hungary (1991), from Mongolia (1992) and Germany (1994). It is planned to remove as part of the Armed Forces structures that do not typically belong thereto the USSR Civil Defense, road large construction units and units; and disband

military construction detachments belonging to other ministries. Brought to completion will be all plans of operations and mobilization and the preparation of new acts of legislation governing military construction. Also planned is the relocation and preparation of stations within the Soviet Union for troops being withdrawn. Set into operation will be a change to the new system of training mobilization assets and implementation of the special-purpose program of social assurance for servicemen and their dependents and for persons discharged from active duty.

In the second phase (1994-1995), plans call for the virtual completion of reduction in the USSR Armed Forces and the organization of a strategic armed force within the territory of the USSR. It is planned to reorganize the central apparatus, refine the internal structure of military districts, and optimize the system of military schools. The change to the new system of training mobilization assets and specialties in short supply will be brought to completion.

In the third phase (1996-2000), it is planned to complete a 50-percent reduction in strategic offensive weapons and the technical rearmament of troops and the Navy; work will continue on development of a set of measures involving the improvement of quality parameters for the Army and Navy. In that period, it is also planned to reorganize and amalgamate combat arms and command and control elements that have similar combat missions and armaments, and assure complete implementation of the special-purpose social assurance program.

I would like to know the kinds of changes the service branches will undergo

. Captain V. Ignatovich  
Subunit Political Worker

[Army General M. A. Moiseyev] By the year 2000, the implementation of the forthcoming agreement reached with the USA relative to reduction in strategic offensive armaments will result in a decrease in number of strategic formations, large units and units of strategic nuclear forces and in their manpower of more than 30 percent.

The ground troops as before will constitute the basis of forces in the continental theaters of military operations. Plans call for reducing their strength by 10 to 12 percent, while retaining their rapid deployment capability to counter a military threat to the USSR. The number of armies, corps, and divisions will be reduced, and sub-units, units, large units, and forces reorganized.

The strength of the air defense forces will drop in the amount of 18 to 20 percent, but these forces will remain as constant readiness troops. The overall cost of the PVO [air defense] system will be diminished by providing surface-to-air missile troops, fighter aviation, and radio-technical troops with new combat equipment and by developing surveillance and troop command and control systems.

The Air Forces will be brought to the level of reasonable sufficiency; there will be a smaller number of aircraft types, and the rearmament periods of aviation large units and units shortened. Improvement of tables of organization will result in a 6- to 8-percent reduction in Air Forces manpower. Concurrent with this will be an enhancement in quality of flight personnel training and improvement in aircraft basing, primarily in the European part of the USSR.

In the Navy, the manpower and weapons effective ceiling will be maintained at a level of defense sufficiency commensurate with an actual threat to the interests of the USSR, with this made possible by qualitative renewal and improvement of command and control systems and of all support systems.

The strength of the USSR Rear Services will be kept at the same level, which is less than 2.6 percent of manpower strength of the USSR Armed Forces (48 percent in the U.S. Army). However, development of the Rear Services will be tied to the country's assimilation of a market economy.

It is also planned to effect a 30-percent reduction in command and control organs of forces, large units, units, and installations that are not a part of the service branches and are not associated with the assigned combat missions; and cut back the number of service schools and scientific research institutions.

Extensive changes carried out within the framework of Armed Forces reform will make it possible to reduce manpower to the level of 3.0 to 3.2 million men; eliminate redundant and similar elements; reduce the manpower requirement to a level commensurate with military danger and defense sufficiency; and lower directorate strength at the central, district, and army levels by 15 to 20 percent.

I was able to see American aircraft carriers at sea on a number of occasions. They are a powerful weapon, I can tell you. I believe that we would be way ahead as far as defense is concerned—now that we have decided to aim for quality parameters—if we could have ships of this kind. What is the Ministry of Defense's thinking in this regard?

Captain 2nd Rank Kalinin  
Ship Commanding Officer

[Marshal of the Soviet Union S. F. Akhromeyev] I find it necessary to say something about the Soviet Union's need for aircraft carriers. (I have been reproached for avoiding such a discussion with Academician G. A. Arbatov.) I must say this about the academician. He sees fit to intrude into military questions which are purely professional, asserting that the USSR has no requirement for aircraft carriers in today's favorable international conditions. I would be happy to agree if the conscience of a professional military man would permit this. I cannot agree with G. A. Arbatov for at least two reasons:

a) The USA and the USSR both possess strategic nuclear forces that they maintain at a high level of combat readiness. These forces of both sides include submarines that carry ballistic missiles. To keep up their combat readiness, these craft must take turns performing constant sea duty in seas and certain areas of oceans close to their shores. Missile-carrying submarines must be given protection from the air and afloat by defending them against aircraft, submarines, and surface combatants of a plausible adversary. Our land-based aircraft cannot perform this kind of mission. The only reliable way of performing this is to employ aircraft carriers and other support craft. Military science and practice have not yet devised any other way to perform this kind of task.

b) The USA has 15 carrier strike forces. (The President of the USA and the Pentagon, choosing to ignore the Soviet academician's advice, continue to provide them. They just recently launched another aircraft carrier of 100,000 tons displacement; two more are on the building ways.) The USA sets their principal mission as protecting the country's interests. There are six aircraft carriers steaming in the Persian Gulf and in nearby areas alone. The combat radius of strike aircraft they have aboard is 1,200 kilometers. The fighter aircraft based on our aircraft carriers are to comprise the first echelon repulsing assaults by these aircraft on the territory of the USSR.

That is why we need aircraft carriers. I do understand that some persons are not in favor of providing expensive weapons systems, but, for the present, we cannot do without them.

Academician G. A. Arbatov feels that in the matter of the country's defense we can plan to a great extent on good intentions on the part of the U. S. administration. However, to be honest, I have strong reservations about these good intentions toward the Soviet Union. This, at least, as far as our country's defense is concerned.

It is no secret that the prestige of Army service has suffered a serious decline. There are refuseniks and deserters. Therefore, with the changes being made in the Armed Forces, could there be an advantage to making a change to contract service?

Lieutenant S. Ishchenko  
Senior Platoon Leader

[Marshal of the Soviet Union D. T. Yazov] Improvement of manpower acquisition is one of the major aspects of reform. Research and computations indicate that the combination volunteer-compulsory system we have decided on is optimum with respect to the military strategic and socio-economic points of view. This incidentally is the system being employed in the vast majority of modern armies of the world. The thinking here is that the personnel slots that are critical to maintaining combat readiness at the necessary level are filled by cadre-type personnel those termed in everyday language to be "professional"—the idea being that military service is their profession. Other specialty slots that

do not require extensive professional training are filled by draftees. Approximately one-third of our Armed Forces presently consists of professional cadre: officers, Army warrant officers, Navy warrant officers, and personnel on extended term of service.

The "volunteer" and "compulsory" component ratio in our combination system may vary as a function of the equipment and weapons development level, and the military-political, socio-economic, and demographic situations, as well as other considerations. In this regard, we plan to carry out an experiment in the course of reform, whereby personnel will have two options starting in 1991 for service in the Navy. Designed for seamen, soldiers, NCOs and petty officers, one option will be 3 years of volunteer service at 150 rubles and more pay a month, with the stipulation that the serviceman acquire a military specialty within the first six months. The other option consists of two years of compulsory service. Ways are being sought to improve the personnel pipeline system in the other service branches.

We generally intend in line with the military reform to effect qualitative improvement in professional training for officers and enlisted personnel. It is hardly advisable to make a change to an all-volunteer army under the present historically-defined conditions or in the foreseeable future. This, due not solely to the associated considerably higher costs. The chief consideration here is that this kind of army is in fact unable to constitute an effective means for resolving tasks of a reliable defense of the country.

Also undergoing changes in the course of military reform are political agencies. Will any major changes be made, or is perestroyka nothing more than a verbal exercise?

Captain N. Musaliyev  
Political Worker

[Colonel General N. I. Shlyaga] The new Rules of the CPSU clearly state that all party organs are elective. This means that there should be a demarcation of the functions of political organs—into military political functions, up to and including the Main Political Directorate, on the one hand. They will become organs for carrying out state policy in the area of defense and security of the USSR, and in the education and social protection of military personnel. Party organs, on the other hand, from regimental party committee to higher party organ of the Armed Forces—the All-Army Party Conference, will become elective.

In practice, measures related to political organ reform, as called for by Ukase of the USSR President, will be carried out within the context of the military reform in progress, in consonance with the missions assigned to the Army and Navy.

It is planned to set up military-political organs in most military units in which political organs presently exist.

Plans call for proceeding in stages to reorganize the previous political organ institution, setting up new military-political organs in the form of departments and directorates, to be subordinate to the Main Military-Political Directorate. Their activity should be governed by constitutional law.

Being introduced at the regiment-military school level is the institution of deputy commanders for military-political work. Reform measures call for a review of the present system of training political cadres.

... The renewed political organs, which should differ from their predecessors largely in loss of functions related to providing leadership to party, trade union, and Komsomol organizations, should in our view retain and develop the functions of political education, ideological work, culture, military discipline, political and military information, both within the Army and outside of it; and of providing leadership to the military press and coordinating the work of social and psychological services.

We look upon the new political organs as having the priority mission of offering social protection to service personnel and their dependents, and also to officers, warrant officers, and extended-service personnel who are discharged into the reserve or into retirement.

The future political organs will be working closely with soviets of people's deputies in the center and in localities, operating on an equal basis with party and other socio-political organizations. The people should be granted more rights and opportunities to exercise through their chosen representatives control over how their sons serve, what the sons need, and how they can be helped.

In our view, the new party structure of the Armed Forces should inject new life into Army and Navy party work. The Army party organization is one of the largest and most vibrant contingents of our party, with more than 1,100,000 communists in its ranks. We are looking forward to continued development of initiative and creativity of the party masses, to the strengthening of primary party organizations, and to maximum democratization of party life.

(The above material was taken from D. T. Yazov's books "Military Reform" and "What Kind of Shield Do We Need?"—Moscow, Voenizdat 1990; "The Well-Forgotten Past"—Moscow, Voenizdat, 1991; newspaper KRASNAYA ZVEZDA Nos 127 and 266, 1990; periodical KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL, No 2, 1991. We also recommend for independent study articles dealing with military reform published in the above publications.)

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### Experiment With Special Purpose Medical Detachment

91UM0745A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian  
20 Jun 91 First Edition p 1

[Article by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent Colonel A. Polyakov: "Special Medical Detachment, or Who Helps in an Emergency?"]

[Text] One after another, explosions thundered, a shock wave shook mighty trees in the forest, and an orange smoke fell over the crowns of pines and firs. The dark green silhouettes of military "first aid" vehicles could be glimpsed between the tree trunks.

That is how a training exercise of the special purpose medical detachment began in the district training center. It has been created at the 408th district military hospital of the Kiev Military District. More than 20 tents were set up in a large field and under them were surgical, antishock, traumatology, and other departments. Attendants delivered the first "victims" there under the cold soaking rains, slipping on the sodden earth.

"An exercise imitating areas of destruction with the arrival of afflicted patients, which is essentially for training, should help us to verify the detachment's readiness, its forces and capabilities of handling real problems," says district medical service chief G. Tsyanok. "Unfortunately, we can already see that initially there were serious shortcomings in the structure of the detachment."

One cannot but heed Georgiy Vasilyevich's words. He spent two hard years in Afghanistan and then worked hard in Chernobyl, so he knows first hand how a medical subdivision should be if it is ready to go to a disaster zone at the first call.

But the creation of this detachment was not an independent activity. In keeping with an order of the USSR Ministry of Defense, such detachments have been created under the Main Military Clinical Hospital imeni Academician N.N. Burdenko and also a number of other hospitals, including the 408th district military hospital.

A special medical detachment was created to render on-the-spot skilled medical service under extreme conditions during peacetime. This includes earthquake zones and the scenes of large disasters at enterprises. According to the roster the detachment has about 50 officers, but only 15 are present. The rest are supposed to arrive from treatment institutions. With 10 GAZ-66 all-terrain vehicles it is impossible to set up more than 30 tents, especially without a loading team. There were no provisions for transportation of the detachment's personnel. In essence, the detachment was simply tacked on to the district hospital, which helped it to get out into the field.

"So we can see once again how some people want to solve large problems with small efforts," says Colonel of the Medical Service G. Tsyanok. "It is our common

firm conviction that the detachment should be fully staffed, that is, all the positions should be filled."

This idea was corroborated by everyone we spoke with during the exercises. And indisputable arguments were given. For a week, the time of the exercise, the normal work of the district hospital practically ground to a halt since its leading specialists were "thrown in" to staff the detachment. Of course, one can take specialists from other treatment institutions, but that would sharply increase the time it would take for the detachment to get ready, and the quality of the work of the specialists would probably suffer because of the lack of the proper interaction with intermediate medical personnel.

"How could I stand at the operating table if I were being assisted by a nurse I had never seen before?" asks Doctor of Medical Sciences Colonel of the Medical Service V. Belyy. "Of course, it is possible, but under extreme conditions every minute counts and we must understand one another without a lot of words. There are many specialties missing in the detachment of physicians. A surgeon will not operate on a damaged eye but there is no ophthalmologist. This staff was created according to the principle of the medical sanitation battalion, but they forgot that this is not appropriate for peacetime."

The civilian specialists, dozens of whom participated in the exercises, fully agree with these statements from the military medics. For example, the director of the Kiev regional scientific production center for emergency medical aid, A. Pugachev, noted that the detachment was "armed" with outdated Yelizorov equipment... produced as long ago as 1973, even though this equipment has been improved significantly since that time. And even the tents which housed the departments are from out of the past. Such formations abroad have special modules with modern equipment, for after all it is first aid that saves people's lives. In the exercises I saw several powerful specialized vehicles with a detoxification division in their back ends, where it is possible under field conditions to withdraw toxic elements from the body. Alas, it was too soon to rejoice.

"We asked the district staff for these vehicles for the training exercises," I was told by Colonel of the Medical Service V. Popov, candidate of medical sciences. "They were 'filled' with medical equipment. Of course, we wanted to work under these conditions but our distribution chart did not include these machines."

Well, are we once again passing off what we desire for what is real? I would not say that. One can also understand the medics. They showed how convenient these vehicles are in the field, in an emergency, and there you can see that the district command would help somehow and the civilian leaders would "vote in favor," for they have the means, and the military would be acting in their interests, the peaceful people. And the military medics would spare no efforts. Incidentally, I chanced to hear a curious conversation. A military doctor, reporting on the

work of one of the divisions, gave the number of possible operations per day. His civilian colleagues were doubtful.

"In Afghanistan we did more," he replied.

This argument worked. Of course, none of the civilian doctors had any intention of holding back under emergency conditions either. But still it was very noticeable that the staff structure of the detachment already requires working to the point of exhaustion. It is time to put an end to practices like this. Incidentally, real professionals have been recruited for the detachment. They are commanded by Colonel of the Medical Service A. Palavin. Almost all the officers have been through Chernobyl and Armenia and served in Afghanistan.

On the day when the exercises were being conducted there was a train accident near Chernovtsy. Here right in the field Colonel of the Medical Service G. Tsyganok contacted the medics in Chernovtsy, who responded that they were able to take care of it by themselves.

The detachment's zone of operation includes three districts—Kiev, Odessa, and Carpathian—and the Black Sea fleet, that is, the entire territory of the Ukraine and Moldova. It would seem that by setting such broad and important tasks for the special purpose medical detachment, it is necessary to approach its staffing quite responsibly, not to be defeated by difficulties of the day, and to carry out the main assignment: The detachment must be fully staffed.

### Comparing French, Soviet Civil Defense

*91UM0745B Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA  
in Russian 20 Jun 91 First Edition p 2*

[Interview with Joel Lebeschu, director of the Civil Defense Service of the French Interior Ministry, by Colonel N. Sergeyev, KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent; place and date not given: "There is No Room for Commercialism When It Comes to Saving People's Lives"]

[Text] A French delegation from the Department of Civil Defense visited the Soviet Union recently. It visited the advanced central USSR Civil Defense course in Moscow and enterprises in Leningrad. The delegation was headed by Joel Lebeschu, director of the Civil Defense Service of the French Interior Ministry.

[Sergeyev] Mr. Lebeschu, could you tell us about the purpose of your visit and how fruitful it has been?

[Lebeschu] This was a return visit on invitation from your civil defense chief Mr. Govorov, who was in France in 1990. We wanted to see what your civil defense organization here in the Union is like. Of course, in a week we cannot claim to have gotten to know your civil defense system well but, since our work was carefully planned and very well organized and our hosts answered all our questions candidly, we can say with confidence

that we now know much more about your civil defense system than we did before we arrived.

[Sergeyev] What caught your attention most of all?

[Lebeschu] You have a very complete and integrated control system in the civil defense structure, on both the vertical and the horizontal planes. I have in mind the broad geographical coverage and the administrative jurisdiction of all the civil defense structural subdivisions. Serious attention should also be given to the notification system, both regional and for the country as a whole. This is a clear achievement and an advantage. And another thing. Unfortunately, you have rich experience in emergencies and disasters, which is also of a certain interest to us...

[Sergeyev] And how do you intend to take advantage of this in your country?

[Lebeschu] A disaster or an emergency cannot be either Soviet or French—they are common to all human societies. A country that has gained any experience in this area is obliged to make sure that people are protected from the same kind of accident in another country and to save human lives. Therefore we were interested in how you organized the aid to the victims and what measures you took to make sure that such a disaster does not occur again. For such an event the USSR and France has an agreement for the creation of joint commissions which will exchange information pertaining to common problems in our civil defense departments. And we will carefully study your information about the causes and consequences of disasters so that they do not occur in our country.

[Sergeyev] We have a saying that goes "Do not buy trouble." I think this is why many people in our country—both leaders and ordinary citizens—are negligent about training and civil defense safety measures. What is this situation like in your country?

[Lebeschu] I think that all people are the same: The majority of Russians, French, and other peoples think that the sky will not fall in on their heads and a disaster could happen to anyone but them. And therefore preparing people for possible emergencies and informing them about various unforeseen occurrences is just as difficult for us as it is for you. Taking this circumstance into account, in our country, at every enterprise, plant, or other facility, be it private or state, there is a concrete, special plan for all possible kinds of emergencies. We call this the "red plan." The knowledge of this plan and its precise implementation is the law for the leader and his responsibility to the state and government.

[Sergeyev] Incidentally, about responsibility. Which of you is responsible for all measures for cleaning up after one disaster or another?

[Lebeschu] The entire civil defense system is under one person—the minister of the interior. But the leaders may differ in each specific case, depending on the scale of the

disaster. If there is an emergency in a city, then it is the mayor of the city. If it is at the level of the department—then it is the prefect. If it is on a national or international scale—then it is the minister of the interior and the director of civil defense, but in each case only one person is responsible for everything.

[Sergeyev] Does this jurisdictional structure make it possible for you to avoid problems in managing civil defense forces during rescue work?

[Lebeschu] Not completely. We have functionaries from the Ministry of the Interior working in our civil defense structure and they give orders to the military temporarily assigned from the Defense Ministry for conducting rescue operations. Additionally, there are state bureaucrats working in civil defense and also those who are paid by local authorities. This creates certain difficulties on which we are now working. And, incidentally, we were interested in how you had arranged this combined chain of command.

[Sergeyev] In addition to military units, what other formations participate in civil defense measures?

[Lebeschu] In addition to the fact that the defense minister places at my disposal military units which, incidentally, are especially trained in civil defense and are used for fighting forest fires and eliminating sea pollution, our system includes fire services, police, and physicians. There is also a group of rescue experts who can fly quickly to any point on the globe. Thus we sent a group to Armenia after the earthquake. It was headed by Mr. Chevalier, a physician who is a member of our delegation today. He returned from there with an order "For personal bravery"...

[Sergeyev] What do you think are the causes of our emergencies and disasters?

[Lebeschu] To be honest, for us it was more important to understand the system of aid for people after the disaster. As for the Chernobyl accident, our nuclear power plants have been constructed according to a principle which prevents that kind of disaster from happening. Your nuclear energy specialists have even said that our system for preventing accidents at power plants is more efficient and reliable. But this does not mean that we could never have an accident.

[Sergeyev] Are there problems with financing civil defense in France?

[Lebeschu] I do not know of a country that does not have problems with financing. Any new business or enterprise immediately encounters finances as the center of all its problems. Everything depends on the degree of economic crisis in the country at the given moment, and then situations arise that require certain extraordinary measures.

[Sergeyev] When can one expect broader cooperation between our countries in the area of civil defense?

[Lebeschu] We signed a memorandum with Mr. Govorov which earmarks a schedule for diplomatic exchange

of experts, specialists, and instructors. Our budget allows for the possibility of beginning this exchange this year.

[Sergeyev] I saw how you turned over to our civil defense leaders documents showing your work experience with specific emergencies without making this a commercial secret.

[Lebeschu] You are right about that. In this area there should be no commercialism.

[Sergeyev] May I ask a question that is a little bit off the subject?

[Lebeschu] Please.

[Sergeyev] You left France with one person as head of the government and when you return there will be another. Is it possible that there will be some change in your personal life because of this?

[Lebeschu] I am not a political figure. I am a bureaucrat and I serve the state first of all. If tomorrow the minister of the interior were to appoint another civil defense director, that is his right and I would have to deal with it. I would take another job without any personal drama. This is the essence of democracy.

[Sergeyev] It is probably good that you are so optimistic about changes in the government.

[Lebeschu] No, this is not optimism or pessimism or even realism—it is a true manifestation of democracy in a democratic country.

[Sergeyev] All we have been talking about is work and politics—let us "dilute" the conversation with some of your personal impressions of your trip. Do you object?

[Lebeschu] Not at all.

[Sergeyev] What surprised you on this trip?

[Lebeschu] The sincere desire of the parties participating in the joint work. And I regard the visit itself as a surprising phenomenon: Even two or three years ago we could not have even dreamed of this.

[Sergeyev] ...did anything disappoint you?

[Lebeschu] No, I cannot recall any disappointments, unless you count the fact that we have spent such a short amount of time in your country.

[Sergeyev] ...what pleased you?

[Lebeschu] The fact that in our departments and in many other areas our country is arranging close contacts with such an unusual country as yours, with whom we have deep historical ties and traditions.

[Sergeyev] What names and symbols do you associate with the concepts of the Soviet Union and Russia?

[Lebeschu] Aleksandr Nevskiy, Peter the Great, Pushkin, Lenin, Eisenstein, and others. But for the majority of Frenchmen, including myself, the Soviet Union means above all Moscow and Leningrad. And I was glad to have the opportunity to see these cities for the first time.

**Basis for German Housing Contracts Questioned**

*91UF0816A Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA  
in Russian 20 Apr 91 p 3*

[Article by Sergey Kornilov: "No Greater Numbers, No Cheaper Prices"]

[Text] Have you ever wondered why gold mined in Russia is a stable factor of poverty and ruin of the peoples on the boundless expanse from the Urals to the Pacific?

Have you ever wondered why the center trades in Russian gold, enriching itself?

I suggest that we grasp together the essence of an episode which is unfolding precisely during these days, as they say, before our very eyes.

At issue is the provision to the USSR of 7.8 billion marks [DM] for the construction of housing with a floor space of 2 million square meters in the territory of the European part of the country for servicemen and their families withdrawn from East Germany, in keeping with the signed intergovernmental agreement between the FRG and the USSR. By 1994, 36,000 apartments should be built; these are 17 housing developments in the Ukraine and 10 each in Russia and Belorussia. The German side is using the same funds to build four "turnkey" prefabricated panel combines in Russia to provide elements necessary for construction.

The USSR Ministry of Defense, a purely Union establishment, acts as the main customer for this project from our side. It has two foreign-trade associations of the MVES [Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations], the Soyuzvneshstroyimport [All-Union Association for Importing Construction Equipment and Materials] and the Tekhnoksport [All-Union Export and Import Association for Industrial Goods], likewise reporting to the Union, involved in selecting foreign construction companies. The foreign-trade associations decided, in turn, that they were not able to accomplish the task on their own (as they had only modest experience after 15 years of operation), and organized some kind of a consortium which was joined by five German companies headed by Dorsch Consult, and the two foreign-trade associations, the Goskomarkhitektury [State Committee for Architecture and Town Planning], and several more organizations on the Soviet side.

However, let us note one thing. Why are foreign companies being sought for the role of general contractor? During the many years of the presence of foreign construction companies in the Soviet market, fruitful relations between these companies and Soviet construction organizations have developed. It would appear that now is precisely the time, while an opportunity is opening, to enhance and expand such cooperation for the benefit of the country, rouse the class of domestic construction personnel through joint work, and generate foreign exchange for the country. However, the generals decided that Soviet construction organizations have no business

bargaining in; they are barely meeting their own plans. Any Tom, Dick, or Harry can work for foreign exchange.

A prequalifying selection of companies wishing to win a tender (i.e., to secure an order to build to a specific design a housing settlement) was organized. The terms for prequalifying selection were published in KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, and they cannot be called anything but draconian, cutting off all opportunities for small- and medium-size Western companies and all Soviet companies to participate in the program. For example, the annual sales of a contender company should be no smaller than DM500 million.

I asked the general director of the Russian concern Sevzapstroy [expansion not identified], V. Reshetilov, to comment on the terms of the prequalifying selection organized by the USSR Ministry of Defense and the consortium. This is what he said: "Our annual turnover amounts to 7 billion rubles [R] in new prices. We build civilian facilities with an area of 7 million square meters a year. In 1990, we overfulfilled our plan for all types of work. What the Ministry of Defense and the Soyuzvneshstroyimport have thought up is insane. The military has determined that the cost of one square meter of housing space is between DM2,500 and DM2,700. Meanwhile, we could build it for half the price and no worse. Yet, we were not allowed to participate in the prequalifying selection. I do not want to tell you the name of the big boss in the Ministry of Defense who put it precisely like this: 'We will not let the Soviets near it!'"

Let us note one more detail. Where did the aforementioned cost of one square meter of housing space amounting to between DM2,500 and DM2,700 come from? Who calculated it? In general, who determined the standard of residences in the settlements under construction? No answer can be found to these questions—it is a secret.

In response to their offers to take part in developing the concept and designing housing settlements, three leading institutes of urban design from Russia, the Ukraine, and Belorussia heard approximately what V. Reshetilov did: "You missed the boat. Proposals have already been sent to foreign companies."

Meanwhile, the proposal of designers and town planners, supported by Soviet construction organizations, applied an approach to solving the problem which was different in principle. For the DM7.8 billion allocated by the FRG Government, the USSR would buy flexible design and construction technologies in the West, and "turnkey" enterprises of the construction industry would be built. This would make it possible to get ahead perceptibly in the sphere of construction in several regions of Russia, the Ukraine, and Belorussia, because, after filling the order of the Ministry of Defense, the enterprises could work for civilian construction. The authors of this project believe, for a good reason, that their solution accommodates the interests of not only hundreds of thousands of servicemen

and their families, but also the millions of citizens of Russia, the Ukraine, and Belorussia.

Let us digress for a moment from the USSR. German construction companies drawn into the implementation of the program at the initial, organizational stage, accepted the rules of Soviet behind-the-scene games, and were not averse to taking advantage of them for their own benefit. An opportunity arose to get rid of, within the framework of the program, the construction technology of the former GDR, quite imperfect from both the technical and ecological points of view, and supply it to the USSR, and to develop the construction of military settlements on this basis. In addition, an opportunity arose to distribute construction orders among "their own people," taking advantage of the stiff conditions for the prequalifying selection of companies, and thus to repatriate to the FRG the DM7.8 billion allocated by the government.

However, unlike the USSR, the FRG is an open and democratic country. A scandal was brewing. I will quote excerpts from an appeal by one of the leaders of the FRG Union of Architects Karl Stekevey to U. Geisenderfer at the Ministry of Economics: "...we believed that your ministry would use free-lance FRG architects, operating in partial cooperation with Soviet architects for performing town planning, design, and work planning; this could become a worthy model for filling orders in the sphere of planning and design...however, the general contractor for the project, 'Working Community for Housing Construction in the USSR,' refused, apparently deliberately, to use free-lance architects and town planners.... Unless the situation changes, this transaction may become a real scandal, and deal an irreparable blow to support for medium-size entrepreneurs and self-employed individuals which your ministry continuously propagates...."

"If this behavior bordering on cynicism assumes a real shape, then, apparently, the people for whom the construction projects are intended will end up in ghetto-type houses built with industrially produced standard materials...."

The USSR Union of Architects did not stay away from it either. Eight USSR people's deputies, including First Secretary of the Board of the USSR Union of Architects Yu. Platonov, sent a letter on 21 January of this year to two committees of the USSR Supreme Soviet—for the issues of defense and state security, and for architecture and construction—in which they invited the attention of the parliament of the country to how impermissible the progress of implementing the program was.

What is the explanation of the position of the USSR Ministry of Defense, an all-powerful Union organization?

First of all, potent social tensions inside the organization itself, which have especially exacerbated recently in conjunction with the start of the troop withdrawal from

Eastern Europe. The results of these tensions are unpredictable, and the leadership of the Ministry of Defense is concerned about building the first housing complexes for the servicemen on time. The leadership of the Ministry of Defense failed to foresee the present-day situation ahead of time. This is why it is now patching holes for which it is to blame to begin with. However, while patching these holes and thinking about nothing but the issues of the moment, the leadership of the Ministry of Defense is sowing the seeds of no less powerful and dangerous tensions in our society by its hasty and short-sighted actions.

In an interview given to journalist Ye. Piskunov (IZVESTIYA, 29 January 1991), First Deputy USSR Minister of Defense General of the Army K. Kochetov said that it is planned to use the military settlements already built as base sites. K. Kochetov believes that this is a more practical solution than building everything from the ground up at new sites. However, he admitted that local authorities allocate land for construction to the military establishment with great difficulty. Undoubtedly, this is the crux of the matter. Under the legislation in effect, the construction of new settlements is coordinated at the republic level, whereas the expansion of those already in existence is at the local level. Knowing how "firmly" local soviets subscribe to perestroika positions at present, it is easy to understand that it was not particularly difficult for the all-powerful organization to coordinate with them the expansion of construction inside the settlements, all the more so because military and party power, the telephone rule of which still remains in effect in the provinces, have always been two peas in a pod.

In reality, the decision to build inside the existing settlements made by the USSR Ministry of Defense absolutely fails to take into account the most complex demographic problems of the Ukraine, Belorussia, and the European segment of Russia. These are problems that have developed in conjunction with the emigration of Soviet citizens to the West, problems caused by the consequences of the Chernobyl disaster, and problems caused by a lack of human resources in rural areas. The settlement of servicemen and their families should be arranged with all of these factors in view.

In addition to what has been said, Director of the Russian State Institute of Town Planning A. Frolov points to yet another psychological aspect of the decision made by the USSR Ministry of Defense. By German standards, the cost of one square meter of residential space amounting to between DM2,500 and DM2,700 is quite low (it includes the cost of common-grid amenities and the infrastructure of the social, cultural, and service sphere), but by Soviet standards it is quite high. It will be a serious affront to the dignity of local families of servicemen whose living conditions are, putting it mildly, modest if, right before their eyes, those arriving from the promised lands will occupy much better apartments here as well.

A. Frolov and his team have calculated that not 2 million square meters of residential space could be built in the USSR but, as the saying goes, 222 million square meters, if the foreign exchange funds provided by the FRG were used thrifitly, and if we embarked on the path of retrofitting operational flexible construction technologies and of adopting new ones. This is like buying milk in one case, and a cow in the other.

On 25 February, the prequalifying selection of companies for the first four tenders ended. Out of 101 companies, 24 remained. Out of these, 11 are German companies, others are Turkish, Finnish, Austrian, French, and Italian. However, this information was not released anywhere in the USSR; it was received from the FRG. The Soyuzvneshstroyimport considers this confidential, and General N. Gryaznov says: "There is no point in calling in fire on yourself each and every time. Whatever we do draws nothing but criticism." However, it is known from independent sources of information that a certain West German company is already negotiating with its long-time partner in the USSR, a major construction enterprise, with regard to signing a contract work agreement, being 100 percent certain that it will be precisely the one to win tender No. 1.

Well, well...

However, let us revisit the consortium. So, several German consulting companies have formed a consortium in order to provide consulting services. Several Soviet organizations joined the consortium: the two foreign trade associations, the Zagrantekhnstroy [expansion not identified] Administration, the MVES Main Technical Administration, and the Goskomarkhitektury. It immediately leaps at one that all of these are Union organizations. There are neither republic nor independent specialists in the consortium. Nonetheless, the consortium should prepare appropriate documentation and administer tenders of which there should be more than 40 all told—for 38 residential settlements and four housing construction combines. How is the operation of the consortium financed? It turned out that it is from the same DM7.8 billion!

Russians, Ukrainians, and Belorussians, and other peoples of our amazing country, do not wait for the center to do something useful for you. You are not of concern to it! Once again, not of concern...

[Photo caption] The cover of the magazine HORIZONT (FRG) No. 5, dated 18 January 1991. Picture caption: The construction deal in the East. The hedgehog says: "I call the shots here!"

**Funding Problems of Far East MD Procuracy**  
*91UM0679A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian*  
*25 May 91 First Edition p 4*

[Article by Lieutenant Colonel V. Usoltsev: "Themis With an Outstretched Hand"]

[Text] Imagine the following situation: after a long search the investigating agencies were finally able to catch a group of especially dangerous criminals and arrest them. But after two days the criminals had to be let go, because there was no money to pay for keeping them, arranging various kinds of expert examinations, and bring in lawyers.

Of course such a situation seems ridiculous. But this is the actual current state of affairs in the judge advocate's office of the Far Eastern Military District.

As confirmation of this the judge advocate of the Far Eastern Military District Major-General of the legal service B. Gurinovich spread out before me a large stack of investigative, explanatory and other documents.

I took one of the folders at random and read: "The Judge Advocate's office of the Petropavlovsk-Kamchatka garrison has been investigating a criminal matter of pre-meditated murder. During the preliminary investigation into this matter forensic-biological, forensic-technical, forensic-medical, and handwriting expert studies were conducted by the Kamchatka Oblast office of forensic-medical experts. Because the aforementioned office had converted to self-accounting and self-financing we were presented with a bill for the expert services in the amount of 6,000 rubles. However, the finance department director of the troop unit, on which we depend for financial allowances, has refused to pay for the expert examinations, justifying their decision by a lack of funds.

The Judge Advocate of the Petropavlovsk-Kamchatka garrison, legal service is Colonel V. Chernenko.

We do not have money for such purposes, explained Major-General of the legal service B. Gurinovich, because before adoption of the pertinent laws of the RSFSR and USSR in the past year the payment for such services was made by the state. The recently adopted laws were insufficient from the financial point of view.

Not so long ago the directors of the Khabarovsk Municipal Clinical Psychiatric Hospital sent the judge advocate a letter, in which they asked to take up the question of compensation for the expenses related to the stay of persons under investigation at the forensic-psychiatric clinic in the hospital. It was suggested that an agreement be concluded to transfer money for these services by a written order.

It should be mentioned that the cost for one man to stay at the forensic-psychiatric department before the price increase was more than 22 rubles per day. This sum has now greatly increased.

I understand that medical workers are now in a terribly impoverished situation, said the district judge advocate, but where can we get the money?

Several military servicemen are currently being investigated, who have committed serious crimes, including murder. They must be subjected to forensic-psychiatric examination. If one considers that on average such a

procedure lasts three weeks, and for one year, according to statistics of the last five years, from 270 to 380 clinical examinations are held, it is easy to calculate that no less than 140,000 rubles are required. For all needs, including temporary duty expenditures, the Ministry of Defence allocates the district judge advocate only half this sum. And there are other expenses, which are related to new economic realities. For example, the criminal investigation requires about 250 to 300 rubles, the forensic-biological work about 1,000 to 1,500 rubles, and recordkeeping tasks up to 900 rubles.

An additional 450,000 rubles will be needed this year just to pay for all kinds of expert investigations according to forecasts of members of the judge advocate's office of the district.

This does not include all our financial problems, advised Major-General of the legal service V. Gurinovich. Payment for judge advocate services is not provided for in any of the articles listing our expenses. But according to the recently enacted laws we are supposed to immediately provide assistance to the arrested persons after apprehending them.

According to data of the past year nearly 70 per cent of the servicemen who were tried under the military justice system, having no real chance to pay their legal bills, filed petitions. Defenders had to be assigned to them for this purpose, that is at government expense. A similar trend can be seen at the present time. According to our records no less than 600,000 rubles is required for this purpose. At least one million additional rubles is needed to support normal operations of the workers of the district judge advocate office.

One asks: How can this be? One cannot let criminals go free because of financial insolvency of the legal protection agencies.

#### Food Allowance for Duty Travel To Increase

91UM0732A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian  
15 Jun 91 First Edition p 3

[Letter to the Editor by Junior Sergeant V. Mezentsev: "Sell Your Shoes"]

[Text] I serve in an independent military cargo escort battalion. I honestly admit that it is difficult for us. My comrades spend most of their time with weapons in hand, as they say, near the clatter of rail car wheels. Our temporary duty routes literally run to every corner of the country. Sometimes trips last 30 days or even longer.

But the soldiers and sergeants try to carry out their military missions in the highest possible manner and we do not receive serious complaints about our work. But we have many difficulties. You cannot list them all. But I cannot be silent about one of them.

After the price increases, temporary duty assignments have become difficult for us. Judge for yourselves: they

allocate per diem rates of a bit more than two rubles per day per person. Besides, we have to return from temporary duty assignments on passenger trains. A glass of tea costs 50 kopeks and we cannot even begin to talk about basic soup. The last guard detail recently returned from Siberia. The comrades said that on the road they starved to the point that they sold their army boots.

I do not know who determined these wretched per diem standards. Although conversations are circulating in our units that, they say, they will be reviewed soon with a view toward increasing them. Just one question—when?

For now prior to a prolonged temporary duty assignment, soldiers send telegrams home with requests to send even an R10 note for subsistence on the trip and the first sergeant is strictly warning people to protect their equipment. He has reason to warn them....

Junior Sergeant V. Mezentsev

FROM THE EDITORIAL STAFF: Colonel V. Litvintsev from USSR Ministry of Defense Central Rations Directorate informed us that in the very near future they plan to increase the sum of travel money for guards who escort military cargoes to R8-10 per day.

#### Makashov Orders Land Cultivation to Avert Food Shortage

91UM0772B Moscow TRUD in Russian 28 Jun 91 p 1

[Order issued by Volga-Ural Military District Commander Colonel-General Albert Makashov, Samara: "Army Farmers"]

[Text] Volga-Ural Military District Commander Colonel-General Albert Makashov issued an order which demanded that division and unit commanders and heads of military educational institutions plow and sow empty lands within the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Defense with feed crops.

A meat, potatoes, and vegetable production plan has been set for each military subunit. In the words of Volga-Ural Military District staff officers, Colonel-General Makashov's order was caused by the lack of guarantees that military units would be provided with food from state reserves in accordance with prescribed standards.

#### Military Transport's View of Withdrawal from Europe

91UM0772C Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA  
in Russian 3 Jul 91 First Edition p 1

[Article by Captain D. Lebedev, senior assistant to the Kaliningrad Seaport and River Port Water Sector Military Commander: "The Nail Stumbling Block: The Problems of Withdrawing Soviet Troops from Eastern Europe from the Point of View of a Military Transport Communications Services Officer"]

[Text] Kaliningrad Seaport has always been one of the primary transshipment points for supplying the Groups of Soviet Forces in the PNR [Polish People's Republic] and GDR [German Democratic Republic]. And, of course, the workload has increased immeasurably when we need to withdraw from Germany in three years what we transported to Germany over nearly four decades.

In fact, the workload is already quite appreciable right now although, judging by everything, the peak of the transport movements is still ahead. And it is not surprising that there have been quite a few specific problems in this situation which are having a negative impact on the rhythm of the troop withdrawals.

Last year, a large group of officers and generals visited Kaliningrad Seaport and assessed the port's capability to receive our troops from Germany. A Baltic Military District rear services task force staff headed by Colonel Yu. Orlov was formed at about the same time. According to its plan, they had to organize receiving equipment from abroad and its further shipment to military districts in cooperation with VOSO [Military Transport Communications Service] organs which plan and manage military transport movements. Everything would be fine but it now seems that, while planning the withdrawal from abroad, we did not totally imagine the entire depth of the impending difficulties. They are also forcing us to become involved with matters that are far removed from "organizing planning and management."

Do you remember the story about the ill-fated nail that did not end up in the blacksmith's forge in time? As a result, they did not shoe the courier's horse and the order was not delivered to the troops who also suffered a bitter defeat. Judging by everything, we will become witnesses to the continuation of the "nail" drama in the background of the withdrawal of our troops from Eastern Europe. Yes, ordinary 150-200 millimeter nails or, more accurately, the "existence of their absence," are frequently holding back the shipment of equipment from Kaliningrad Seaport. The fact is that they, along with cable, are used to secure equipment to railway flat cars. For example, no less than 35 kilograms of cable, of which, incidentally, there is also a catastrophic shortage, is needed to secure one BTR [Armored Transport Vehicle]. Things have reached the point that we recommend that the subunits being withdrawn supply themselves with nails and cable in Germany.

Of course, you can complain as much as you want with regard to our mass shortage but the officers of our Baltic Military District rear services staff and task force simply do not have time to do this. And if only the problem was just nails and cable. As we all know, during the last year the situation in Eastern Europe has developed in such a way that we have had to change the troop withdrawal routes: if we had previously planned to send the troop trains using the shortest route through Poland and all calculations had been conducted considering this variation, now the troop columns are going to northern Germany to the seaports of Rostock and Mukran. Then

vehicles and equipment are loaded on ships. A transshipment is once again conducted in Kaliningrad, Klaypeda, or Leningrad and all of this is causing unplanned material expenditures and is substantially overloading the railroad.

Right now the cargo ship Kompozitor Musorgskiy is regularly sailing between Kaliningrad and Germany. It would seem that there would not be such a large workload at the port and local railroad division. But at the very least, railroad workers must provide nearly 20 flat cars per day for military cargoes. Moreover, you can hardly manage to form up a troop train in one day and they spend some time standing idle waiting to dispatch the loaded flat cars. And then the next disconnect immediately emerges and it is a serious "nail": the railroad workers, guided by their own standard acts, are demanding to be paid for this idle time. But who will do this? The port? The military department? But this case is special and it is impossible to name either those people or other people as guilty of causing the idle time. Of course, we cannot resolve this problem at the local level but the port staff has found itself at the crux of these disagreements and we have to look for ways to eliminate them.

But our officers require neither more nor less strength or nerves in order to deal with the everyday concerns for receiving the troops from Germany. The withdrawal is not a march or an exercise but a departure from permanent bases where many generations of our servicemen lived and served. And right now not only combat vehicles but also military equipment and supplies are arriving from the West. Many tons of them, beginning with concrete structural elements for shelters and ending with aircraft external fuel tanks are in the port. And our task is to protect all of this and to ship it to the recipients as soon as possible. And this is impossible to do without the cooperation of numerous transport subunits and services which we unfortunately do not always manage to work out.

The troop withdrawals have also complicated the solution to such a serious problem as organizing guard duty. Sometimes you cannot find a recommendation on how to carry out this task in the port in the Manual of Garrison and Guard Duties. Right now no less than 12 cargoes are located here that are accompanied by guards from the Western Group of Forces—this is more than 60 men who have sometimes been detained in Kaliningrad for more than a month. They must be located alongside the cargoes in the port and this has forced us to resolve a mass of questions. Say, where to billet these servicemen, where to feed them, and, finally, where to let them take showers? And we have largely solved these issues through the port administration. But unfortunately we cannot brag about the comforts: the soldiers live in overcrowded, ill-equipped rooms, frequently attempt to eat food dry without beverages and, naturally, the organization of service leaves much to be desired.

Yes, today we need to admit that we have turned out to be unprepared for the situation when a significant portion of the cargo from Germany is going by sea and specifically through Kaliningrad due to complications with the transit through Poland. All of the hitches which I have just described are to a significant degree—the consequences of this lack of preparedness. Moreover, such large-scale and complicated measures have never previously been conducted. Recently, something has been done with the goal of stabilizing the military cargo transport situation. But right now, in my opinion, we need to carefully analyze how the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Eastern Europe is proceeding and support this act with comprehensive assistance and support, including by Baltic Fleet and Baltic Military District forces.

It is a question of fulfilling the agreement achieved between the USSR and Germany during the course of difficult negotiations at the highest level. Violation of the troop withdrawal time period, bureaucratic red tape, and the sluggishness and indifference of officials will inevitably harm the prestige of our state and will result in material, including hard currency, losses.

#### Local Authorities Seek Takeover of Military Farm Land

91UM0772D Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA  
in Russian 3 Jul 91 First Edition p 2

[Article by Major-General V. Snyatovskiy, Turkestan Military District Rear Services Deputy Commander: "The Land Ultimatum, or About How Local Authorities Want to Solve Their Problems by Using Military Sovkhozes"]

[Text] The rural assemblies of the two military sovkhozes located in Kazakhstan's Dzhambul Oblast were seething. Yes and how could people not be disturbed when the future of their farms and their personal fates were at stake. And the villagers' indignation was caused by the May 27 1991 Dzhuvalinskiy Rayon Soviet of People's Deputies resolution.

While considering the issue on how to increase the utilization efficiency of the rayon's natural and economic resources under conditions of the transition to market relations, at their session the deputies practically reduced it to one problem, to the problem of transferring military sovkhozes to rayon authority. In the adopted resolution, this was motivated by the fact that the sovkhozes, organized at one time based on several kolkhozes and through the transfer of 31,000 hectares of land without considering the opinions of local governmental organs, supply practically their entire output of agricultural products to the military department while utilizing the rayon's resources and their output is not applied toward local deliveries.

For the sake of objectivity, I must note that the initiative to transfer the military sovkhozes under the "civilian wing" does not belong to raysoviet. A month earlier,

Dzhambul Oblast Soviet decided to send a similar request to the republic president but then the deputies suddenly remembered: how can we resolve this issue without considering the raysoviet's opinion? They immediately issued the appropriate instructions.

What attracted the people's deputies rapt attention to the military sovkhozes? Maybe the fact that they are the most highly profitable farms in the rayon? Their annual profits total over four million rubles. They annually produce 2,000 tons of meat, 2,600 tons of milk, 40,000 tons of potatoes, 2,000 tons of vegetables, and 14,000 tons of grain fodder. Powerful modern production and socio-cultural facilities have been created at the sovkhozes. They have their own bakery, brick plant, and evaporated milk production shop. They are completing construction of a potato processing plant. This is without talking about outstanding rest areas for workers and entire streets of modern cottages with all the conveniences.... As they say, there is something to bolster the deputy mandate. Officials have not had an aversion to openly juggling the facts in their appeals.

And the truth consists of the fact that the military sovkhozes that we are talking about were created based on state land utilization acts with land consolidation. There is also a Kazakh SSR Council of Ministers resolution. The military sovkhozes emerged on the site of unprofitable kolkhozes and on poorly developed, unirrigated lands. Right now they get water to irrigate the farms from neighboring Kyrgyzstan. According to the agreement with the leadership of this republic, the Kok-say Canal was built using the sovkhozes' assets. And today the rayon can hardly take credit because the sovkhozes have the most productive fields. The Ministry of Defense annually allocates from R2.5 to R7 million for this purpose. For example, this year R5 million has been allocated for land reclamation work alone.

Yes, Dzhuvalinskiy Rayon would unquestionably significantly raise its own indicators if the military sovkhozes production was counted in its deliveries. But who gains from this double bookkeeping? People cannot be fed with figures.

I can only agree with the people's deputies on one thing. A certain tax on the farms' profits must enter into the local budget. This issue has already been resolved positively. So is it worthwhile to start a ruckus? All the more so since the sovkhozes conscientiously pay for everything received from the rayon.

But let us assume that the military sovkhozes nevertheless transfer to the rayon agricultural industrial system. What does this provide? When we checked with Dzhuvalinskiy Raysoviet Chairman Ye. Amanbekov on whether the rayon will be able to invest the same resources in the farms that the Ministry of Defense does, he simply answered: No. Therefore, with time the sovkhozes will end up on the same level as the rest of the rayon's farms or will completely decline.

However, the military sovkhozes' workers and employees were most of all upset by the fact that everything had been discussed in secret and that no one had asked them for their opinions. But their opinions were heard at the rural assemblies. So, V. Alekseyeva, a worker at one of the sovkhozes, expressed the concern that:

"How much can you recarve the land? The events in Fergana, Osh, and on the border of Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan are still fresh in our minds. There everything also began with disputes surrounding land. Who will assume responsibility that this may happen here as a result of inciting passions?"

Unfortunately, a similar situation is developing around military sovkhozes not only in Dzhuvalinskiy Rayon. We all know that civilian kolkhozes and sovkhozes, in accordance with the instructions of local Soviets, have begun the direct seizure of Ministry of Defense lands not far from the capital of the republic and also in Chimkent Oblast. Kurday Raysoviet Chairman Shupta and Leninskii Rayispolkom Representatives Pulatov and Tasboltayev actively participated in this. And what does it mean to give up the land? This is what Turkestanets Military Sovkhoz Director M. Khai states in his report: "The seizure without compensation of 450 hectares of land will result in unemployment in the Bagizh Department since Leninskii RIK [rayon executive committee] wishes to take only the land and it is not interested in the fate of its workers."

Do the people's deputies know what they are creating? We can hardly count on correcting the situation in republic agriculture by taking 3-4 military sovkhozes if the capabilities of hundreds of their own farms are not realized.

But not only military sovkhozes have become the object of certain local Soviets claims. A letter, signed by Dzheti-Oguzskiy Rayon Soviet of People's Deputies Chairman I. Borubayev, recently arrived at the military district rear services in which he specifically requests "allocation of R600,000 to the rayon to carry out construction of Tamga Sovkhoz, a kindergarten, a medical assistant-midwife facility, and also to provide for allotting R200 and 50 trip passes." Otherwise, the letter threatens to raise the question of the seizure of the land allocated to Tamga Sanatorium and the Issyk-Kul Tourist Facility.

In this kind of ultimatum, it is even difficult to understand what R200 and trip passes it is a question of. And that is with the fact that there are only six officers, not counting members of their families, among the 900 people who serve the Ministry of Defense treatment-recovery institution. The remaining personnel are Tamga Village residents. Nearly 40 percent of them live in well-appointed apartments built by the Ministry of Defense. Village residents are served at Voyentorg [Post

Exchange] stores and cafes, they visit the club, and they take advantage of medical assistance at sanatoriums and other benefits. And how much has been done in the village by the hands of military builders!...

And what is characteristic: there is a greater desire to correct their affairs at someone else's expense in those places where the rayon or oblast's economic situation is worst of all and where the farmers are least diligent.

### Units Prepare for Harvest Work

*91UM0772A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian  
4 Jul 91 First Edition p 3*

[Articles by Volga-Ural Military District TASS Correspondent B. Belyakov and North Caucasus Military District TASS Correspondent V. Bondarenko: "Grain—An Army Concern"]

[Text] "The formation of 'grain' battalions is coming to an end in the Volga-Ural Military District," said Military District Military-Political Directorate Deputy Chief Colonel N. Krasnyy. "By July 10, five of them will be in the fields of Saratov, Samara, and Orenburg Oblasts. The sixth will begin working a bit later when the course of the harvest prompts where it is needed most. Up to 800 reservists are being called into each of these military formations. At the present time, the questions of the "virgin land workers" wages are being worked out. It has been determined that the wages for the military district's military drivers will be paid partially... in grain. Well, under conditions of the continuing breakdown of food deliveries, the army is compelled to look after itself. Grain will provide the capability to supply soldiers with groats and flour. And after processing a portion of the grain into mixed fodder, we can exchange it for, say, milk and meat.

Maintenance, food supply, and other support services are preparing to go out into the fields with the driver. Contracts for meat and vegetable deliveries are being concluded with farms. The military district is allocating groats, flour, sugar, and canned goods to the "virgin land workers." The reservists will be provided with housing, clean beds, and the required spectrum of everyday services. The military district's "grain" battalions must haul nearly 2,000,000 tons of various agricultural cargoes. The fate of the current harvest will largely depend on their well-coordinated work. Volga grain must be delivered to the grain bin rapidly and without losses.

B. Belyakov  
TASS Correspondent

Volga-Ural Military District

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North Caucasus Military District drivers have recently received route lists to the fields of Stavropol and Astrakhan Oblasts. Fifteen hundred trucks will participate in

the harvest. Their task is to haul 3,000,000 tons of agricultural cargoes in the shortest possible period of time and to help the grain workers to gather everything that has been grown without losses.

"One thousand crews are setting out on the road. The rest will be on site by June 5. The military district has never provided such a large motor vehicle detachment to the village even though we are not being allocated any additional resources for this purpose," stressed Military District Motor Vehicle Services Chief Colonel V. Kuzmin in a conversation with a TASS correspondent.

"And we have to reconfigure the truck beds and create a motor vehicle camp. Just like in past years, lumber and metal are needed and, as always, there is not enough of them. According to the USSR Ministry of Defense assessments that have been disseminated to us, servicemen's assistance to agricultural workers in gathering the harvest will increase each year so the problems that are repeated from year to year need to be resolved once—once and for all.

V. Bondarenko  
TASS Correspondent  
North Caucasus Military District

**Report of Commission on Volkogonov's History**

*91UM0753A Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA  
in Russian 16 Jun 91 pp 4-5*

[Stenographic Report of the Session of the Editorial Commission on the Ten-Volume History of the Great Patriotic War with the following personnel in attendance: General of the Army M.A. Gareyev, Military Inspector—USSR Ministry of Defense general inspectors group advisor; Admiral of the Fleet V.N. Chernavin; General of the Army M.A. Moiseyev, chief of the USSR Armed Forces General Staff; General of the Army M.M. Zaytsev; Marshal of Aviation G.P. Skorikov; General of the Army K.A. Kochetov; General of the Army N.G. Lyashchenko; General of the Army I.G. Pavlovskiy; Ten-Volume History of the Great Patriotic War Editorial Staff Chief Colonel R. Savushkin; CPSU Central Committee Secretary V. Falin; All-Union Council of Veterans of War and Labor Chairman Marshal N. Ogarkov; USSR Minister of Defense Marshal Dmitriy Timofeyevich Yazov; General of the Army P.G. Lushev; Doctor of Historical Sciences F. M. Vaganov, chief of the Main Archival Administration under the USSR Council of Ministers; Doctor of Philosophical Sciences Colonel-General Dmitriy Antonovich Volkogonov, director of the USSR Ministry of Defense Institute of Military History; Ground Forces Commander-in-Chief General of the Army V.I. Varennikov; USSR Academy of Sciences Corresponding Member, Director of the USSR Academy of Sciences Institute of General History A.O. Chubaryan; Doctor of Historical Sciences A.P. Novoseltsev, director of the USSR Academy of Sciences Institute of History of the USSR; Doctor of Historical Sciences B.A. Toman, Institute of Marxism-Leninism under the CPSU Central Committee; and M.S. Kapitsa, Institute of Oriental Studies: "They Will Not Hand Over to Us the Truth About the War: The Generals Determine What the Soviet People Must Know About the Great Patriotic War and What They Must Not." Introductory commentary entitled: "The Generals and History" by Vitaliy Tretyakov.]

[Text]

**The Generals and History**

I read recently in a CPSU publication regrets with regard to the fact that we had not received the first volume of the ten-volume history on the Great Patriotic War on the 50th Anniversary of the beginning of the war. But slightly prior to that I—by chance—learned that Colonel-General D.A. Volkogonov, historian and RSFSR People's Deputy, is already no longer the Director of the USSR Ministry of Defense Institute of Military History [IVI]. The link between these two events lay on the surface. I telephoned Dmitriy Antonovich Volkogonov and learned that he had left his director's post at the IVI after a discussion at the USSR Ministry of Defense about that same volume which had not been published within

the intended time period. And D. Volkogonov was, in addition to everything else, the leader of the ten-volume work authors' collective.

D. Volkogonov advised me to specifically refer to the latest articles and Marshal Akhromeyev's interview in the 4th issue of VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL for clarification of the reasons why the first volume has not been published. I will permit myself to quote several paragraphs from this interview:

"If Volkogonov had managed to prepare and publish "Velikaya Otechestvennaya voyna sovetskogo naroda" [The Great Patriotic War of the Soviet People] from those positions that are filled with falsehoods that he had set forth in the first volume, this would have inflicted enormous damage not only to history. The obvious falsehood about the Great Patriotic War would have been used to undermine our country's integrity, to undermine its socialist choice, and for the latest slander of the Communist Party. We could not permit that."

"Col-Gen Volkogonov is an anticomunist. Today he has betrayed the cause of the CPSU and has stood under the banner of one of the former leaders of the CPSU and now virulent anticomunist B.N. Yeltsin."

"I calculated that nearly 80 percent of the material where it is a question of the course of building socialism was dedicated to a description of Stalinism in its various manifestations and nearly 20 percent was dedicated to the labor of Soviet society during those years and the results of building socialism."

"These distortions which we today call Stalinism had a great impact on the state of society prior to the Great Patriotic War. All of this is shown in the first volume but it is shown from anti-socialist positions."

"The second defect consists of a fundamentally incorrect assessment of the August 23 1939 Soviet-German Non-aggression Treaty."

Such is Marshal Akhromeyev's position (because I do not want to quote an abomination, I directly refer those readers who are interested in the characterization which USSR Presidential Advisor Marshal Akhromeyev personally gives D. Volkogonov to VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL).

So, it is clear why the volume was not published. It is true that it is unclear just specifically what was written in such a dangerous volume for the Soviet people. Such graphically public criticism of a manuscript that for the time being is unknown to an overwhelming number of both historians and military people (already not talking about simple readers) is already a phenomenon that has not been encountered in our Party commentary for a long time. (But then again, this recidivism of the past was repeated on June 13 by SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in an extensive article—more than 1,500 words—"The First Volume Is not About that").

I have not yet read this manuscript and in this sense I am on an equal footing with all other readers. But on the other hand NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA managed to obtain a transcript of the Ten-Volume Main Editorial Commission session that gave up as hopeless the publication of the first volume. NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA is also publishing this document (with minimal abridgement).

This document is unique. Active and retired marshals and generals and also CPSU Central Committee associates provide their assessment of the historians' work. The Soviet people can be calm—their archives and its history, including the history of ITS war with Fascism are in reliable hands. And these hands will not publish this history.

While publishing this document without any commentary whatsoever, NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA wants to place all participants in the discussion within the walls of the Ministry of Defense in various conditions. Each person says what he is thinking. We—read, although what has been said was also not intended for us.

NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA hopes that both D. Volkogonov, the other authors of the volume, and also their opponents will also again express themselves on its pages. In any case, we are prepared to offer both this and other place for these articles.

Vitaliy Tretyakov

Transcript of the Ten-Volume Work "Velikaya Otechestvennaya voyna sovetskogo naroda" [The Great Patriotic War of the Soviet People] Main Editorial Commission [GRK] Session that occurred on March 7 1991.

The location where it occurred: the USSR Ministry of Defense board meeting hall, Moscow. Present: 57 persons (Ministry of Defense Board members, a group of general inspectors, GRK members and, from the USSR Academy of Sciences—A.P. Novoseltsev, A.O. Chubaryan, from IML [Institute of Marxism-Leninism] under the CPSU Central Committee—B.A. Toman, from IVI—Col-Gen D.A. Volkogonov, Major-General A.G. Khorkov, Colonel R.A. Savushkin, Colonel V.A. Zolotarev, Colonel V.I. Mikora, Colonel A.M. Sokolov, Colonel N.M. Romanichev, Colonel V.A. Pronko, Lieutenant-Colonel S.N. Osipov, Lieutenant-Colonel Yu.Ye. Rybalkin, Major K.V. Golubovskiy, and Major V.I. Fesenko). Chairman: General of the Army A.F. Kochetov (here and further on, Kochetov's initials have been indicated precisely so—NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA comment) [should be K.A. Kochetov] (Deputy (as in the transcript—NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA comment) Minister of Defense.

9:55 a.m.

[Kochetov] We have assembled in order to discuss the manuscript of the first volume of the scientific work "The Great Patriotic War of the Soviet People". Last year, the GRK deputy chairman decided to expand the

source base and to rework the manuscript. The second version has been submitted to us right now. Its size is quite substantial—1,911 pages. This is one of the primary and main volumes that imparts the work's overall tone. Hence, it is also extremely crucial.

More than 40 responses and more than 300 pages of comments and suggestions have been sent to the GRK. There is a genuine pluralism of opinions in them that is characteristic for our time.

The main issue consists of what differentiates the new work from the preceding version from the point of view of historical authenticity, veracity, and documentation. One can ascertain that this manuscript does not provide the grounds to talk about the high quality of the first volume. But the new version is a step forward. We are faced with a complex task—to create a work for generations and to reveal everything heroic and the entire potential of the people that won the most brilliant victory in history.

The ancestors of Soviet people living today fought and lived while perceiving the country with all of its deformations as its brainchild and the CPSU as its native party.

When the concept of a ten-volume work was being discussed, everyone agreed that the main driving force is the Soviet people, the people-soldiers, and the laborers headed by the CPSU. But today, while proceeding from momentary interests, everything is being run down and everything is already being placed at the fault of the Party and the people are becoming to blame. In fact the people cannot be to blame because it won the victory.

The submitted work has substantial flaws:

1. The work's title "Nakanune" [On the Eve] is broad and accurate but the authors go into the Russia of 1913, the revolutions, etc. That is, they want to extract the negative from historical directions and they attempt to analyze the state's foreign and domestic policies, the activities of the Party and the ruling organs, and so forth, that is, to examine issues that are not within the GRK's prerogative.

Many issues and problems have still not been covered by modern historiography. We cannot rush ahead of events.

Many reviews will contain the question: "If everything was so bad before the war, why did we win?" And really the sources of the victory and the victory itself must be the main line of the ten-volume work.

2. The chronological framework. There are two positions in the reviews: set forth events in chronological succession for the entire prewar period and second—the volume's chronological framework has been artificially expanded.

It certainly would be correct to begin a detailed presentation of the events from September 1939 but we must

also reflect the most common issues of the excursion into history from even earlier time periods.

The size of the volume has caused many questions. Some consider the size of 1,930 pages to be justified (the previously mentioned number of pages was 1,911. Discrepancy in the transcript—NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA comment); others propose decisively reducing it.

The volume's authors' attempt to reflect the positive trends and negative processes in domestic and foreign policy received support. But it is intolerable to approach the assessment of the past with prejudice or to defame it, which are especially characteristic of Chapters 1 and 11.

Many new documents have been used in the work but many have also not been used. Many reviews point out the inaccessibility of many documents. This certainly is a major drawback, all the more so since many documents are well known in the West and are used in work against us.

### 3. The presentation of material and the manner of presenting it.

Much was well written but much was written in too much of a commentator's language and a tendency was observed toward the style of MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI or OGONEK. We need to remember that this is a scientific work but at the same time the work is not only for experts but also for the people.

### 4. The fundamental comments of the reviews:

a) The VKP(b)'s [All-Union Communist Party (bolshevik)] role. A weighty assessment of the VKP(b)'s role is the cutting edge in the solution of all tasks for covering the Great Patriotic War. According to it, communists and nonaffiliated persons will assess the Party's role in the shift of industry to a wartime footing and its work both in the rear and at the front.

b) Excessive references to Stalinist repression. Stalin was not guilty of all misfortunes and sins. Therefore, the task of removing the excesses was given at the GRK's first session. But instead of 231 references to the repressions in the first version, the second version increased to 380 references.

It is obvious that the "Triumph and Tragedy" weighed on the authors of the first volume.

[Response] It weighed (noise in the hall).

This attention to Stalin is hardly historically justified.

Sic!

Ten-Volume History of the Great Patriotic War Editorial Staff Chief Col R. Savushkin:

"Our repeated appeals to the Central Committee, KGB, and MID [Ministry of Foreign Affairs] archives were not crowned with success. Sometimes, according to their

workers' choice, we were offered some incomplete documents or excerpts from them based on which it was impossible to form an overall picture of the problem."

**Chief of the General Staff General of the Army M. Moiseyev:**

"We did not give them and we will not give them access to documents because they are not being appropriately utilized—they are being utilized to write personal works during work time."

**CPSU Central Committee Secretary V. Falin:**

"Today what has been written in the volume is more anticommunist than what has been published abroad."

"The work must be done, but we will not permit the alternating authors access to restricted archives. There are no self-willed persons here and there cannot be. The documents must be used appropriately."

**All-Union Council of Veterans of War and Labor Chairman Marshal N. Ogarkov:**

"This volume is a bill of indictment of the CPSU's."

**USSR Minister of Defense Marshal D. Yazov:**

"Right now the 'Democrats' are setting as their goal the preparation and conduct of a Nuremberg II against the CPSU. The concepts for the bill of indictment in this trial are present in the volume."

"Practically all archives are open but we all gave exclusive rights to the executors and they took everything, regardless of quality."

"The first chapter has been written from some sort of hatred for Stalin."

"The interpretation of the events of 1939, the Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact, was not done the way Yakovlev did it."

Sic!

I want to propose an agenda with this speech.

1. Hear the editorial chief's report.

2. Exchange opinions.

3. Make a decision.

We are shifting to a discussion. I am giving the floor to the Ten-Volume Work's Chief of Editorial Staff Colonel R.A. Savushkin.

[Colonel R.A. Savushkin] Comrade Chairman of the Main Editorial Commission!

In accordance with the task of Main Editorial Commission's Chairman, Marshal of the Soviet Union Comrade Dmitriy Timofeyevich Yazov, I am reporting on the work on the first volume of the ten-volume work "The Great Patriotic War of the Soviet People" that has

received reviews and prospects of future work as they are seen by the editorial staff of the work.

A year ago, the first volume's galley was accepted as the basis and the editorial staff reworked the volume based on the comments. Since the GRK Chairman assigned the task of expanding the chronological framework of the coverage of military policy and military structural development and revealing the most important provisions of military reform of 1925-1928 based on the desires of the "minor" GRK participants, the size of the volume doubled. The authors' desire to carry out the primary mass of comments and suggestions expressed by GRK members in their reviews promoted this.

The new volume galley that was submitted for discussion was sent out to 53 addressees. Thirty reviews have been received. Twenty three reviews have still not been submitted.

Thirteen of the 30 reviews indicate that the volume can be recommended for publication, that the manuscript as a whole is a good basis for further work, and that it can be approved. However, all 13 of these reviews stress that the manuscript needs to be reworked.

Eleven reviews indicated that it was impossible to publish the volume in this form and that the manuscript needs to be revised and four of them even indicated that it needs to be reworked.

Six reviews did not formulate a conclusion about the volume's future prospects, but it was noted that a significant step forward has been made and they listed comments and proposals.

We can judge how great the diversity of opinions is according to two assessments:

**1. General of the Army P.G. Lushev:** "I see a biased, one-sided approach in the presentation of the first volume and sometimes even an approach toward the analysis of phenomena affecting the formation and development of Soviet society in the prewar years based on momentary considerations. Exaggerated attention to negative factors in various spheres of its vital activities creates a distorted impression about the events that occurred at that time and interferes with the objective perception of our history, especially for the current generation of Soviet people."

**2. Institute of Oriental Studies—M.S. Kapitsa:** "The aspiration to objectively show a picture of the development of domestic and foreign policy, to reveal the positive trends in the life of Soviet society, the activities of the Party and the Soviet government and also the negative processes and excesses in domestic and foreign policy merits all kinds of approval."

The truth certainly lies somewhere in between. One thing is unambiguously clear: serious work is still required on the volume.

A total of 601 remarks and suggestions were expressed in the critics' reviews. During analysis, we divided them according to the problems examined in the volume into:

- political and socio-economic (these are chapters 1, 11, 12, and 13);
- international (these are chapters 2, 3, 4, and 5);
- military (14, 15, 16, and 17); and,
- the enemy (6, 7, 8, 9, and 10).

The chapters dedicated to political and socio-economic problems caused the most serious criticism. They received 192 comments and totaled 48.5 percent of the total number. Among them, chapters 1 and 11 caused a storm of indignation: "The Soviet Union in the Interwar Years" and "Worsening of the Political Regime". There were a total of 158 comments on these two chapters, which is equal to one-third (26.3 percent) of all comments on the volume. Chapter 1 received an especially low rating. It has been assessed as biased, extremely biased, and defamatory. It also received the lowest rating from the Chief of the Institute. Specifically, he said: "Chapter one is the weakest chapter in the volume. The generalizations and the eclectic nature of the material are very contradictory. The source data base is totally unsatisfactory. There are no archival documents. There are few interesting facts, generalizations, or conclusions."

When the first chapter was submitted by the Main Editor and the Chief of the Ten-volume Editorial Staff, it was proposed that chapter 1 be excluded as not meeting current requirements and not to present it at all. However, the proposal was not accepted and the chapter was sent. At the same time, the hope was expressed that during the discussion the GRK members would suggest a direction for its revision.

What are the difficulties involved with work on political and socio-economic problems? The fact is that these problems are being reworked by the coexecutors institutes—the Institute of Marxism-Leninism under the CPSU Central Committee, the USSR Institute of General History, and the USSR Institute of History. Relations between the Institute of Military History and the coexecutors institutes have not taken shape...

What do we need to do bring chapters 1, 11, 12, and 13 up to the appropriate level? Marshal of the Soviet Union Sergey Fedorovich Akhromeyev has submitted a comprehensive program to revise these chapters. We think that it is entirely sufficient to be the basis of subsequent work of the newly created Editorial Staff on Political and Socio-economic Problems and the first volume's Editorial Staff.

The overwhelming majority of comments and suggestions of the other reviewers will be taken into account during the process of the work. However, since we were not able to discuss the reviews received at the volume editorial board due to lack of time, permit me to answer

all questions posed in a summarized list of comments and suggestions which will be distributed to all GRK members.

Nearly 100 comments and suggestions have been expressed on international problems, that is, nearly three times less than on the preceding problem. On the whole, chapters 2, 3, 4, and 5 were assessed positively but even here a scattering of opinion is observed. Some stress: while comparing the first volume of the new work with similar sections of previous publications, one can conclude that it is a step forward in the study of the prehistory of the Great Patriotic War (V.M. Arkhipov, V.M. Mikhalkin, V.F. Yermakov, M.S. Kapitsa, O. Bykov, and Ye.I. Shaposhnikov). The manuscript is free from political bias and is historically accurate. The authors managed to avoid a number of stereotyped perceptions and the glorification of past years while showing our prewar policy and military structural development. They have managed to raise to a scientific analysis not only achievements but also miscalculations and have discovered positive trends in the life of Soviet society of the 1920's-40's and also negative processes and flaws in domestic and foreign policy.

Others indicate (the MID). At the direction of Deputy Minister V.F. Petrovskiy, F.N. Kovalev, head of MID's IDU):

"The authors were assigned the task of presenting at one stroke the prewar history of the Soviet State. ... However as a result of the unbalanced assessments... in our historical science and the absence of a new comprehensive study of the history of the USSR and CPSU, it is hardly advisable to resolve this task within the framework of the introductory volume to the work 'The Great Patriotic War of the Soviet People'."

What caused the need for the first part? And why are we asking the GRK to preserve its material and to increase the volume by 1.5-2 times?

1. Chapters 1-4 and 5 of the first volume are the political foundation of the entire ten-volume work. Without the materials of this portion, it is impossible to understand why the USSR concluded the treaty with Germany in 1939, why the USSR became Germany's main enemy in 1941, why the imperialist countries—England and the United States, who were conducting a policy of anticomunism, ended up along with the USSR in a single anti-Hitler coalition. Its main role was to discover, designate, and reveal the sources of those problems that received further development during the Great Patriotic War in our relations with the Allies and with the emigre circles of countries that were part of the Fascist Bloc, and our demands at Tehran, Yalta, and Potsdam.

Without a comprehensive, objective analysis of the situation that engendered the war, it is impossible to understand the nature of the war, its driving forces, and the sides' goals and tasks in this war. Lenin repeatedly stressed that we need to study policy prior to a war, the policy that leads to and results in war, and the question

of who was to gain, "why is this war being conducted and which classes prepared and directed it" (V.I. Lenin).

2. The goal of the second part is to introduce the reader to that international situation in which the Second World War, which caused the Great Patriotic War which became its primary component, was born.

3. Based on new documents and research of recent years, the authors examine the USSR's foreign policy under conditions of the hostile capitalist encirclement of the 1920's-30's, the reaction of the Soviet State to preparations for war by the capitalist states, and the USSR's activities on the international arena that were directed at preventing war and restraining aggressors in an alliance with other nonaggressive states.

4. The issues raised in the first part reveal the following primary problems:

- the USSR's struggle to emerge from the political isolation in which it had found itself after October 1917, to consolidate its international position, to strengthen the country's defense capability and, the role of Soviet-German military cooperation in the resolution of these tasks in the 1920's.

- the USSR's struggle for a policy of collective security after Fascism came to power in Germany and the initiation of aggressive acts in Europe and in the Far East.

- the USSR's foreign policy after Munich when it once again found itself in political isolation and the Soviet government's struggle for the creation of an anti-Fascist alliance of the USSR, England, and France.

- the conclusion of the Nonaggression Pact with Germany and its positive and negative consequences and impact on the course of future events.

- the USSR's creation of a strategic forward defense area in the west after the initiation of the Second World War (the liberation of Western Ukraine and Western Belorussia, treaties with the Baltic countries, the war with Finland, and the reunification of Bessarabia with the USSR).

- the USSR's foreign policy in April-June 1941 under conditions of the very complicated international situation and miscalculations permitted by the Soviet leadership.

We did not resolve all of the problems indicated at the proper level, to which the reviews we have received testify. There have been quite a few comments.

We think that we need to listen to and consider all comments and suggestions while revising the manuscript. Here we have experienced historians working who are well-known in the country, the nucleus of which consists of associates of our institute. They will deal with these tasks. However while examining this circle of problems, the authors' collective has encountered a great

deal of difficulty in the archival support of the work. And we cannot agree with Comrade Fedor Mikhaylovich Vaganov, head of the Main Archival Administration under the USSR Cabinet of Ministers: "The source study base of the work is still incomplete which has a negative impact on the work's primary provisions." The absence of documents does not provide the researchers the capability to make weighty assessments and conclusions and forms the basis for defamatory conjecture.

Unfortunately, our repeated appeals to the Central Committee, KGB and MID archives have not been crowned with success. Sometimes, according to their workers' choice, we were offered some incomplete documents or excerpts from them based on which it was impossible to form an overall picture of the problem.

We request GRK and your assistance, Comrade Minister of Defense (obviously, D. Yazov's presence was assumed from the beginning of the session—NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA comment) to solve this problem.

A total of 130 comments and suggestions or 22 percent of their entire number were on the military problem. They are mainly of a personal nature, although their realization is extremely necessary. The relatively high level of development of these problems is in many ways associated with that aid which was rendered to the editorial staff by associates of the General Staff, the branches of the Armed Forces, and the academies. Colonel-General Andrian Aleksandrovich Danilevich's direct participation in the development of chapters and sections and also in the editing of the manuscript also had great significance.

I think that the editorial staff collective is capable of quite skillfully dealing with the revision of the military problem in a very short period of time.

Coverage of problems in the volume that reflect Fascist Germany's preparations for an attack against the Soviet Union on the whole received a favorable response. A total of 82 comments and suggestions were made which totaled 13 percent. The overwhelming majority of them will be realized. We see that the primary emphasis must be made to improve on the terminology and documentation base.

In conclusion, I want to once again apologize that lack of time for preparation did not permit me to address specific comments and to express the volume editorial staff's and editorial board's attitude toward them. All of this will be done during the course of the work after summarization of the review materials.

I will once again list our requests. We ask:

1. for assistance to obtain access to the archives I have listed.
2. to make clarifications to the ten-volume editorial staff.
3. to render assistance to establish normal working relations with institutes—coexecutors.

4. to allocate additional resources of paper needed to provide GRK members with the manuscripts of volumes.

5. to render assistance in computerizing and equipping the editorial staff with modern duplicating equipment.

6. to allocate additional resources for revising the volume as a result of the increased size and time periods.

The report is complete.

[Kochetov] You may ask questions.

[Lizichev] In your opinion, does the volume require revising or reworking?

[Savushkin] Chapters 1 and 11 need to be fundamentally reworked and the remaining chapters need revising to a greater or lesser degree.

[Lizichev] What will be the final size? 2-3 books?

[Savushkin] We advocate each volume being published in two books. This is the generally accepted practice.

[Vaganov] Today a work has been presented to us in which the directions, chronological framework, and section titles have been significantly amended. These changes are the GRK's prerogative. I am a GRK member, why were these changes carried out and by whom?

[Savushkin] The second and third parts did not undergo any significant changes other than chapter titles. The first part is a result of GRK members' suggestions that were expressed at the sessions.

[Vaganov] The GRK's rights have been violated insofar as the editorial staff is independently making corrections to the writing of the ten-volume work.

[Savushkin] There was a "minor" GRK on March 26, 1990 where these issues were discussed and were resolved. The Minister of Defense did not invite all GRK members to this session.

[Pavlovskiy] Why do they finish off the Party in the volume, beginning with 1917? Where did the idea come from that the Party did not lead in general? Maybe we should simply delete chapters 1 and 11? Why are you finishing off the Party, whose task is this? Where are you obtaining the material?

[Savushkin] Materials for chapters 1 and 11 were primarily prepared by the institutes—coexecutors. We received these materials in November-December and we could not correct them with all of our desire to do so.

[Lyashchenko] Why is there so little about the friendship of the Soviet peoples? If there had not been friendship, we would not have survived if the situation in the country had been like it is now. We need to reinforce this issue.

There is little about the highest military leadership's miscalculations in their preparations for war. There is little about the rear. My division was formed at the beginning of the war. We walked around without trousers for a month. They sent us to the front without cannon and we received heavy rifled weapons while we were on our way to the front. You need to write about this, about all of this chaos.

On Stalin. I was at the May 5th reception at the Kremlin. Stalin frankly talked about the inevitability of war and that it would be our good fortune if Molotov succeeded in averting it for 2-3 months. I arrived in the troops and there they did not know anything. You need to reflect this.

[Kochetov] Maybe we need to replace the chapters 1 and 11 authors' collective?

[Savushkin] We think that we can use part of it and that we need to replace part of it.

[Kochetov] Where did the title "Worsening of the Political Regime" come from?

[Savushkin] The wording results from the fact that prior to the war it was necessary to rally the Homeland and to increase the work of all state organs.

[Kochetov] You are evading the answer. According to your answer, no worsening whatsoever occurs. But the idea in the chapter is something else. To show everything negative, the attitude toward the authorities, toward the order, and the system. Here there is an analogy of Fascism with Socialism, almost like running on Fascist lines.

[Pavlovskiy] After the Finnish War, there was a special Military Soviet at the Kremlin which tasked industry, etc. But there was no worsening of the regime. There was preparation for war. But in your work, both the VKP(b), the VLKSM [All- Union Lenin Young Communist League], and the trade union—everyone was against the people, where did you get that?

[Skorikov] It has been well pointed out that the main actor of the Great Patriotic War was the people and we need to write about that. But is it advisable to show history from 1913, we need to begin from the end of the 1920's or the middle 1930's.

[Zaytsev] Much of the information in the volume is not entirely correct.

The authors have embellished the Wehrmacht.

Why do we have 23,000 tanks and the Germans have 5,000?

Expert data on tanks and aircraft have been inflated.

The book is ideologized.

[Moiseyev] Much of the information and numbers are totally incorrect. There is much embellishment of the

Wehrmacht and much disparagement of the Red Army. For example, where did you get 23,000 tanks for us and 5,300 for the Germans. You do not count their captured equipment and you even count our resources used after Ukraine, Bessarabia, and the Baltic states. The ideologization is still worse than in the first edition.

[Savushkin] All of the figures are from the archives alone.

[Vaganov] Which archives? The fund, inventory, or the case?

[Kochetov] This is not an issue for the spur of the moment.

[Chernavin] Why were all of our comments on the Navy ignored? What are you thinking of changing in this issue?

[Savushkin] Three authors have been replaced (N.I. Devyaterikov, V.I. Zhumatiy, and V.N. Shevchenko), we have not hired everyone, we need to look for new ones.

[Kochetov] Are there any more questions? No. I am giving the floor to General of the Army M.A. Gareyev.

[Gareyev] First of all, I wish to express the desire that we complete the ten- volume work despite everything. We cannot retreat and resort to essays and the like. We have long asked to be given the opportunity to publish this work, to provide the opportunity to work, and now it is impossible to retreat in the face of it. Later on, the difficulties will be even greater.

I agree with all of the main comments. The new version of volume one has many new facts, materials, and documents. Many sections are very good, especially the second book. But there are also shortcomings which require attention. This is first of all:

—more weighty political assessments, they must be more objective and under no circumstances one-sided;

—the charges that the Bolsheviks unleashed the civil war are unfounded. We can only talk about specific shortcomings but we also need to specifically talk about the good things. People were also voluntarily joined into kolkhozes and so forth;

—the sphere of the Institute of Military History: the entire arbitrariness and repression in the army are reduced to Stalin, but Tukhachevskiy began it—one has only to refer to his speech in Leningrad and the persecution of Svechin.

The operation in depth is also not Tukhachevskiy's development but Triandafillov started this.

—During my familiarization with the material, the ill will toward one's own country by the authors' collective drew attention to itself. For example, Chapter 3, p 171: "The Red Army's technical backwardness was not brought to light in a timely manner." As if it previously was good and now it had become worse.

We actually had been attempting to overcome this backwardness the entire time but we did not have enough resources to do so.

—Today's standards are clearly seen in the term "militarization of society." At that time it was a need and requirement of the state in order to survive.

—The skeptical attitude toward the introduction of universal training in 1930, 100-150 years after the developed countries. But for us this really was an achievement. The ill will is seen in the presentation of the facts.

Could we have prevented the war—this is a fundamental issue.

The USSR Supreme Soviet decision for science is not a decree. The treaties of 1939 had the goal of preventing war. Much could have been done but not to totally exclude war. It was a question of delaying the war. And we need to reflect this.

There are many fabrications including the worn out ones used in OGONEK. For example, there were no rifles: but there were nearly eight million rifles in the Red Army for 5.3 million personnel. That is, we need to talk about the disorganization and about the lack of administrative ability, etc., and not about a total lack of readiness.

The institutes-coexecutors need to convince us using scientific facts. One can scientifically argue that:

a) Hitler did not conduct a preventive war but the reverse.

b) We did not prepare for an offensive war but only for defense and there is confirmation of this. There are documents in the archives that confirm this and it is necessary to use them.

The question is not one of total novelty—much has already been qualitatively studied but a number of issues need to be painstakingly analyzed. For example, the events on Lake Khasan and on the Khalkhin-Gol River and the issue on the number of tanks. Even Müller-Gillebrand talks about T-1 and T-2 tanks and captured equipment but our researchers do not consider them.

We must educate generations, this is what this work has been directed toward.

[Moiseyev] The authors' collective created adequate material to reveal the topic. It will be incomprehensible and it will be too bad if the work that has begun is stopped. But the new editorial staff has preserved many shortcomings.

1. The first three chapters are a departure from the topic, the titles have been changed, the chronological framework has been arbitrarily expanded, everything right up to 1939, the famine in the Volga area, etc., are not linked with the events of the Great Patriotic War. The chapter titles do not correspond to the content—"Worsening of

the Political Regime" and "Militarization of Spiritual Life". And just what was patriotism and the heroism of the Soviet people at that time, the army was reborn along with the people. And we are crossing all of that out with one stroke.

Development of the work will only make sense when our successes, achievements, and priorities are shown along with the deformations that existed. Nearly 20 years ago Western political leaders of the Great Patriotic War era published assessments of the quality of training of our officers and soldiers. The assessments were very high. But our developers are standing on different positions.

2. The aspiration to splash out only the negative is incomprehensible and erroneous. "The Victory was accidental"—that is how it is written in the volume. This is precisely a current that is advantageous today for destructive forces. This is today's situation and as a result the position of military authors is incomprehensible: "Needless victims, etc." This is either thoughtlessly written or, rather on the contrary, intentionally. The Institute of Military History occupied the leading role here and a great deal of guilt is personally D.A. Volkogonov's. The struggle for power in Russia compelled D.A. Volkogonov to cast the work to the whims of fate.

3. The authors' collective departed from the GRK's instructions to reflect only the truth and to write objectively. There are many dubious, worn-out facts and figures. An attempt has been seen to disparage everyone and everything.

This is the work's anti-scientific development.

4. There is much superfluous and repetitive material—hence the twofold increase in size. You could throw half of it away and it would be better and the truth would actually remain.

5. There is much that is biased in the assessments of the General Staff's work. The axis of the German troops' main attacks was allegedly incorrectly determined. But here there are live witnesses (Gareyev and others)—this is not so. You do not need to use rumors.

#### CONCLUSION:

The manuscript does not need improvement and revision [marafet] but a thorough reworking, a basic review of structure, reduction of size, and thorough editing.

Right now I do not have time, in 12 hours I am going to defend Vienna (the Vienna negotiations) and then later once again the people of the moment will accuse: We need to once again look at what we are getting in return.

[A voice from the hall] We already took Vienna once, right now we need to defend the army.

[Moiseyev] I also have this in mind.

We need to review the entire composition of the GRK, approve specific people to be responsible for chapters, look at what a man is and what he has in his soul. Do not allow the people of the moment near the cannon shot. We have not allowed them access to the documents and we will not and we will not give them the archives because they do not utilize them appropriately—they use them to write personal works during work time.

[Vaganov] The speakers have mentioned the GRK tasks. In connection with this, the question arises about the USSR Ministry of Defense IMH and how it regards the comments. The very organization of the scientific work does not meet the elementary requirements. When we discussed the structure—everyone agreed and later the IMH independently changes everything while ignoring the GRK.

According to the initiative, the Main Archives along with the IMH conducted a conference "The USSR on the Eve of War" but this did not entail any improvement of the work's documentation base. The IMH is also ignoring the previously developed works (the six-volume and twelve-volume sets). The IMH is closed, outside authors are not permitted. The structure of the first chapters does not withstand criticism. There is no continuity, it is as if previously there were only fools and now there are intelligent people—you can go far with that.

The question arises: what is the IMH—a scientific institution or a commentators' center?

The titles of sections: "The Evolution of the Social System"—only people who do not know history can write like that.

"The Repressive-Administrative System"—who thought up that term and who was the first to introduce it? Let us find him and let him explain it to the people.

Who advanced the thesis: "What have we built?". So far, no one has answered.

The task has been defined for the GRK—determine the direction of research. If the IMH cannot define the topic of research, then I also do not know what to say.

How much did these four chapters cost, how much in money? And this is under the country's serious financial situation. The ten-volume work will exceed both the six-volume and the twelve-volume work in cost and this one has not yet turned out anything. GRK members need to be actively involved in the IMH's work.

[Falin] First of all, I want to make a correction to V.A. Savushkin's report. At the first discussion of the volume at the GRK, we arrived at the conclusion of the need for a fundamental reworking. The authors intended to produce a new version by Autumn 1990. But what has been produced is distinguished by the fact that it is a turn for the worse from the first version. Today what was written in the volume is more anticomunist than what has been published abroad.

For example, pp 132-133: We all know that, just like the majority of other Bolshevik leaders, Lenin viewed the October Revolution not as a national phenomenon, "not even as a European phenomenon, but as a worldwide social phenomenon." Later, a precise trend is deduced—world revolution according to the Bolsheviks' plans. The conclusion is drawn that the Great October Socialist Revolution interrupted Russia's natural development and plunged the country into the depths of disaster. The Bolsheviks began—the Comintern, etc., and the bourgeoisie was compelled to protect itself—the Anti-Comintern Pact, etc.

Who needs this? There is no truth in this. The truth cannot be in the middle, we need to search for the truth as it was and not reconcile the extremes as Comrade Savushkin suggests.

Furthermore, I need to point out that the volume's material is disjointed, there are thousands of errors, and I have not encountered work that is more slipshod in my 40 years of work. The history on contemporary times—Nagornyy Karabakh, that has been unjustly annexed to Azerbaijan, has appeared, Vilnius—the ancient capital of Lithuania, the idea on the forcible annexation of Western Ukraine, Western Belorussia, and the Baltic Region. Rejection of universal principles in the USSR's domestic policy. We cannot write such works using state money.

One more question: the work must be conducted and the alternating staff of authors will not be permitted into the restricted archives. Willful people are not and cannot be permitted here. Documents must be appropriately utilized.

We need to assess the future from the point of view of can this collective work? Can they serve only the facts? Who will work further?

Maybe we need to find new authors and create a new collective? This surgical operation will be cheaper. The Second World War began prior to September 1939—Japan, Albania, etc.

We need to write the history of the war and not the history of the country or the Party.

The solution that has been prepared for discussion does not fill the bill. We need another decision.

[Volkogonov] Dear comrades! My voice will be certainly be alone in this hall. There certainly is not and will not be any scientific discussion in this hall and the voices of science will not be heard. An unfair trial of science, history, and a large collective of authors is occurring here. There is unbridled criticism instead of analysis of the problems. It is very difficult to write today, especially on historical topics. None of the critics have themselves decided to write. They do not have any genuine arguments but only quick tempers like Vaganov has.

In the situation that has been created, I cannot write a new history. To only write about victories in 1945 means

to lie about 1941, about the four million prisoners, and about the retreat to Moscow and the Volga, etc. It is impossible to transform history into policy.

[Varennikov] I propose that we do not permit him to speak!!!

[Volkogonov] I am no less a patriot than Falin and I love my Homeland no less. But it is impossible to change history with a subsequent description. I agree that there are still many shortcomings in the volume, especially in chapters 1 and 11. But let us discuss, argue, and defend our points of view. However, Comrade Falin and certain others are not conducting a scientific discussion but are engaged in accusations of anti-patriotism.

[Yells from their seats] Enough! Why are we listening to him!

[Volkogonov] I am expressing my opinion, let us come to an agreement. I told the Minister of Defense that I cannot write a false history and several weeks ago I asked to be relieved from my position as head of the USSR Ministry of Defense Institute of Military History. Here they say that we were prepared in 1939, I cannot agree with that, and the facts and events confirm the opposite. They are prodding us to write a false history.

[Response] Stop this speech!

[Volkogonov] I bear total responsibility for the criticism directed at the volume and maybe I actually did not pay adequate attention to the first volume but I never wrote one line of "personal works" at work.

The main hero actually is the people but the people are also the martyrs. We wanted to show this, including the causes of 1941's failures. The 1939-1941 period is the key to understanding what occurred at the beginning of the war.

We withstood only at the cost of victims and thanks to unbending courage. And how do we assess the 43,000 repressed servicemen? Other victims? We do not need gold-plated patriotism. We need the truth.

[Varennikov] Why are we only listening to him?

[Kochetov] We also need to listen to him.

[Volkogonov] Several specific questions:

The role of the Party. It was manifested only at the very bottom and at the top the Party simply did not work—the Central Committee assembled for the war only once in 1944.

[Vaganov] The Politburo continued to work, I saw the documents myself.

[Volkogonov] The worsening of the regime. But this did occur. What do you call the destruction of 21 million of our fellow countrymen.

[Yells from the seats and noise] Do not allow him to speak!

[Volkogonov] They will not permit me to speak. This is not an assembly of scholars, this is an unfair trial.

[Kochetov] We allowed you to speak and you called us an unfair trial. And in chapter 11 you compare Fascism and Socialism and you talk about the genetic causes.

[Volkogonov] They are already calling me a turncoat. Filatov (editor-in-chief of VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL—NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA comment) places me right along side Goebbels and Vaganov says anti-history. I want the truth and you agree with me and at the same time: "Do not write that, not like that."

My voice is alone in this hall. But I would like to see what you say about all of this in about 10 years.

Noise in the hall, yells.

[Kochetov] Thank you, Dmitriy Antonovich.

Sic!

**Doctor of Historical Sciences B. Toman (Institute of Marxism-Leninism under the CPSU Central Committee):**

"Less than 70 pages is devoted to VKP(b) organizational activity. This is very little."

**Deputy USSR Minister of Defense General of the Army A. Kochetov:**

"The task to delete excesses was given at the first session of the Main Editorial Commission. But instead of 231 references to the repressions in the first version, they came up with 380 in the second version."

**General of the Army I. Pavlovskiy:**

"Why are you finishing off the Party, whose task is that?"

**Voice from the hall:**

"We have already taken Vienna once, right now we need to defend the army."

**Head (now already former) of the ten-volume authors' collective Colonel-General D. Volkogonov:**

"They are urging us to write a false history."

"My voice is alone in this hall. But I would like to see what you say about all of this in about 10 years."

**Commander-in-Chief of the Ground Forces—USSR Deputy Minister of Defense General of the Army V. Varennikov:**

"There is a proposal to deny him the right to speak."

Sic!

[Chubaryan] Dear comrades! During R.A. Savushkin's speech, a question was raised about the minor GRK. This was not an underground but an official session where all questions raised were discussed and official decisions were made.

From the very beginning, I had a skeptical attitude toward the idea of publishing a work today under society's contemporary level of development. People have been working on the "Ocherki istorii KPSS" [Essays on the History of the CPSU] for five years but there are also no results—it is very difficult to write.

The first volume also had to become the most difficult. I agree that the volume is amorphous, there is much in it that is superfluous, and there is no core.

Actually, the volume has become worse than it was. We gave material and did not see it again. Editing was conducted without approval from our institute.

Right now it is difficult to immediately write a ten-volume work. We need to publish the 1-2 volume "Sovetskiy narod v Velikoy Otechestvennoy voynе" [The Soviet People in the Great Patriotic War]. And we need to nevertheless discuss the volume that has been submitted.

In other volumes where the primary content will concern combat operations, the situation will be more favorable.

**12:22.**

**USSR Minister of Defense Marshal of the Soviet Union D.T. Yazov enters the board session hall.**

[Chubaryan] Right now, we jointly with the Americans are preparing new works on the prewar years and we are setting the task of showing the global conflict of the 20th Century.

This can also be reflected in the ten-volume work.

[Ogarkov] We have been tinkering with volume one for a long time. In my opinion, the issue is clear. We in the Group of General Inspectors have listened to R.A. Savushkin and later to D.A. Volkogonov, we made our comments, but there has not been any reaction whatsoever. The volume has become still worse and much that is new and superfluous has appeared.

[Yazov] How does the Tambov Uprising relate to the war?

[Ogarkov] Why is the volume in 2-3 books? We need to condense it to one book. There are also serious comments on dividing it into periods and on the chapter titles. Division into periods: a critical period—why is there half of 1943 when, as we all know, Stalingrad was at the beginning of 1942? Are we playing a dirty trick on the Americans?

The fourth volume—has gathered all of the failures, an entire volume on them, but there is also only one volume—the ninth—to describe the victory.

I do not want to read the first volume. It is pure bias. Truth must be objective. We do not recognize our country. This volume is a bill of indictment of the CPSU.

[Yazov] The "Democrats" are now setting as their goal the preparation and conduct of Nuremberg II of the CPSU. The concepts for the bill of indictment in this process are present in the volume.

[Ogarkov] I propose: The manuscript of the volume cannot be recognized as satisfactory, it needs to be reworked;

—give the editorial staff time and reconvene once again in September;

—no-confidence in Savushkin and in the collective. They go round and round [zatsiklilis] and are unable to rectify the situation. We need reinforcement.

[Novoseltsev] Fear arises in me over what is occurring here. D.A. Volkogonov speaks and people yell "leave" from their seats—this is a witches' sabbath and not a scholarly meeting. This has simply struck me.

There are very many difficulties with the publication of this work—we have spent four years and the end is not in sight. There were meetings at our institute and we obviously did not manage to prepare the work within the time period.

Maybe we should write a three-volume work for the broad masses. Any historian must master his material but we do not have archives. Letters and circulars are arriving from the USSR Ministry of Defense and things are right where they started. Naturally, there are secret materials but it is incorrect to restrict entire archives.

In the sphere of organizing the work itself—they are all big shots at IMH. It is a head organization and must answer. But we all are also guilty: The USSR Institute of History, the Institute of General History, and the Main Archival Administration.

It is not so simple to replace authors. We have been asked to write sections and we cannot—there are no authors. Throughout the Soviet period there is the most difficult situation with people.

The volume's style requires editing and the numbers require verification. The first half of the volume is quite overloaded with unnecessary detail of the Tambov Rebellion type.

We need to study the level of readiness for war, this will save us from attacks from both the right and the left. We need to discuss this in an argumentative manner. Naturally without taking MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI as the basis but we also need to consider the situation in the country. We need to radically rework the first volume.

[Toman] The content of the first volume provides the basis to assert that the volume's authors and editorial board conducted significant work. We can certify that a significant portion of your collective's comments and suggestions were taken into account. At the same time, shortcomings also exist:

- there was no chapter 1 in the last manuscript and it is no accident that it is chapter 1 that has caused the squall of comments. This chapter is very raw and it should not have been submitted for discussion.
- the concept of the first volume has not yet been developed, hence the ambivalence, lack of argumentation, and the weakness of the terminology.
- the term "on the eve" is too broadly understood.
- the pressure of the everyday commentators is being clearly sensed.
- The volume's structure and proportions appear to be disproportional to us and the assertion that we can full-bloodedly reflect the state of society by showing events at the front is erroneous.

Two hundred pages are devoted to coverage of the political system, 100 pages to the economy, and 130 pages to the spiritual sphere of the more than 1,900 pages. Less than 70 pages are devoted to the VKP(b)'s organizational activities. This is very little. It is impossible to show the heavy and valiant labor of the people without the link to the Communist Party. A critical-analytical approach must be used to the description of events. Without having shown all of the deprivations and sufferings, we cannot show the greatness of the Victory.

We need to pay primary attention to setting forth the events from 1939 and not from 1913.

The chapter headings have been excessively polemicized and they are extremely biased.

We need to define mutual relations with the institutes-coexecutors.

There is a need to give the editorial staffs realistic time periods, compose an outline for reworking it, a precise schedule, and bring the work to an end.

The suggestion to run off the authors' collective is unrealistic and even harmful. We propose preparing a volume dummy and familiarizing the academic community with it. Then we will get a scientific, argumentative opinion.

[Varennikov] I must report, Comrade Minister, that the 40 year period for coverage in the volume was not taken by chance. This is not simply the chronological framework that has been extended but the intention. The intention is to slander communists.

[Yazov] In my opinion, everyone in this hall are communists. And communists cannot spit on their own Party.

[Varennikov] Here Volkogonov spoke and he said that this was an unfair trial of science. But many speakers have revealed the defects in the work.

We oppose unscientific approaches and anticomunism.

I doubt that the collective created by him (Volkogonov) can properly carry out the task of publishing the ten-volume work.

[Yazov] Will we continue? Enough? Good.

There is the impression that I am at fault: I assigned the work to IMH. We need to think about how the GRK will discuss all of the chapters. We certainly need to create working groups: 3-4 from the general inspectors group plus the deputy Minister of Defense and discuss it in a narrow circle.

Right now there are still many live witnesses who remember. Even I from the level of a company commander remember a lot, including the prewar time. And many people occupied high positions. Obviously, it is this work that will lead us away from errors.

The issue of the archives: practically all archives are open but we gave the executors access to everything and they took everything regardless of quality.

At the first GRK session I said, that while beginning the first volume, we need to be thinking about the tenth. We won, therefore, there were sources of this victory.

I am amazed, how could the GRK submit this first volume? Who gathered the materials about 1913 and why? Why is there bias in the coverage of many issues?

The first volume has been written with some sort of hatred toward Stalin. Dmitriy Antonovich, what kind of unfair trial is this?

The impression is that people worked in order to disparage not only the CPSU but also the Soviet people and to present them as submissive.

We need to review the entire structure of the ten-volume work and especially the first volume. This has to be done in the course of the work and to decide who will track which volume in order to prevent errors.

Of course, we wanted to publish the first volume in 1991 but this is unrealistic. We will not drive the horses hard especially for the anniversary. It is true that the truth is most precious of all.

As for subsequent volumes, we can create 10 working groups based on the IMH and enlist departments of academies and from the USSR Institute of History and General History, if they express a desire.

It is true that there are no historians and they have not been trained for a long time. History requires comprehension and comparison.

We need to understand that we cannot write about each of the 15 million people and it is this number of people who passed through the army during the war but there are famous portions (the 307th Rifle Division, for example—Ponyri) and people.

The main reason that we have begun to reinterpret the Great Patriotic War 50 years later is that we must, we are obliged to, and we can interpret what occurred.

The decision must be as follows. We cannot discard everything that has been written in these three books. We will take part of it.

First of all, we will strictly designate the beginning, for example, 1936.

[Lizichev] A major event occurred—the adoption of the Constitution of the USSR.

[Yazov] And the rest—industrialization and collectivization in the form of certification.

[Noise, responses] That is correct!

[Yazov] The end—the eve of the war, June 1941. But not like Yakovlev did it, interpreting the events of 1939 and Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact.

[Noise, responses] That is correct!

[Yazov] I do not want to accuse the authors' collective of anti-Sovietism or anti-party sentiments. But it is impossible to forget those who died or to shrug off the lives of past generations although they also believed Stalin and what he told them. It could not have been otherwise.

It is right now, 50 years later, that we do not believe him.

Stalin wanted to increase the prestige of the Red Army, patriotism, and loyalty to the Homeland. He was the first to take the oath, behind him was Voroshilov, and the entire country knew this.

Why has only the negative been gathered? Let me cite an example—the uneducated and later these uneducated people won and they were the first to soar into space.

I want to thank the session participants. I will conduct the conference at the invitation of the IMH and the institutes-coexecutors in order to resolve during the course of the work what to do, what to know, and whom to ask.

The work "The Great Patriotic War of the Soviet People" will not be a work of solitary persons but will be the collective's work. We will modify the composition of the editorial staff. The first volume is a mess and that must not happen with subsequent volumes.

### Volkogonov Discusses his Dismissal

91UM0753B Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA  
in Russian 22 Jun 91 p 4

[Interview with Doctor of Philosophical and Doctor of Historical Sciences Colonel-General Dmitriy Antonovich Volkogonov, former head of the Institute of Military History, by I. Sichka: "Have We Closed Accounts with the War?"]

[Text] We have not encountered this grimace of the era of stagnation for a long time when they begin to "assail" in the press books that have not been printed anywhere and that no one has read. But now Marshal Akhromeyev's articles have appeared in VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL and PRAVITELSTVENNYY VESTNIK and then articles were published in SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA and in certain other publications. What are they about? They are about what no one has yet seen with their own eyes: about the first volume of the new ten-volume work "Velikaya Otechestvennaya voyna sovetskogo naroda" [The Great Patriotic War of the Soviet People]. A multitude of scathing labels from "defamatory" and "anticommunist" to "pseudoscientific" have already been stuck to this book. Hardly any of our readers would manage to convince themselves of the validity of these accusations since the Ministry of Defense Main Editorial Board (MEB) has rejected the book as defective while it was still in the manuscript stage and it does not have any chance of being published in the near future. Therefore, we decided to turn to the leader (now already former) of the creative collective of authors, Doctor of Philosophical Sciences and Doctor of Historical Sciences, Colonel-General D. Volkogonov.

[Sichka] Dmitriy Antonovich, what happened to the ten-volume work?

[Volkogonov] In our country, there is a long tradition of publishing major works of this nature on the anniversary. In 1987, the CPSU Central Committee decided to publish the ten-volume work "The Great Patriotic War of the Soviet People" by the 50th Anniversary of the Victory.

Marshal Yazov was appointed head of the Main Editorial Board and Marshal Akhromeyev, current Chief of the General Staff General of the Army Moiseyev, and your humble servant were appointed the assistants. The Institute of Military History, the USSR Academy of Sciences, and the Institute of Marxism-Leninism are the primary executors.

A board session took place on March 7, 1991 at which the first volume that we prepared was found to be "anticommunist" and rejected. As a result, the authors' collective that had for the most part already prepared the first four volumes was compelled to do all of the spade work all over again. I decided to leave my position as

chief of the Institute of Military History as a sign of protest. Although the issue of my dismissal had been predetermined.

From the very beginning, I advocated that the composition of the MEC [Main Editorial Commission] include more scholars and historians. But unfortunately they are an obvious minority there. Marshals, generals, Deputy Ministers of Defense, and the CPSU Central Committee secretaries decide everything....

*From the transcript of the March 7 1991 MEC session.*

USSR Academy of Sciences Institute of History of the USSR Director A. Novoseltsev:

"Fear arises in me over what is occurring here. D.A. Volkogonov speaks and people yell 'leave' from their seats—this is a witches' sabbath and not a scholarly meeting...."

We thought that we needed to write an honest history of the war! But it is impossible to do this without analysis of what our society represented on the eve of the war. Naturally, we showed that it was undemocratic, totalitarian, and where millions of people were subjected to repression. A society which genetically predetermined the sources of our errors. It is this that caused the general indignation from the MEC.

*From the transcript of the March 7 1991 MEC session.*

General of the Army K. Kochetov:

"The authors... want to extract the negative from the historical directions and attempt to analyze the state's foreign and domestic policy, the activities of the Party and ruling organs, etc., that is, to examine issues that are not the MEC's prerogative. Many issues have still not been covered by modern historiography. We should not rush ahead of events...."

You know that I am very moved when Marshal Akhromeyev states: yes, there were repressions in our country but Volkogonov and his team present all of this from anti-communist positions. I would be interested in knowing how these repressions must appear from communist positions? Yes and in general the concept of "communist" or "anticommunist" positions, strictly speaking, do not have any relation at all to historical science. Here there must be only truth.

*From the transcript of the March 7 1991 MEC session.*

CPSU Central Committee Secretary V. Falin:

"Today what has been written in the volume is more anticomunist than what has been published abroad."

Akhromeyev is incorrect when he writes that previously Volkogonov had "glorified the CPSU beyond measure" in his dissertations and books. I have not written any book that "glorified the feats of the Communist Party" although all of us are children of the system that has

brought us to today's crisis and we need to have the courage to openly admit this.

[Sichka] In his articles Marshal Akhromeyev asserts that two currents existed in our society during the 1920's-1940's: Stalinism and anti-Stalinism. These "seething trends were even encountered within the Party itself." It is the latter that was the primary force for building socialism in the country.

[Volkogonov] These assertions are methodologically ignorant. If I may say so, this "theory" has one goal: to defend the totalitarian system and to present only Stalin and his entourage as guilty of a historical failure. If everything was like that, then after the dictator's death everything would have been all right by itself and the "anti-Stalinist current" would have prevailed without "turbulence." In reality, there unfortunately was a monolithic bureaucratic society in our country. Naturally someone protested in spirit against the established order and did not accept Stalin.... But no organizations, all the more so legal resistance movements were or could have been since the end of the 1920's. The slightest hint of dissent was mercilessly stopped. And all of us, both Akhromeyev and I, blindly believed in what should have been. And here we do not have to invent anything and we do not need to distort our past. I am afraid that right now they will begin to revamp the ten- volume work under this "concept" and they will begin to present people's ordinary often forced labor as a struggle with Stalinism. And not just anyone but the advisor to the President of the USSR on military issues is advocating this idea.

[Sichka] Dmitriy Antonovich, what do you think, could the war have started for us some other way?

[Volkogonov] History does not know the subjunctive mood and it is impossible to change anything in it. But man is not organized like that, he always wants to know: and what would it be if....

Having become acquainted with a large number of documents, today I can quite completely imagine what June 1941 was like. War was already in the air. Under these conditions, Narkom [People's Commissar] of Defense Timoshenko, Chief of the General Staff Zhukov, and Special Western Military District Commander Pavlov, who was later made nearly the main culprit of our failures of the first days of the war, repeatedly appealed to Stalin. They requested one thing: Bring the troops to combat readiness and withdraw them from billeting locations in accordance with the border defense plan. General Pavlov sent his last telegram to Stalin one week before the war began. Stalin's answer was categorical: one more message like that and we would assess this as panic-mongering.

If the troops would have been withdrawn to previously designated areas, the nature of the war would certainly have been different. The Germans' first attack was very powerful and they most likely would have broken through the first line of our defense and probably would also have broken through the second.... They probably

would have advanced into the country to a depth of 200-250 kilometers but hardly any farther. And so, essentially nearly 80 million Soviet people found themselves under occupation a year later! The enemy seized an enormous territory up to the Volga. And the war itself would not have lasted four years but maybe two and half to three at the most. And 27 million Soviet people would not have died of which more than 17 million were civilians.

On the first day, 1,200 of our aircraft were destroyed and of them nearly 800 were destroyed directly at airfields. This was a catastrophe. Fuel and ammunition dumps were destroyed. On the sixth day of the war, the Western Front was surrounded by the Germans. Using the last enciphered telegram that he managed to send to the troops, Pavlov ordered the troops to make enormous marches, 60 kilometers per day, in order to have time to withdraw the troops from the "sack" through a narrow corridor that remained near Minsk. But it was already late. And we also need to truthfully talk about this because it is impossible for the truth to disparage history.

[Sichka] But do we know everything about that war?

[Volkogonov] If all of the military documents were published as it has been done in the civilized countries, then no disputes whatsoever would arise.

This primarily concerns the archives of the Politburo, of the Supreme Commanders Headquarters, of the State Committee for Defense, etc. We still do not know many things that are associated with the treaties between the USSR and Germany. Specifically, with the infamous Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact. I believe that there is a possibility that those documents have not been preserved.

They tell us: Tell us, what do you need? And sometimes we do not even know what to request or in general what documents exist on some issue or other.

*From the transcript of the March 7 1991 MEC session.*

Chief editor Colonel R. Savushkin:

"The Authors' collective encountered great difficulties in archival support of the work. Unfortunately, our repeated appeals to the CPSU Central Committee, KGB, and MID archives were not crowned with success...."

Chief of the General Staff General of the Army M. Moiseyev:

"We did not permit and will not permit and we will not give them access to documents because they are being improperly utilized...."

CPSU Central Committee Secretary V. Falin:

"The work must be conducted but we will not permit the alternating authors into the restricted archives. There are no self-willed persons here and there cannot be...."

[Sichka] Nevertheless, today what blank spots exist in the history of the Great Patriotic War?

[Volkogonov] There were a total of nearly 50 major strategic operations in the history of the last war. Nearly 15 were defensive and 35 were offensive. All of the offensive operations, say, Yassko-Kishinev, Berlin, Vienna, Budapest, etc., are beautifully described in hundreds of books and monographs. But then again defensive operations, especially those in which we suffered defeat, have remained practically unknown. Say, few people know about the unfinished frontal offensive operations, for example, of 1942: Sinyavino, Lyuban, Demyansk, the Crimea, Kharkov, and Voronezh.... Or the defensive operations of 1941-1942: Vyazemskiy, Orel, Bryansk, Umanskiy, and others.... In August 1941, 452,000 of our soldiers and officers found themselves encircled near Kiev and more than half a million men—near Vyazma in the Autumn of that same year. During the Kharkov Offensive Operation, the Germans managed to surround two of our armies in General Bobkin's group. As a result, 240,000 of our troops died or were taken prisoner. Naturally, these and many other operations do not nearly constitute the pride of our military art. But this is not grounds for their silence. We need to discuss everything. Only then will we find out what the Soviet people and Soviet soldier endured before they celebrated the victory.

[Sichka] Right now attempts are being undertaken in some discussions to look at General Vlasov's personality in a new way. Some are inclined to see him as a man who headed an armed force against Stalin and his dictatorship.

[Volkogonov] I saw very many documents concerning Vlasov. Prior to the war, he had a very good record and he commanded the 99th Motorized Rifle Division which was recognized as one of the best in the Red Army. He recommended himself well near Kiev and Moscow, was mentioned in several of Stalin's orders, and received the rank of lieutenant-general. And, who knows, it is possible that he would have attained the rank of marshal with time if he had not been surrounded on the Volkovskiy Front.

I think that this is precisely the situation when the traditional point of view is correct. Vlasov betrayed his oath and betrayed his military duty. Ultimately, he fought not for Stalin but for the people. And he betrayed the people. Yes he obviously did not intend to become a traitor. But he ended up a prisoner through fate and he did not want to vegetate in a camp and share the fate of General Karbyshev or General Lukin. And although he attempted to impart the ideological tint of "a fighter against tyranny" and "liberator of the Russian people" to his misdeed, treason is treason.

[Sichka] What new facts in historical documents were cited in the first volume that caused the MEC's dissatisfaction?

[Volkogonov] We described the German attack against Poland and the Soviet Union's participation in the division of Poland much more completely than this has

even previously been done and the Baltic events were described. They had never before written this way about the Russo-Finnish War. Incidentally, this campaign demonstrated our total lack of readiness to conduct modern war. We managed to break the resistance of the enemy only through the enormous numerical superiority that we had achieved. Stalin thought that he only had to threaten the Finns and they would immediately resort to concessions. That did not happen. We had to deploy several armies and concentrate a significant number of tanks and aircraft. This victory was also achieved at the cost of a great number of human casualties, we lost four times as many people as the Finns. We wanted to show all of this so that it would be clear how we went into the Patriotic War. That trend that our losses in personnel exceeded German losses by nearly a factor of three during the entire four years of the war already has its beginning in the Finnish Campaign.

Although I need to point out for the sake of justice that our military leaders learned how to fight during the second and third periods of the Great Patriotic War. But Stalin, when he dictated his orders, often added: "Carry out the mission without considering casualties."

[Sichka] Judging by the articles in which you are accused of "defamation," your assessments of the Soviet-German Treaty of 1939 also caused the MEC's dissatisfaction. What are they and do they differ from the conclusions of the First USSR Congress of People's Deputies?

[Volkogonov] No, in principle we did not differ from the conclusions of the Congress committee. We attempted to study Soviet-German relations of that time in all of their dynamics and contradictions. For example, in the book we talk about the fact that a chance existed for the Soviet Union to conclude a treaty with the West in August 1939 and the fact that this did not occur. Without having broken off talks with England and France, Stalin had already begun a dialogue with Hitler. In and of itself this is already unscrupulous. By the way, everyone—both Stalin, Hitler, and the Western Democracies of that time—all of them spoke the same language. A cynical trade was occurring and each wanted to achieve his security at the expense of the others' security. As a result, everyone lost.

Essentially, by not preventing Hitler's attack against Poland and by having concluded a Treaty of Friendship with Germany on September 28, Stalin placed the country in the position of a nonbelligerent ally of Fascist Germany. And if you look at things in an unbiased manner, this September deal has little to differentiate it from the Munich collusion when the West gave Czechoslovakia to Hitler.

Having struck up a "friendship" with Germany, Stalin began to render quite a bit of assistance to the Fascist regime. Both ideological and material. Trotsky, in his "Bulletin of Opposition," even called Stalin "Hitler's quartermaster." And there were definite grounds for

this. Ships and trains went to Germany with a great quantity of strategic material. I am already not talking about bread. We supplied the Germans with manganese which they did not have. Germany bought rubber in Indonesia and it obtained the "green street" on Soviet railroads. Stalin gave Germany many anti-Fascists and Polish officers who had ended up in the USSR after the dismemberment of Poland....

For two and a half months prior to the beginning of the war, the Germans totally ceased all of their deliveries of commodities to the USSR. We rushed our materials to Germany until the very last day. And Stalin's shortsightedness as a politician also manifested itself in this. He was possessed by the obsessive idea that Hitler would decide not to conduct a war on two fronts.

We also attempted to honestly and impartially describe these diplomatic maneuvers in the first volume, we cited quite a few new documents, and provided a number of sharp assessments. And I think that today these assessments do not differ from what is generally accepted.

[Sichka] Dmitriy Antonovich, the persistent opinion exists that if we had not signed these treaties with Germany in 1939, the war would not have begun in 1941 but a year and a half or two earlier.

[Volkogonov] Marshal Akhromeyev asserts that the "Weiss" Plan existed—Fascist Germany's attack against the Soviet Union through the territory of the Baltic states." Hardly! The "Weiss" Plan is the code name of Fascist Germany's attack plan against Poland. But not against the Soviet Union. No 1939 document that provides evidence of the development of a plan for a direct attack against the Soviet Union has been found either in our country or in Germany. One can only theoretically expound on this: they would have finished off Poland and then immediately advanced against the USSR. These enormous military campaigns are not carried out on the spur of the moment, today they decided, tomorrow the troops advanced. The Barbarossa Plan for an attack against the Soviet Union was only signed by Hitler on December 18, 1940.

In this situation, one can talk about something else: the August 1939 Treaty created more favorable strategic conditions for us for entry into the war. We extended our western borders by 200-250 kilometers and improved our position. But unfortunately we could not even take advantage of this. First, the Germans covered this distance in 3-4 days. Second, we practically threw away well-equipped fortified regions on the old border and we did not manage to create new ones.

So I assess these treaties in a political sense as very lackluster and in a moral sense as completely cynical.

[Sichka] There is one other aspect of the history of the Great Patriotic War that it is not customary to subject to revision. This is the Party's leading role in attaining victory.

[Volkogonov] The Party was a political reality as one of the main supports of the Stalinist regime. But it only served as a tool for the dictator. Only one Central Committee Plenum took place throughout the entire war. During the war, three different organs were merged into one conglomerate: the Politburo, the State Committee for Defense, and the Supreme Commander's Headquarters. And while planning the next session, the people themselves at times did not know, as Zhukov wrote, what kind of session it was—Politburo, GKO [State Committee for Defense], or Headquarters? Normally, Stalin issued orders at the end: formulate a Politburo decision or a Headquarters order.... Stalin actually was the one-man command and, depending on the need, he impacted an ideological, state, or military tint to his decisions using these three organs. Still prior to the war, the Party was transformed into an order that rested on a monopoly of political power. And the courageous conduct of rank and file people during the war, regardless of whether or not they were VKP(b) members, is explained not so much by ideological motives as much as by patriotic motives.

*From the transcript of the March 7 1991 MEC session.*

**Doctor of Historical Sciences B. Toman (Institute of Marxism-Leninism under the CPSU Central Committee):**

"Two hundred pages are devoted to coverage of the political system, 100 pages to the economy, and 130 pages to the spiritual sphere of the more than 1,900 pages. Less than 70 pages are devoted to the VKP(b)'s organizational activities. This is very little. It is impossible to show the heavy and valiant labor of the people without the link to the Communist Party."

[Sichka] Dmitriy Antonovich, what can you say about Stalin's talents as a military leader? Today some are inclined as previously to consider him a genius military leader and others—on the contrary—as an extremely mediocre military leader....

[Volkogonov] I am not inclined to tend toward either extreme. Stalin had one important advantage over all of our other military leaders: he possessed the entire range of power—economic, political, and military. Imagine that Zhukov had been designated the Supreme Commander, without any doubt the really most talented military leader. Anyway, he would have had to turn to Stalin for authorization on political or economic issues. Under those conditions which had developed in our country, Stalin's designation as GKO Chairman and Supreme Commander was logical. So Stalin's "talent as a military leader" was manifested thanks not to his personal qualities but thanks to his position as dictator and single holder of power in the country.

On the other hand, Stalin very rapidly cultivated an extremely convenient position: the military came to him to report already with prepared drafts of decisions and he either approved or rejected them. In the event of success, he automatically received the laurels. In the event of defeat, the sins were attributed to the inertness

of the executors. For the sake of justice, I need to point out that Zhukov also wrote about this which, beginning with the second period of the war (after Stalingrad), Stalin had already begun to sort out strategy pretty well. Obviously, because it is quite close to politics. But he remained weak in operational art until the end of the war and he never really understood tactics. But then again, he had a whole series of obsessive ideas with which he exasperated his entourage. Say, after Stalingrad he was possessed by the obsessive idea of encirclement. During the discussion of each major operation, he usually asked one and the same question: is it not possible to create one more "small Stalingrad" here for the Germans? Or the constant idea of changing the time periods of the operations. Many major military leaders knew about this and the matter was reduced to the ridiculous. If the initiation of an operation was required for operational considerations, say, on the 10th, then they would indicate the 15th in the report knowing that Stalin would surely move the date up five to six days earlier.

I think that we were actually lucky that we had intelligent, talented military leaders at the post of chief of the General Staff during the entire war.

[Sichka] What do you see as the main lessons of the last war?

[Volkogonov] I see three as a minimum. first, the general historical pattern has once again been confirmed: any aggressor will sooner or later be defeated.

Second, when a threat of a universal nature arises, all other interests—class, ideological, and others become secondary. Stalin and Churchill were absolute class enemies but, at the critical moment, based on universal interests, they managed to conclude an alliance. And I see the first sources of the new thinking in this. Reagan and Gorbachev did not propose it to us at Reykjavik, the first sprouts of the new thinking appeared on June 22, 1941 when Churchill wired Stalin about his support. It is another matter that already in 1945-46 these sprouts were frozen under the winds of the Cold War.

And finally the third: the war ended Hitlerism and this is a fact of enormous historical significance but it consolidated Stalinism. Stalin believed in his own historical correctness and he undertook everything possible to conserve the totalitarian system he had created. Having finished the war victoriously, we found ourselves still far from those days when the night of the Stalinist era would end.

In conclusion, I will say that it is time for us to learn how to relate to history as a science. Yes it is very close to politics and they often speculate on this recalling that "history is policy toppled over in the past." But history, I repeat, cannot be "communist" or "anticommunist." It is only true and honest, or false and truncated.

**Wartime GKO Shelter Opened To Viewing**

91UM0627A Moscow SYN OTECHESTVA in Russian  
No 13, 29 Mar 91 p 14

[Article by Major S. Gulko: "Secrecy Stamp Removed: Installation No. 1"]

[Text] Not too long from now, Samara residents will have an opportunity to visit an unusual museum whose exhibits will be in former "secret installation No. 1"—the official name, until recently, for the shelter built during the Great Patriotic war in the city on the Volga for the country's State Defense Council.

The history of the construction of this unique engineering structure is of interest. In the fall of 1941, when the fascists were surveying Moscow through the Zeiss lenses of their binoculars, many government institutions were evacuated from the capital to Kuybyshev. Here, to the Volga, plans called for moving the members of the State Defense Committee, led by Stalin. A special shelter was built in Kuybyshev for the committee. It was designed and constructed by Moscow subway builders in record short time—from February to November 1942. A colossal amount of work was performed in that time: 25,000 cubic meters of earth was excavated and hauled away, 10,000 cubic meters of concrete and reinforced concrete was laid. And all this was done virtually by hand, in a confined space at a depth of down to 40 meters, and under the strictest secrecy. The city's old-timers remember how in 1942, when passing by the building housing the cultural institute, under which the shelter was being built, they never noticed anything and consequently had no idea what was going on.

The unique engineering structure was never needed during the war years. The post for directing civil defense subunits in the event of an emergency that was housed here until recently also went virtually unused. Soon the shelter will hold a civil defense instructional and methods center and a Civil Defense Museum. By order of the chief of the oblast civil defense staff, the museum's artistic and methodological council have already been formed and is made up of staff officials, oblast civil defense instructors, and veterans.

What does the shelter consist of?

One enters the underground shelter via 192 steps situated within a circular well made of prefabricated reinforced-concrete rings. There is also an elevator. Each of the six floors has workrooms for the members of the State Defense Council and rooms for security personnel and services. At a depth of 37 meters is the largest

room—the State Defense Council's conference hall, which basically resembles Stalin's Kremlin office (see photo). Its total area is 70 square meters.

Air raids posed no threat to the shelter, which was designed to house 100 people. Two concrete "mattresses" (one 3.5 meters thick, the other 1 meter thick), plus a cushion of earth more than 20 meters thick provided reliable protection. The installation had a dependable life support system. The technical floor has two power sources and two air intake and purification units equipped with filters. In the event the filter-ventilation units were to fail, air recycling equipment was to be switched on. The floor also has an elevator and staircase and a passage to a neighboring shaft. Visitors to the museum will have something to see in former "secret installation No. 1." Plans call for setting up seven demonstration halls whose exhibits will tell about the origin and development of the local air defense forces and civil defense, about protecting the population from the effects of accidents, catastrophes, natural disasters and from chemical substances and radiation, about providing medical services, and about engineering installations and communications and detection systems and equipment.

The exposition will feature documents from the Great Patriotic War period, individual protective devices and equipment, and other exhibits telling about the past and present of the oblast civil defense organization.

One of the museum's halls is to be called "Kuybyshev—the USSR's Second Capital During the War Years." Its materials will reveal to visitors little known pages from the history of ancient Samara, including the decision that the party Central Committee and State Defense Council took in October 1941 to evacuate some central institutions and the entire diplomatic corps from Moscow to Kuybyshev. In accordance with the decision, part of the apparatus of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) Central Committee and of the USSR Council of People's Commissars was moved to the city on the Volga and began operating there, along with other state institutions. In November 1941, a military parade was held in Kuybyshev, with Marshal of the Soviet Union K.L. Voroshilov presiding. The soldiers who took part in it left the square and headed straight for the front.

Museum visitors will have the chance to visit the State Defense Committee's conference room and to see the private quarters of the Supreme Commander in Chief, in which the atmosphere of that far-off time will be recreated, with a map showing the situation on the fronts just before state institutions and the diplomatic corps were evacuated to Kuybyshev.

**Findings of Investigation Into Afghan Bombing Incident**

91UM0761A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian  
29 Jun 91 First Edition p 2

[Interview with Colonel-General A. Fatah, commander in chief of the Air Force and Air Defense Forces of the Republic of Afghanistan, by Colonel A. Oliynik, KRASNAYA ZVEZDA special correspondent, in Kabul on 28 June: "Namadguti Poyen—A Pilot's Tragic Error"; first paragraph is KRASNAYA ZVEZDA introduction]

[Text] In the republic of Afghanistan, a commission to investigate an incident which occurred the morning of 4 June on the Soviet-Afghanistan border has completed its work. At that time, as we know, the Tajik village of Namadguti Poyen in Gorno-Badakhshan Autonomous Oblast was subjected to aerial bombing from an Afghanistan Air Force aircraft. Our special correspondent met in Kabul with the chairman of the commission, Colonel-General A. Fatah, commander in chief of the Air Force and Air Defense Forces of the Republic of Afghanistan.

[Fatah] As a result of a thorough investigation and flight to the location of this incident conducted jointly with the Soviet side, we have ascertained all the details of this ill-fated flight. Here is how everything took place. At the beginning of June, our air reconnaissance discovered a concentration from the rebel detachment of Ahmad Shah Mas'ud in the northwest part of the country, in the vicinity of the Zebak population center, which is not far from the Soviet-Afghan border. At the next high-level staff meeting, the country's President Najibullah assigned the Air Force the mission of conducting an aerial bomb strafing of the area. That same day I issued the appropriate order to my first deputy, Lieutenant-General Mustafa. Early on the morning of 4 June he flew out on a fighter-bomber to find the grouping lost in the remote mountainous region of Gikdukush. Although the weather was clear that day, flying in this region and maintaining one's orientation is always very difficult and complicated due to the abundance of mountain peaks and deep canyons. It is here that the pilot lost his bearings and for a brief period crossed the border river Pyandzh, mistaking it for the mountain river Vardudzh. He saw a concentration of people and equipment (it later became clear that this was a local section of the rayon agricultural implements and machinery sales center) and released his lethal load. The bombing was conducted from an altitude of 5,500 meters. As a result of the pilot's error, an extremely unfortunate tragedy took place and Soviet people perished.

The next day, upon careful analysis of his flight, Lieutenant-General Mustafa realized his error and reported it to the minister of defense, General of the Army M. Watanjar. Together they went to the Soviet embassy in Kabul and offered their apologies. As has already been reported in the Soviet and Afghan press, Republic of Afghanistan President Najibullah sent a message to USSR President M.S. Gorbachev and Tajikistan President K. Makhkamov expressing

deep regret in connection with the incident. Literally days afterward, our governmental delegation headed by Minister A. Kayum went to Tajikistan. They visited the village of Namadguti Poyen, expressed condolences to the families of those who perished and Soviet citizens who were victims of the incident, and determined compensation. Although I understand that no amount of money can return the lives of those who perished...

[Oliynik] All the same, how could the pilot make such a mistake? After all, Lieutenant-General Mustafa is known in Afghanistan as a genuine ace pilot, twice decorated as Hero of the Republic of Afghanistan, who has chalked up thousands of air combat missions.

[Fatah] Yes, that is true. Soviet military aviation specialists consider General Mustafa a God-given pilot. During the war period he passed through every grade from ordinary pilot to first deputy commander in chief. There is no far-off corner where he has not flown. Unfortunately, this self-assurance served, in his words, as a valuable trait gone wrong. The fact is that the assumed area of concentration of the rebels is located at a bend in the mountain river Vardudzh—the very same kind of twist made by the river Pyandzh in the same area. But almost 30 kilometers to the north of it. This can be clearly seen on the map. It is this bend which confused the experienced pilot. He crossed a ridge and wound up over the river Pyandzh. From an altitude it is difficult to distinguish peaceful citizens from military personnel. In addition, every second counted—he was running out of fuel. In short, this was a tragic error of war and nothing more—as certain organs of the press are attempting to depict, and not only in the West.

[Oliynik] And so there was, all the same, a violation of the USSR state border?

[Fatah] Yes, though for a short period of time. Had it not happened, aerial bombs would not have fallen on the territory of a Soviet village.

[Oliynik] Colonel A. Arinakhin, a Soviet member of the commission, told me that this is far from being the first time Afghan combat aviation has violated our airspace. What measures have now been taken by the government to see to it that similar mistakes do not happen in the future?

[Fatah] I have here a directive of President Najibullah which has just been published. Along with other measures, it delineates a 10-kilometer border zone along the Afghan-Soviet border in which combat air missions will henceforth be prohibited. In the event of urgent necessity (we continue, after all, to be in a state of war), such combat flights will be possible only after obtaining the personal authorization of the country's president. The directive focuses special attention on enhancement of crew flight training and increased rigid supervision of flight preparations. I am convinced—and can assure the Soviet people of this—that a tragic mistake of this nature will not happen again.

**Civilian Programs for Defense Industries Detailed**

*914A0816A Moscow PLANOVYE KHOZYAYSTVO  
No 4, Apr 91 pp 76-81*

[Article by V. Kotov, deputy department head, USSR Gosplan: "The State Program for Conversion of the Defense Industry"]

[Text] The state program for the conversion of the defense industry and the development of non-military production until 1995, which arises from social pressures that place a priority upon economic progress together with a reduction of military outlays, has been approved by the Government of the USSR.

This multifaceted plan was in the process of preparation for about two years. A significant share of the work in forming the conversion program was carried out by USSR Gosplan [State Planning Committee]. Directly participating in this effort were the State Commission on Military and Industrial Matters of the USSR Council of Ministers; the USSR Ministry of Defense; specialists from ministries for sectors of the defense industry; a number of ministries for civilian branches of industry; and other central ministries and departments, enterprises, and organizations of the defense complex, as well as representatives of republic and regional administrative bodies. The difficulty of this undertaking lay in the complexity and unprecedented nature of the conversion problem as well as a lack of adequate experience in coming to terms with it either in this country or abroad. To draw up the program in draft form, USSR Gosplan specialists compiled methodological recommendations and established a system of procedures for processing proposals and drawing up planning documents.

The need was recognized to bring about the conversion without substantially altering the industrial potential of the defense enterprises or increasing the output of vitally important civilian products and consumer goods by making maximum use of resources and manpower as they become free of engaging in the production of weapons and military equipment.

In this connection an analysis was made of each enterprise undergoing conversion to determine the potential for civilian output at industrial plants as they became available. Through this process a determination was made of plants fully in use for the production of civilian products without any substantial modernization, plants in need of renovation for this purpose, and plants that should be either written off or else undergo conversion.

While in the process of working out the conversion program, a study was made of matters related to the release of a number of enterprises in civilian sectors of industry from the production of military equipment as branches of the defense industry as well as to long-term international cooperation in exchanging military weapons and technology.

In preparing for the conversion program it was considered necessary to keep the production process going without any letup. That is, as the output of military weapons and equipment was being reduced, there should be a continuous build-up in the output of high-quality civilian products and consumer goods. In this connection, together with the resolution of technical production problems, the need was recognized of anticipating measures to resolve the economic and social problems related to the transformation of industrial plants, the requalifying of specialists, payment of compensation, granting of concessions, and so on.

The program reflects concerns with the conversion of scientific research and design organizations within the defense complex to the development of new kinds of civilian products and consumer goods that meeting the highest standards of world scientific and technical achievement. Moreover, the entire scientific and technical potential, as it becomes released from work to improve military technology, should be fully utilized for civilian needs.

The state conservation program was drafted on the basis of the following preliminary principles:

- The extent and depth of conversion was to be determined by the degree to which military expenses were curtailed in accordance with decisions adopted;
- State tasks were to be coordinated with the proposals of enterprises, organizations, and regions where the conversion process was taking place, while state aid was to be rendered to enterprises and organizations undergoing conversion for resolving social problems;
- Industrial production plants becoming released and the scientific and technical potential of the defense complex were to be reoriented primarily for the purpose of satisfying the priority demands of the national economy.

The program contains target indicators of Union government special-purpose programs for achieving major objectives of scientific and technical progress, including the development of civil aviation, non-military shipbuilding, a space program in the interests of the economy, communications to promote international cooperation as well as the economy, prospective production of high-purity materials and compounds, and fiber-optic communications for enterprises of the USSR Ministry of Atomic Energy and Industry.

In each of these Union programs the basic tasks were determined together with the amounts to be allocated for processing and deliveries in the major categories of technological development, designating deliveries for exports as well as the amounts required for capital investments and the foreign exchange needed to carry out each program through all sources of financing.

**The Union government special program to develop civil aviation** is of major interest. It has been launched by

funds set aside for scientific research, design, and testing and is aimed at meeting to the extent possible the demands of the public and the national economy for passenger transport and aviation services.

The program provides for the achievement of a wide range of tasks. Among them is the completion of tests performed on the Il-96-300 and Tu-204 airplanes and putting them into service as soon as possible; replacement of the obsolete An-24 with new Il-114 airplanes, accommodating 60 passengers, for local airlines; development of the new An-38 for local airlines, the Il-7611 for extinguishing forest fires, an amphibious airplane, and a new multipurpose agricultural plane; the design of an engine to improve the performance and efficiency of Il-96-300 and Tu-204 aircraft, while creating the prototypes for developing an engine for new types of passenger and transport planes; joint efforts with other countries to use foreign engines and on-board equipment to maintain the competitiveness of Il-96-300 and Tu-204 aircraft; improving the potential for exporting these aircraft; and developing new types of helicopters to improve their efficiency and our country's export potential.

To exploit the existing fleet of aircraft, measures are provided for to improve engine power, to increase the reliability of engine performance, and to modernize navigation equipment in response to new requirements for aircraft separation in flights over Western Europe and the Atlantic Ocean.

The completion of this program will make it possible to replace the present inventory of planes under the USSR Ministry of Civil Aviation with more economical, efficient, and up-to-date technology, which will reduce the presently unsatisfactory demand for passenger transport while making it possible to extend our exports.

To fulfill this program, research, design, and testing work worth about R8 billion must be carried out and R4.3 billion must be spent on the renovation of enterprises and organizations. In all, between 1991 and 1995, more than R16 billion are set aside for the Ministry of Civil Aviation to upgrade its aviation technology.

**The Union government special program to develop non-military shipbuilding in the construction of ships at domestic plants for the USSR Ministry of the Maritime Fleet, the USSR Ministry of the Fish Industry, the USSR Ministry of the Petroleum and Gas Industry, and the USSR Ministry of Geology, as well as meeting the needs of the fishing fleet and other contractors. Ship production by 1995 is expected to be 1.75 times higher than in 1991, including increased deliveries of commercial ships for export overseas totaling more than R2 billion.**

Special attention is given in the program to developing new complementary equipment—radar, navigational, electronic, and power-generating equipment. The necessity for producing equipment of this kind is dictated by a need to improve the technical and economic standards of ships, and also to fulfill unconditionally international agreements to refrain from polluting the oceans and to

maintain the safety of sea navigation. Capital investments totaling R700 million are required to carry out the program. Outlays for research, design, and testing amounting to R1.8 billion will make it possible between 1991 and 1995 to provide for the national economy and for export ships worth about R13.5 billion, including dry-cargo vessels, ice-cutting transport ships, tankers, tugboats, cargo ships with horizontal freight-handling capabilities, and ships of the technical fleet.

**The Union government space program** provides for enhancing the economic effectiveness of using satellites in various fields (communications, television, navigation, geodesy, meteorology) as well as for participating in the formation of an international market for space technology and information. Its main missions include communications with stationary and moving objects in space; space television and navigation; remote earth exploration; carrying out national economic tasks with piloted space vehicles and space technology; and scientific, medical, and biological research in space.

Completion of the program will make it possible to satisfy basic needs of the economy in communications; to solve the problem of providing republic television in the national languages; to extend the utility of space vehicles for transmitting information; to provide for transmission of signals broadcast by ships and aircraft in distress; and to reduce expenditures on geological surveys, studies of the natural wealth of forests, land masses, and predicting the weather. In addition, it offers the opportunity to produce semiconductors and biological or medicinal substances in space; to increase the impact of piloted research programs in space and maintain the USSR's lead in this area; to cooperate with the United States in a program to develop a unified international transport system; and to continue launches for commercial purposes with the cooperation of other countries abroad and with the participation of their cosmonauts.

**The Union government program to develop communications for economic purposes**, while serving to promote international cooperation, is directed primarily at satisfying the needs of the people and the national economy for communications services. To complete the program, allocations of about R700 million are earmarked for capital investments in the restructuring of enterprises and organizations, and R11 billion for research, design, and testing purposes, including R2 billion for contracts and client contractors.

The program also envisions growth in the production of communications equipment for the Unified Automated Network of Communication in the Country (YeASS) [Yedinaya avtomatizirovannaya set svyazi strany]. The volume of production of switching equipment and information relay systems will increase three times in 1995 by comparison with 1991, and other defense complex industries will become involved in making deliveries of communications equipment.

Completion of the program will make it possible to accelerate development while improving the quality of all types of communications services available to the people and the national economy, while extending international collaboration in such vital areas as satellite communications, optical-fiber and digital transmission systems, in-flight radio communications, and high-definition television.

To develop production capacity on the basis of which to convert the enterprises and organizations and modernize communications during the period 1991-1995, capital investments totaling R4.3 billion are required, and outlays of R4.34 billion are required for scientific research, engineering design, and testing. This will provide the national economy with communications technology and equipment valued at R16.6 billion. Meanwhile, the amount of communications services in 1995 is projected to reach R18 billion, and the automation of international telephone exchange to reach 91 percent. Opportunities for local stations to hook up to the automated international telephone network are expected to increase virtually throughout the country. Single-channel television will become available at that time to 99.4 percent, two-channel television programs to 97 percent, and multi-channel programs to 60 percent of the population.

The Union government development program of the Ministry of Atomic Energy and Industry for the eventual production of materials, substances, and compounds of high purity, microelectronic products, computers, and fiber-optic components provides for a stronger impetus towards social objectives in the scientific and productive activities under this ministry and for pioneering development in fields reliant on knowledge that has been gained in both the pure and applied sciences.

A key factor in accelerating the development of production by the ministry under the conditions of conversion is the presence of a rich variety of deposits of elements, compounds, and ore concentrations in regions where uranium-mining operations are in progress. Plans call for measures to obtain materials for the economy with a steady sales market, particularly rare and precious metals, trace elements, and chemical compounds of recognized value, as well as products made from them, and to spur chemical and metallurgical production by exploiting scientific advances, the latest technology, and high-purity substances.

This integrated approach to the problem of developing the field of microelectronics will eventually make it possible to secure the science-based technology and special technical equipment with which to obtain high-purity materials and substances with the special characteristics that are needed in electronics—an industry that requires unusually clean conditions for production. Thus the production base will be established for microelectronics, computer technology, and automation.

To meet new standards of quality required for data processing and transfer systems, serial production is

planned using equipment for manufacturing optical fibers and cables made from them and for monitoring instruments with which to diagnose and fine-tune the systems developed. At the same time, it is necessary over a five-year period to carry out scientific research, design, and testing at a cost of R340 million, while making capital investments of R440 million.

**Projected program volume indicators are presented in the form of predictions with respect to the use of plants freed from producing military supplies by having been transformed and geared to the design and production of non-military products and consumer goods.**

The output of consumer goods other than foodstuffs is projected, in terms of 1990 prices, to increase to R44.9 billion in 1991 and to reach R71 billion in 1995; that is, by comparison with 1990 an increase by a factor of 1.8 is anticipated, and by comparison with the base year 1988 an increase by a factor of 2.6 is anticipated. Fifteen million television sets should be manufactured in 1995 (as compared with 9.6 million in 1988), including 12 million color sets (5.7 million in 1988), as well as 2.4 million video tape recorders, 7.5 million sound recorders, 8.7 million refrigerators and freezers (6.1 million in 1988), 3.2 million sewing machines (1.5 million in 1988), 7.7 million washing machines (4.2 million in 1988), 6.7 million vacuum cleaners (3.7 million in 1988), 3.4 million bicycles, 4 million cameras, 280,000 digital record players, 740,000 motorcycles and motorscooters, 360,000 power mowers and cultivators, 2.2 million kitchen ranges, and 1.8 million microwave ovens.

Total production of technological equipment for making over branches of the agro-industrial complex is scheduled to rise in 1995 to 2.2 times that of 1990, amounting to R3.92 billion (in 1991 prices and conditions), and with the participation of the USSR Ministry of Atomic Energy and Industry reaching a total of R4.9 billion. Enterprises of the defense industry should develop and assimilate automatic equipment and machines for the production of more than three thousand new product lines, thereby making it possible to completely renew the product list of technological equipment produced for this purpose.

For the first time in this country the task is encountered of providing batching equipment and various kinds of fast freezers for food concentrate and confectionery production. The licensing of concessions will make possible such industries as sugar refining, the manufacture of macaroni products, and beverage bottling by modern and highly efficient automated production lines.

Considerable attention has been given to innovation in the development of production, and specifically to the development of equipment complexes for enterprises of limited capacity, located in remote regions of the country and in rural areas where raw materials are available, such as milk processing, cheese production, bread baking, canning, and meat-packing enterprises.

For these purposes there are plans to produce 1,185 units of up-to-date batching equipment in 1995, including 300 for bread-baking, 200 for canneries, 300 for meat-packing plants, 240 for sausage-manufacturing operations, and 70 for cheese production workshops. The schedule also provides for 1,450 production lines for bottling beverages, 3,020 automatic systems for packaging and packing various food products, and 200 assembly lines for producing confectionery and pastry products.

**The production of technological equipment for enterprises of light industry** is projected to reach R2.67 billion in 1995, which amounts to an increase of 1.9 times by comparison with 1990. The relative amounts of equipment produced will undergo a change with a marked rise in production of equipment that is economically useful and in short supply, thereby determining the degree of technological progress made in the field of light industry. This progress will make it possible by 1995 to satisfy in basic respects the need for the most critical kinds of equipment and to reduce the amount that is imported. During the period 1991-1995 branch enterprises of the defense industry should through their own efforts assimilate output by more than 1,400 items of equipment. This innovation, together with licensed purchases from abroad, promises to bring about a rise in labor productivity by a factor in the range of 1.5-2.5.

**The production of technological equipment for commercial and public food service enterprises** is scheduled to double in 1995 by comparison with 1990, reaching a total book value of R1.65 billion. This will become possible with the assimilation of output by more than 140 kinds of new equipment and the technical resources for a broader introduction of commercial methods of self-service with the sale of goods in packed or packaged form. Production is scheduled in 1995 of 575,000 units of commercial refrigeration equipment, 577,000 units of heating equipment, 330,000 machines for processing food products, 48,000 dishwashers, 30,000 food distribution lines, and 50,000 automat.

Modular equipment for the introduction of industrial methods of food preparation will be manufactured for the use of public food catering and service enterprises, consisting of a series of tanks and containers for food storage and sets of equipment designed to expedite fast food service. At the same time, microwave ovens will be widely used to prepare ready-made meals.

**The production of medical technology** is projected to increase by a factor of 2.5 during the period 1991-1995 as a result of the conversion, making it possible to reach a total volume worth R3.8 billion. A number of enterprises, research institutes, and design bureaus within the defense complex possess the experience to adapt themselves to this kind of production. But the volume of deliveries does not yet meet public health requirements either in terms of technical proficiency or product quality. The conversion process creates an opportunity for significant growth in the production of advanced

medical technology. Together with the growth of goods produced, research, development, and testing organizations are planning to create radically new types of medical instruments and equipment for use in such fields as ophthalmology, cardiology, applied stomatology, drug-free therapy, laboratory diagnosis, treatment monitoring, and intensive emergency care.

Enterprises of the USSR Ministry of General Machine Building plan to master production of high-quality rehabilitation equipment, including orthopedic and prosthetic devices, wheelchairs, and powered appliances for invalids.

**The program includes a list of 130 scientific and technical achievements of the defense complex recommended for use by non-military industries (most of which have perhaps already been turned over to these industries).** Many of them have no prototypes anywhere in the world. Among them are wear-resistant aluminum oxide coatings made by highly efficient methods of micro arc-welding anode-cathode oxidation; corrosion-resistant and wear-resistant coatings of chromium, aluminum, niobium, copper, silicon, and molybdenum, created by a method of ion-plasma spraying in a vacuum; ceramic materials fired at high temperatures for the manufacture of inexpensive turbines and internal combustion engines; and composite materials of glass, carbon, and organic fibers for the production of a broad range of tanks, pipes, and other articles for use in such areas as chemical machine-building, construction work, and the agro-industrial industry.

The projected amount of financing of research, design, and testing work for non-military purposes is determined by the amount of development required for major aspects of non-military production and scientific study as well as for special-purpose Union programs. For the period 1991-1995, projections include approximately R4 billion to be spent on the design of new models of technological equipment for the agro-industrial complex, light industry, trade, public catering services; R3.5 billion for medical technology; R4.2 billion for consumer goods; R4.6 billion for computer technology; R4.7 billion for communications and solid-state equipment for use in television and radio broadcasting; and R8.3 billion to develop new materials and technology.

Capital expenditures during 1991-1995 total R16 billion for complete Union government special programs; R15.2 billion to develop electronics; R13.2 billion to redesign plants for producing consumer goods; R3.2 billion to provide processing industries of the agro-industrial complex with new technology; and R1.7 billion for medical technology.

Included in the program is a section on developing a network of small-scale enterprises based on production freed from the design and manufacture of military technology, either leased or privately owned, having an inter-branch character, which can tap the potential of the

defense industries for scientific and technical achievements by producing major products used in civilian life and consumer goods other than foodstuffs.

The program proposes to release entirely four enterprises of the defense complex from producing any military products—the Sretenskiy Shipbuilding Plant, The Leninskaya Kuznitsa Plant, the Poshkar-Olenskiy Mechanized Plant, and the Yuryuzanskiy Mechanized Plant. It also frees up 39 other non-military industrial enterprises previously involved in the production of military equipment, including four enterprises of the USSR Ministry of Metallurgy, seven enterprises of the Ministry of Heavy Machine Building, and tractor plants in Chelyabinsk, Pavlodar, and Vladimir.

To accelerate the process of re-equipping the national economy by exploiting the potential of the defense complex, and to bring about a radical improvement in the process of incorporating scientific and technical advances of the defense industries into the civilian sector, the need was recognized for an **All-Union Innovative Conversion Fund** formed with assets turned over by ministries, departments, associations, and organizations. This fund to expedite the conversion process by undertaking measures for the social protection of workers at enterprises undergoing conversion and to finance research and development applicable to non-military projects is scheduled to be established in 1992. Its formation presupposes the realization of assets gained through the sale of unfinished building projects and the use of military technology, as well as some of the assets to be derived from a year-by-year reduction in the volume of arms deliveries, military technology, and allocations for research, design, and testing, as well as from other sources.

To develop the foreign economic activity of enterprises undergoing conversion within the framework of rights and duties defined in "Basic Guidelines for Stabilizing the National Economy during the Transition to a Market Economy," the State Commission for Foreign Economic Questions and the State Commission for Military-Industrial Questions of the USSR Council of Ministers, acting jointly with USSR Gosplan and interested ministries and departments, are assigned the task of preparing during the first six months of 1991 a plan to expand economic cooperation of these enterprises with foreign firms by delivering competitive products for export.

With respect to prospects for developing affirmative actions reflecting a further diminution of international tensions and lessening of military confrontation, the program suggests that the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs, acting in conjunction with the ministries of the defense industries as well as with the enterprises, associations, and organizations, explore the international ramifications of converting the defense industries and keep administrative bodies of the military-industrial complex informed about the progress of disarmament negotiations and their outcome.

As demonstrated by the international conference on conversion that took place in Moscow under the aegis of the United Nations in August 1990, the disarmament process is becoming increasingly widespread throughout the world, and the vigorous stand of our country on this issue has had a substantial influence on the emergence of this trend.

With regard to extending the conversion process and strengthening its effect upon the development of the country's economy, the Institute for Economics and Forecasting Scientific and Technical Progress and The United States of America and Canada Institute of the USSR Academy of Sciences will submit practical recommendations, indicating various options for reducing military outlays, suggesting new ways to mobilize management during the changeover to a market economy, and assessing the implications of these efforts for future of the national economy.

The state program for conversion of the defense industry and the development of non-military production within the defense complex now extends throughout the country. In considering the government conversion plan for 1991 with respect to areas of USSR jurisdiction, its basic objectives were reviewed by the USSR Supreme Soviet and endorsed in a separate appendix to its decree on the plan.

An all-Union forecast by the USSR government of economic prospects in 1991 made an estimate of the total output of consumer goods (other than foodstuffs) and major non-military output under the influence of the conversion process. Specifically, it estimates a 1991 output of 9.95 million radios, 11.6 million television sets (including 7.93 million color sets), 6.3 million refrigerators, 1.9 million household sewing machines, 6.35 million washing machines, about 7 million tape recorders, 300,000 video tape recorders, 154,000 power mowers and cultivators, and 660,000 motor bicycles and motor-scooters.

The 1991 projection of technological equipment for light industry is valued at R1.71 billion (in 1991 prices); for renovating branches of the agro-industrial complex, R2.44 billion; for trade and public catering, almost R1 billion; and for medical technology, R1.9 billion.

The results of efforts by branches of the defense industry in 1990 under conditions of the conversion confirm the correctness of the approaches taken in drafting this program. Enterprises of the defense complex produced in 1990 consumer goods worth a total of R38.3 billion—that is, 1.4 times more than the amount produced in the pre-conversion year of 1988. The technological equipment used to convert branches of the agro-industrial complex produced in 1990 output was valued at almost R2.3 billion (in 1991 prices), which represents an increase of 1.6 times in comparable prices over 1988; in light industry, the figure was R1.67 billion (an increase of 1.4 times); in medical technology, R1.54 billion (an increase of 1.4 times); in communications, R1.94 billion

(an increase of 2 times); and in civil aviation technology, R1.44 billion (an increase of 1.7 times).

Without the measures that were taken to convert these industries, such rates of increase in non-military production would have been impossible. The fulfillment of the program entails strenuous efforts in reshaping the production plants freed from producing military technology. It is necessary to master new technology for producing civilian goods, to requalify large numbers of workers, to adjust cooperative relations, to raise the level of the productivity and organization of labor, and thereby expand the output of consumer goods.

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### **Leningrad's Almaz Shipbuilding Ends Warship Construction**

91UM0660B Moscow *IZVESTIYA* in Russian  
12 May 91 Union Edition p 2

[Article by Vladimir Nevelskiy under the "Direct Link" rubric: "The Last Man-of-War"; first paragraph is *IZVESTIYA* introduction]

[Text] The conversion plan calls for the collective of the Leningrad Almaz shipbuilding association to cease production of its main military product line.

The Petrovskiy Island shipbuilders, whose business since olden times has been the construction of warships and fitting the entire fleet with weaponry, have just launched their last ship. One more of the same series started to take shape on the building ways, but it will be cut up for scrap.

Conversion has not affected the enterprise's work load adversely. The association is designing high-speed catamarans intended for use on rivers and in coastal areas. Construction has started on racers featuring all-welded hulls made of aluminum-magnesium alloys. Nowhere else in the world is this kind of yacht being built.

With the Almaz's switch to nonmilitary activity, a multitude of proposals for collaborative work came pouring in from foreign firms. The first contracts have been signed with them. In progress is the establishment of a joint enterprise that will build sailing yachts, which will be offered for sale on the Western market.

### **Consumer Goods from Ship Repair Enterprise**

91UM0660A Moscow *KRASNAYA ZVEZDA* in Russian  
18 May 91 First Edition p 4

[Article by Capt 2nd Rank V. Pasyakin: "Where There's a Will, There's a Way"; first paragraph is *KRASNAYA ZVEZDA* introduction]

[Text] The ship repair enterprise headed by Captain 1st Rank A. Velichko is well-known for more than its "specialty." The consumer goods manufactured there

are in demand in Sevastopol, the Crimea, the Ukraine—about 50 cities in the Soviet Union are provided with the ship repair people's products. Virtually nothing is returned with a complaint of poor quality.

A person can marvel at even a partial listing of consumer items the enterprise has learned to produce: kitchen corner cabinets; children's single-style and bunk beds; sets of lifting weights; athletic training equipment; garden tools; garden fence sections; loggia and balcony frames; assorted automobile accessories.

This activity actually started in 1989, when 728,000 rubles' worth of output was produced. The 1990 plan has already exceeded 1.6 million rubles. The enterprise has learned to make garden sheds, storage sheds and metal garages. Recent additions are a plastics shop and a garment shop, which makes bedding items, skirts, underwear, men's and women's work clothing and tourist outfits. In a word, everything that is in demand by consumers.

"This year there has been a doubling of consumer goods tasking," said B. Kozlov, production control assistant chief. "We have to exercise quite a bit of inventiveness to keep up. In this connection, we have a contract with Simferopol scientific production association Foton to supply the latter with television circuit boards."

Boris Anatolyevich walked us into the radiotechnical armaments shop, where we had a look at the assembly line. There we saw about 50 girls doing radio assembly work. Much has been done there to keep their work from becoming monotonous, dull or unpleasant. The shop is preparing to make a change to two-shift operation, which will resolve the employment problem—something of no small importance at a time of change to a market economy, in addition to increasing the output of scarce accessory items.

Be the truth known, the Naval ship repair enterprise, which incidentally has long since celebrated its 100th anniversary, is no hotbed of scientific and technical technologies. It is—to put it in picturesque terms—a ship repair draft horse, a run-of-the-mill enterprise. Many problems must be resolved by applying nothing more than local resources.

The following is an example. One of the sections of the shop where the radio assemblers work makes choke coils. They previously were wound manually, by means of a simple machine; a specialist could make no more than 90 units a shift. Now in use is a semiautomatic machine developed and set up by Leonid Fedorovich Maksimenko; it has increased the output almost threefold. This, along with improved product quality and extended guaranty of all operations.

The process has proceeded on a course of natural development: To render the manufacturing operation profitable and improve quality, it has been necessary to introduce various technical improvements and seek

ways to lower production costs. For example, the introduction of the enterprise's own plastics, furniture and fabric shops has made it possible to resolve problems associated with other specialized production operations, in addition to expanding the mix of consumer goods.

However, it would be a mistake to conclude that the ship repair people have no problems. Foremost is interruptions in deliveries of raw materials and other materials. This however is common to the Union as a whole; there are also internal problems that can and should be resolved within the Armed Forces.

"Listen to this: Our plant produces 30,000 automobile antennas worth 400,000 rubles," said B. Kozlov. "Well, the same kind of antennas is being made by two neighboring military enterprises. This is a case of one maker 'stealing' an item from another maker. It is always easier to take the beaten path, of course, but what is the consumer supposed to do with all those antennas? The general picture is one whereby one out of four enterprises of our main directorate is stewing in its own juice, so to speak. I believe that it is necessary to coordinate their consumer goods production activities and at some place—hopefully—combine the efforts. Looking to the future, we would like to learn how to manufacture washing machines, but doing this on our own would be difficult."

Well, it seems to me that what was said above makes sense. Why should each and every place "reinvent the bicycle"? Especially now that the door has been opened to economic incentive, with a market that has not been saturated. That is something to which skill and initiative can be applied. The social welfare of a labor collective will be increasingly dependent on the degree of success of its operation. This being the case, it is necessary to build a firm foundation and set one's will to find a way.

#### Roundtable on Conversion Problems

914A0888A Moscow RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA  
in Russian 26 Jun 91 p 2

[Continuation of article in 7 June issue by Valeriy Badov: "Conversion: RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA Roundtable. 2. Get Out of the 'Defense' Casemates"]

[Text] Oleg SHISHKIN, USSR minister of general machine building:

I think you are well aware that our ministry works with space rocket technology. In terms of land- and sea-based missiles we lag behind neither the West nor the East. We have retained our strategic parity in space as well. I must state unequivocally that we are not behind. The country's defense capability is provided by ground-based strategic arms. I would like to discuss the problems that have now arisen for us as a result of conversion.

What are these problems? We are singling out the key ones in our collectives.

The first thing is not to allow unemployment at all.

Another crucial problem is not to dissipate the technological level and scientific potential we have achieved.

The third problem pertains to consumer goods, medical equipment, and the agro-industrial complex, catch up with the rest of the world.

This is the range of problems we have set for ourselves. How do we intend to solve them? The first field of activity is space. What is there? You know what poor communications we have in the country. Space communications could change the picture completely. Modern means of navigation for all kinds of rolling stock. Investigation of the earth's natural resources. The creation in space of materials and medicines which cannot be created on earth. We must not use space like a toy, a propaganda stunt.

We must get out of the shell of the defense industry emerge into broad daylight.

I must say that the last two years have opened our eyes to many things. For example, in the agro-industrial complex it is unthinkable to drop below the modern level. It was not without reason that the grain, confectionery, sugar, and soap industry, to which we must deliver equipment, ended up under the wing of the agro-industrial complex. Things have reached a point in the country where there are no skilled designers left, for example, in the confectionery industry. They have been transferred and all the equipment is foreign-made.

**RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA:** Your ministry was instructed to manufacture wheelchairs for individuals and also to create a design bureau for problems of prosthetic devices. The problem of the individual's wheelchairs was scheduled to be solved in 1991. Output was to be increased to 50,000 a year. There are disabled people in the country who have never been out in the street in their lives because they do not have wheelchairs. Have the design bureaus been created and how widely are wheelchairs being produced?

We delivered 6,000 prosthetic devices free of charge for the Afghan veterans. Last year we made 18,000. The cost of each runs into the thousands of rubles. One asks who can buy them at that price. Who and where? The social security department does not have that kind of money. We are working on the problem but it has not been solved yet. We made contact with the Americans and created a joint enterprise at the Leningrad Bolshevik plant. We are preparing capacities for 50,000 wheelchairs. We will make 20,000 of them next year, but the capacities will be for 50,000 and we will increase them in the future. The Ministry of Automotive Agricultural Machine Building, in turn, will make 50,000 of them. They say that 100,000 will be enough for the country, but nobody knows that for sure.

**RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA:** What development of processes of privatization of property will there be in your branch?

Today everything has been taken over for privatization. Well, all right, we will divide up what there is when we enter the market. But what is the point? When we enter the market this divided and dispersed property will collapse because it will not be ready for market relations. And all this privatized property will be either unnecessary or bankrupt or sold somewhere at less than its real value.

In this connection the major task today, when approaching the market, is not privatization and not dividing up our national economy, whose level, excuse me, is low enough already. We produce refrigerators, television sets, and a few other things. For our country this is a good level. But as soon as we enter the world market, these television sets will be worth pennies compared to the Japanese ones. And perhaps they will not be bought on the market at all. What is the point of a privatized enterprise if it produces antediluvian refrigerators? People will still avoid it, this property. Therefore, I think the main thing in preparing for the market in the defense sector of the economy should be to solve large problems, beginning with large-scale science. In order to drive a wedge into the world market it is necessary to have well equipped plants and powerful design bureaus. We still have to create them, and then you can privatize them as much as you like. Whether it be private or state or any other kind of property, it should be competitive. Otherwise there is no point in our entering the world market.

**A. ALEKSEYEV, designer:**

Many specialists who are quite skilled, especially young ones, are leaving defense industry enterprises for the cooperatives. They are leaving for joint ventures as well. They are motivated by the idea that they can go for a year or two and earn enough money for a dacha or a car and then return. But we are deprived of these specialists for good because they lose their skills. This is a great danger for defense industry enterprises—losing their specialists. And another critical problem is technical equipment which is removed from operation. The technical equipment is fairly modern and it can be used somewhere in the national economy. A good deal of military equipment, especially radar, will now no longer be used. And this equipment is being pilfered bit by bit. And the country will sustain losses again. These problems must be solved immediately: Which enterprises will salvage the equipment, which of it can be used in the enterprise.

**Yu. GLYBIN, economist:**

As one of the developers of the program and law on conversion, I would like to discuss the following.

First. The real process of conversion is becoming uncontrollable. Many people think that this is our last trump

card, which must be played in order to help the economy. I must assure you that this is not the case. Why? Those who went furthest into the development of the draft law on conversion, which meets the requirements of such a highly developed economy as that of the United States, were the Americans. But the Weiss draft law on conversion has not been adopted yet.

Studying the text of this draft law and observing the processes taking place in our country in matters of conversion of defense branches, one arrives at the idea that the most terrible thing that threatens us is haste. For example, with these volumes of arms production, and ours are quite comparable with America's, the curtailment of military programs is a painful thing. A very careful analysis shows that a billion in "withdrawn" budget allocations will produce nothing but losses for the national economy.

Why? Look at what makes up the billion's worth of "finished" and sold products. It is approximately 2 billion rubles [R] worth of "goods" because the amount is spread out many times prior to completion of the process. Let us say that Boris Mikhaylovich Belousov makes a large missile complex: He makes the missile himself, the launcher is provided by a different department, the control system by another, and so forth. From this 2 billion worth of "goods" the government will automatically fail to receive about R200 million in profit.

By reducing military allocations by a billion, we discharge from the plants tens of thousands of people to whom wages must be paid during their year and a half of retraining. It is also necessary to add to the economic incentive funds for those personnel who are not to blame for being left without work. Further. It is necessary to write off incomplete production, which must be salvaged after the cancellation of the state order. So it turns out that by cutting our expenditures on the defense industry by a billion rubles, we will create "overhead expenses" that are equal if not greater.

When the plants have to be retooled to produce consumer goods instead of arms, no return can be expected before the third year. Certain rash economists ask: Why not close down the two tank plants altogether? There are 35,000 people working at one and 35,000 at the other. Thus the losses from this act will exceed the budget savings several times over, plus we will have lost a unique production.

Sometimes critics of conversion ask: But why agricultural and light industry and not the production of dry cargo ships and long distance liners? Because there is nobody in the country who can perform this piece of the work: create a complex of modern equipment in the country for the processing branches, light industry, and medicine.

Reducing the series production of the military output also jams things up. When tank production was curtailed

sharply, it immediately ended up with each tank leaving through the gates of the plant costing twice as much.

The question arises: What are we to do with all this written-off property? An enormous program has been developed for salvaging the arms eliminated as a result of the Vienna treaties. Salvaging is a very new and promising thing. The gains from this run into the billions of rubles. Organizational structures have also been developed for the complex of work for salvaging military equipment.

**O. SHISHKIN** People frequently speak about the wasteful expenditures on space study. Yet America's NASA, which engages solely in civilian space study, has 24,000 employees, but, I note, it does not have its own plants. Only research centers and institutes. NASA is not autonomously financed, in the way we define it, but receives money from the budget. For this year it received \$14 billion. This is addressed to those critics who advise rashly curtailing our national space programs in order to ease the burden of the budget.

Materials for the roundtable were prepared for printing by Valeriy Badov.

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